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ABSTRACT 
The “official” narrative of the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola, or FNLA) as presented by FNLA documents and scholars such as 
Christine Messiant and Inge Brinkman, paints a picture of a liberation movement that 
fragmented and lost its credibility over time, from its inception in 1962 to its demise in 1978. 
In part, this was due to the actions, or rather inaction of its authoritarian and highly paranoid 
leader Holden Roberto. In contrast, however, former FNLA fighters I have interviewed 
remember the FNLA and Holden Roberto as having been the righteous and just vanguard of 
the Angolan struggle against Portuguese colonialism, and later against the MPLA Soviet 
“puppet” regime. For the ex-FNLA fighters, the FNLA stood for progress, inclusivity, and 
justice, to the extent that many of these former fighters have proclaimed their continued loyalty 
to the FNLA to this day. By making use of concepts such as memory, myth, as well as senses 
of place, belonging and identity, this thesis will examine these two divergent narratives, and 
will posit that the respondents’ reflections on the FNLA are ultimately tied to their present 
identities as forgotten and betrayed war veterans.  
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MAP OF ANGOLA 
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* Department of Foreign Affairs of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, G.R.A.E. Actualities Nr. 
2, 1970, Arquivo Mario Pinto de Andrade, 04308.004.019, Casa Comum, Fundação Mario Soares. 
* 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1962, an independence movement calling itself the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola, or FNLA, was formed in what was then Léopoldville, now Kinshasa. The FNLA 
purported to be fighting for the liberation of Angola from Portuguese colonial rule, and was 
one of three independence movements, the others being the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola, MPLA, and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, 
who engaged the Portuguese colonial regime in a war of independence that would last until 
1974. Throughout the Angolan war for independence, the FNLA was regarded as being the 
strongest independence movement in terms of troop and weapon numbers and enjoyed 
widespread international recognition. However, by late 1975, it was clear that the MPLA, 
assisted by Cuba and the Soviet Union, had turned the tables on the FNLA, and was able to 
assert itself as the government of an independent Angola. This was challenged by the FNLA 
and UNITA, and the three parties engaged each other in a brutal and long civil war that was to 
last until 2002.  However, due to various reasons, the FNLA collapsed in 1978 and became 
insignificant for the remainder of the conflict. Also in 1975, several FNLA fighters who had 
been stationed in the south of Angola and formed part of an abortive FNLA - South African 
coalition that aimed to wrest the capital, Luanda, away from the MPLA, found themselves 
abandoned by their commander, and cut off from other FNLA forces in the north of Angola. 
Facing attacks by MPLA, Cuban and UNITA troops, many of these FNLA fighters fled to 
refugee camps on the border with what was then South West Africa. From there, some joined 
the South African Defence Force to be deployed as 32 Battalion, a counter-insurgency force 
that operated in the border region until the unit was relocated to the South African town of 
Pomfret in 1989 in preparation for Namibia’s independence in 1990.2 
                                                          
2 Bothma, L. “Buffalo Soldiers: South Africa’s 32 Battalion”, L. J. Bothma, Bloemfontein.; Nortje, P. The 
Terrible Ones: A Complete History of 32 Battalion, Volume 1, Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2012. 
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Given the significant role that the FNLA has played in Angolan history during the mid-
twentieth century, it is surprising that it has been accorded so little scholarly attention. 
Although it is often mentioned as part of the broader literature on the Angolan war for 
independence and civil war, see for instance the body of scholarly work by John Marcum, René 
Pélissier, Douglass Wheeler, David Birmingham, Linda Heywood and Christine Messiant, to 
name but a few, the overall history of the FNLA has not been dealt with in any particular detail. 
The MPLA and UNITA, on the other hand, have enjoyed a great deal more academic attention. 
Scholars such as Inge Brinkman and Justin Pearce have explored to what extent factors such 
as ideology, identity, ethnicity and regionalism have influenced the MPLA and UNITA’s 
political, social and military behaviour during the independence and civil wars.3 Even in studies 
where the FNLA is accorded a more central focus, such as Jean Martial Arsénne Mbah’s 
account which looks at the political rivalries between the FNLA and MPLA, the FNLA is dealt 
with in relation to another movement rather than in its own right.4 It must be noted, however, 
that given its limited scope, this thesis will not endeavour to provide a complete and detailed 
history and analysis of the FNLA. 
 
Rather, I will focus on oral history interviews that I have conducted with a group of former 
FNLA fighters now living in Pomfret, specifically looking at how this group speak of and relate 
to the FNLA in the present. One former FNLA fighter, Pedro Manuel, whom I interviewed for 
this thesis, had the following to say about the FNLA and its leader: 
                                                          
3 See for instance: Brinkman, I. A War for People: Civilians, Mobility and Legitimacy in South-East Angola 
during the MPLA’s War for Independence, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, Köln, 2005.; Pearce, J. Control, ideology 
and identity in civil war: The Angolan Central Highlands 1965-2002, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 
Oxford, 2011. 
4 Mbah, J. As rivalidades políticas entre a Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) e o Movimento 
Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) : 1961-1975, Mayamba Editora, Luanda, 2010. 
8 
 
Holden Roberto of the FNLA […] [was] fighting for freedom. FNLA is the father of the revolution 
for freedom. […] We wanted a united government, all together for the same objectives. […] Holden 
Roberto wanted to unite all the groups and people.5  
The above statement portrays the FNLA and its leader Holden Roberto as having been just and 
virtuous, striving to unite all Angolans in the fight for freedom. This narrative reflects the 
general mood of other FNLA veterans that I have interviewed. In contrast, scholarly accounts 
of the FNLA, as well as official FNLA documents, provide a different narrative, namely that 
of the rise and fall of a movement that slowly disintegrated and lost its credibility from its 
inception in 1962, until its demise in 1978. According to this view, the FNLA lacked 
organisational capacity and was being led by a leader who was paranoid, autocratic, and 
accused of widespread misappropriation of FNLA equipment and funds. As such, the key 
question that this thesis will explore is:  How and why was the myth and memory of an 
unblemished FNLA produced and sustained by the FNLA veterans of Pomfret? 
 
To address this question, I will focus on the respondents, their particular experiences, and how 
they have come to grapple with these. I will argue that the respondents have experienced several 
stages of dislocation and processes of displacement: having experienced internal displacement 
during the Angolan war for independence; having fled to refugee camps after their military 
defeat in 1975; and having been relocated to South Africa from Namibia in 1989. The veterans 
of Pomfret were further subjected to forced removal attempts in 2008, and continue to live a 
life in limbo, with the prospect of losing their current homes being ever present. From the 
interviews, it is clear that feelings of despair, and unresolved loss and fear, have come to 
dominate their everyday lives. It is within this context that I argue their romanticisation of the 
                                                          
5Comment by former FNLA combatant Pedro Manuel, who had joined the FNLA in 1967 at the age of 19. 
Interview between Pedro Manuel and Christian Claassen, 10 September 2014, Pomfret. 
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FNLA has taken shape, and I explore this by making use of notions of militarised masculinity, 
as well as gendered loss and dislocation. Furthermore, I will draw on notions of power 
throughout this thesis, relating not only to the power relations in my fieldwork and my 
subsequent interpretation and analysis but also how respondents have struggled with a loss of 
social potency as they attempt to cling to fragments of power which has eroded over time. 
Moreover, I will look at the relationship between public and private remembering and 
forgetting, and will posit that the myth of an unblemished FNLA promoted by the Pomfret 
veterans can be seen as a response to counter the MPLA and ANC governments’ master 
narratives which actively exclude the FNLA and 32 Battalion. So too, understanding how 
respondents have wrestled with limited and constrained choices throughout their lives is a 
central theme. 
 
It is also worth noting that the topic of this thesis underwent several major changes during my 
studies. I had initially aimed to use the FNLA and the respondents I had interviewed as a case 
study with which to problematise the greed versus grievance debate as presented by Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, with the latter scholars positing that participation in civil war 
stemmed from one’s greed to profit from the conflict. 6 However, after some time and several 
discussions with my supervisors, I came to realise that the greed versus grievance dichotomy 
was beginning to constrain my research. I also came to realise that the scope of the project that 
I was determined to continue with, namely ascertaining why the veterans interviewed for this 
thesis chose to join the FNLA, was far too broad. I could only hope to arrive at very thin and 
questionable conclusions based on my limited research, and drawing mostly on research 
conducted by other scholars, which contained biases and problems as well. It is through this 
                                                          
6 Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 56, no. 4, 
2004. 
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process, with the assistance of my supervisors, that I came to settle on the present topic. I had 
become aware of the two distinct FNLA narratives that were beginning to reveal themselves, 
and it became clear that the research that I had conducted lent itself to an oral history approach, 
in order to explore how these two narratives relate to each other. It is with this in mind that the 
next section of this introduction will look at oral history methodology in more detail, in 
preparation for later chapters of this thesis. 
 
Methodology 
Oral history interviews form the basis of this thesis. More specifically, I conducted semi-
structured thematic interviews with the aim of asking specific questions regarding the 
interviewees’ experiences of the FNLA. This was done within a wider framework of a life 
history interview, with the intent of tracking the respondents’ experiences with the FNLA over 
space and time. According to Robert Atkinson, “the life story interview does not necessarily 
seek historical truth, [but rather] the storyteller’s version of or perspective on what he or she 
remembers happened, […] what the respondents want to tell.” For Atkinson, this in itself “tells 
us a good deal about what we really want to know.”7  Accordingly, respondents were asked to 
recall their early childhood, their adolescent years, as well as their early adult years. Thus, 
respondents were asked to recall “life phases” in a chronological way.8 Furthermore, while 
respondents were asked when they first encountered the FNLA, when they had joined, and how 
they experienced the FNLA, they were also asked how their closest relatives perceived the 
FNLA, as well as how the FNLA interacted with their immediate communities. As such, 
interviews did not attempt to establish an “objective series of events”, but much rather sought 
                                                          
7 Atkinson, R. “The Life Story Interview”, in Gubrium, J., and Holstein J. Handbook of Interview Research: 
Context and Method, Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 135-136. 
8 Plummer, K. “Getting and Doing Life Stories”, in Plummer, K. (ed.) Documents of Life 2: An Invitation to a 
Critical Humanism, Sage Publishers, London, 2000, pp. 128-133. 
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to understand how respondents made sense of the world in which they lived.9 The above can 
thus be understood to be an interactionist approach, which Silverman describes as seeking to 
“generate data which gives an authentic insight into people’s experiences”.10 
 
Respondents were requested to sign a consent form, allowing me to use their interviews for 
this thesis, as well as permitting the storage of their interviews at the University of Cape Town 
Libraries. Before signing, I explained what exactly the interviews would be used for, as well 
as who could access the interviews once stored at UCT Libraries. Respondents were given the 
opportunity to make amendments to the consent form before signing. The bulk of the interviews 
were conducted in Portuguese, with the aid of a translator. Interviews conducted in English 
were transcribed by myself while I made use of the services of a translator to have the 
Portuguese interviews transcribed. The next sections will take a closer look at oral history, by 
discussing methodological issues that often accompany an oral history approach, while also 
looking at concepts such as memory, myth, and senses of self, place and belonging in more 
detail.  
 
What is Oral History? 
Although borrowed from memory and refugee studies, concepts such as memory, myth, as well 
as senses of place, belonging and identity have come to feature strongly in oral history. These 
ideas will form a key part of later chapters, which will endeavour to analyse and make sense 
of why the FNLA veterans interviewed for this thesis speak about the FNLA in the way they 
do. As such, below, I will briefly outline and discuss them in more detail. Broadly speaking, 
                                                          
9 Plummer, “Getting and Doing Life Stories”, p. 129. 
10 Silverman, D. Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction, Sage 
Publications, London, 1993, p. 25. 
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oral history can be seen as being a process, a knowledge transaction (mostly in the form of an 
interview) between a researcher, and a respondent. Alessandro Portelli, for instance, notes that 
oral history is a “[…] sequence of verbal processes and constructs generated by cultural and 
personal encounters in the context of fieldwork between the narrator(s) and the historian 
[…].”11As such, the relationship between the two (or more) parties participating in the 
interview process will invariably shape how the interviewer and interviewee interact with each 
other, and various factors may influence the outcome of the interview.  
 
For instance, Minkley and Rassool point out the “[…] difficulties of the changing ‘knowledge 
transactions’ between interviewer and interviewee over time, the differences of age, colour, 
class, and gender, the issues of language and translation and those of subjectivity, memory and 
reliability”.12  However, as Valerie Yow argues, these factors, which include culture, ethnicity, 
language and gender, influence not only how the interviewees interact with the interviewer and 
vice versa, but also impact on how the researcher shapes his or her research agenda, in the ways 
the researcher “[…] ask[s] questions and respond[s] to narrators and interpret[s] and evaluate[s] 
what they say”. 13 The above is particularly relevant for this thesis, and I will explore this matter 
in more detail in chapter three. 
 
Other key points to take into consideration are the aspects of interpretation and analysis. 
Historians need to be aware of the risk of collapsing interviews “[…] into historical realist 
                                                          
11 Portelli, A., The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue, University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 1997, p. 3. 
12 Minkley, G., and Rassool, C. “Orality, Memory and Social History in South Africa”, in Nuttall, S., and 
Coetzee, C. (eds.) Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa, Oxford University Press, Cape 
Town, 1998, p. 96. 
13 Yow, V. “‘Do I Like Them Too Much?’: Effects of the Oral History Interview on the Interviewer and Vice-
Versa”, in Perks, R., and Thomson, A. (eds.), The Oral History Reader (2nd Edition), Routledge, London, 2006, 
p. 57. 
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narrative[s]”.14 This applies especially to the writing of transcripts as well as the final analysis 
of the interviews, where “oral transcripts, their construction, and their re-presentation in history 
typically reflect a process of selection, editing, embellishing, and deleting the material of 
individual memory […]”.15 Kum-Kum Bhavnani argues that “knowledge is socially 
constructed”, and hence, is subject to certain power relations.16  The very act of recording 
interviews, transcribing, and later interpreting, analysing and writing, is a form of knowledge 
construction and production. Historians exercise their power over the interviewee as they edit, 
shape, cut out and splice together the interviews to suit their research agenda. These power 
relations extend to interviewee-interviewer dynamics within the settings of the interviews. As 
Portelli states: “The life story as a full, coherent oral narrative does not exist in nature; it’s a 
synthetic product of social science […]. […] oral history begins in the orality of the narrator 
but is directed towards (and concluded by) the written text of the historian.”17 
 
Memory 
The notion of memory has become a major dialogical feature in the work of oral historians. As 
Tim Keegan notes, “[…] human memory is given to error, misconception, elision, distortion, 
elaboration and downright fabrication.”18  As such, oral narratives need to be located within 
and in relation to “[…] memory and tradition, myth, and legend, in the making of […] 
identities”.19  It is equally important to note that memory is by no means a static repository of 
facts or a final product, but rather, an active and continuous construction in the present, that 
                                                          
14 Minkley and Rassool, “Orality, Memory and Social History in South Africa”, p. 98-99. 
15 Minkley and Rassool, “Orality, Memory and Social History in South Africa”, p. 99. 
16 Bhavnani, K. “‘What’s Power Got To Do With It?’: Empowerment and Social Research”, in Parker, I., and 
Shottel, J. (eds.), Deconstructing Social Psychology, Routledge, London and New York, 1990, p. 142. 
17 Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia, pp. 4-5. 
18 Quoted in Minkley and Rassool, “Orality, Memory and Social History in South Africa”, p. 91. 
19 Minkley and Rassool, “Orality, Memory and Social History in South Africa”, p. 96. 
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draws on the past, present, and conceptions of the future. As such, memory, as well as identity, 
is constantly negotiated and renegotiated. 
 
 As Sean Field notes, “[…] visual traces and emotions are framed as memories through 
people’s imagination and movements within physical, social, and cultural landscapes.”20   
According to Field, the interview process involves the “co-creation of oral histories”.21  In this 
sense, the oral history interview is much more of an inter-view, or an exchange of views, where 
the respondent gives meaning to visual memories through narration in an oral form, and the 
researcher receives these words, imbued with emotions and feelings, and reconstructs and 
imagines the world the respondent has described. Similarly, Henry Greenspan notes that the 
retelling of someone’s story is an active process of construction while Abrams refers to 
memory as being an active process involving the creation of meanings.22 
 
Furthermore, as Abrams notes, a researcher’s questions act as cues, “resulting in the 
respondent’s retrieval of a series of memories which are then remembered and narrated.”23 In 
this sense, memories are constructed in the present, as an interviewee draws on past 
experiences, links them together, interprets them, and chooses how to ascribe meaning to these 
memories through language. Memory is therefore by no means fixed, but fluid. Invariably, the 
physical context of the interview setting, as well as the researcher-respondent dynamics 
influences how the respondent chooses to narrate his/her memories. This does not mean that 
                                                          
20 Field, S. Oral History, Community, and Displacement: Imagining Memories in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 8. 
21 Field, Oral History, Community, and Displacement, p. 10. 
22 Greenspan, H. “Collaborative Interpretation of Survivor’s Accounts: A Radical Challenge to Conventional 
Practice”, in Holocaust Studies: A Journal of Culture and History, vol. 17, no. 1, 2011, p. 87.; Abrams, L. Oral 
History Theory, Routlege, London, 2010, p. 79. 
23 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 84. 
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“truths” are not conveyed, but rather, it is important to note how these “truths” are shaped by 
various factors, such as power relations, culture and memory. 
 
Myth 
Tied to the concept of memory, is the concept of myth. However, rather than seeing myth as a 
fallible byproduct of memory, Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson point out that myth is, in 
fact, a fundamental component of human thought. Samuel and Thompson argue that rather than 
seeing myths as “blurred experience [and] as disorderly masses of fragments”, myths must be 
seen as accounts molded “[…] through a process of narrative shaping in which both conscious 
and unconscious, myth and reality, played significant parts.”24 As such, these myths are “[…] 
embedded in real experience: both growing from it, and helping to shape its perception.”25 
Samuel and Thompson further note that myths act as tools to anchor one’s sense of identity 
and place in the past, a world that has been lost, “and that it is the omissions and shaping which 
make these stories also myth.”26 However, rather than myth only aiding one to negotiate senses 
of self and place in relation to the past, myths also act as tools that enable one to negotiate the 
present. As Michael Roper points out, reconstructing the past can act as a means to mediate 
death and loss, and that it can aid in restoring the connection between past and present.27 Hence, 
“[…] myths are a way not only of structuring memory, but also of exploring experience”, and 
that one must consider myths “[…] not only as special clues to the past, but equally as windows 
on the making and remaking of individual and collective consciousness, in which both fact and 
fantasy, past and present, each has its part.”28 
                                                          
24 Samuel, R., and Thompson, P. (eds.), The Myths We Live By, Routledge, London and New York, 1990, pp. 4-
5. 
25 Samuel and Thompson, The Myths We Live By, p. 6. 
26 Samuel and Thompson, The Myths We Live By, pp. 8-9. 
27 Roper, M. “The Unconscious Work of History”, in Cultural and Social History, vol. 11, no. 2, 2014, p. 181. 
28 Samuel and Thompson, The Myths We Live By, pp. 13, 21. 
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In his influential study concerning the violent clashes between factory workers and police in 
the Italian town of Terni in 1949, it struck Alessandro Portelli that some of the accounts by 
respondents he had interviewed concerning the death of one of the factory workers at the hands 
of the police were so varied, and did not match up to the official report on the worker’s death. 
However, rather than dismissing these accounts entirely based on their lack of reliability, 
Portelli argues that these myths are significant in that they “[…] became the ground upon which 
collective memory and imagination built a cluster of tales, symbols, legends, and imaginary 
reconstructions.”29 Like Samuel and Thompson, Portelli argues that myths are valuable in that 
they “[…] lead us through, and beyond facts to their meanings.”30 Portelli goes on to point out 
that the narratives respondents convey are never entirely consistent: “Most narrators seek to 
confer coherence to their stories by adhering to a (relatively) consistent principle or ‘mode’ of 
selection: the sphere of politics; the life of the community; and personal experiences.” 
However, “[…] a given event can be placed in more than one mode.”31 As Cathrine Brun notes, 
“[…] fantasy becomes a social practice, and imagination becomes part of the construction of 
people’s biographies which in turn become partly imagined lives […]”.32  Another point 
Portelli makes is that there is much information to be extracted from seemingly “false” 
testimonies, as “[t]he importance of oral testimony may not lie in its adherence to fact, but 
rather in its departure from it, as imagination, and desire emerge. Therefore, there are no ‘false’ 
oral sources.”33 
                                                          
29 Portelli, A. The Death of Luigi Trastulli and other Stories: Form and Weaving in Oral History, State 
University of Washington Press, New York, 1991, p. 1. 
30 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and other Stories, p. 2. 
31 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and other Stories, p. 21. 
32 Brun, C. “Reterritorializing the Relationship between People and Place in Refugee Studies”, Geografiska 
Annaler, vol 83, no. 1, 2001, p. 19. 
33 Portelli, A. “What Makes Oral History Different”, in Perks, R., and Thomson, A. (eds.), The Oral History 
Reader, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 68. 
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Senses of Place, Belonging and Identity 
Memory and myth are particularly relevant when conducting interviews with migrants and 
refugees. While the participants in this study are not refugees as such, they have been displaced 
from their homeland. Two related concepts that form a key part of the vast literature on refugee 
and migrant studies are senses of place and senses of belonging, both of which contribute to 
one’s sense of self and identity. As Meritt Buyer points out, one’s sense of identity is “actively 
and strategically constructed in relation to multiple spaces for multiple purposes”.34  More so, 
forced displacement and migration constantly pushes one to renegotiate one’s sense of identity, 
drawing from past experiences and the life left behind, and the new and often hostile and 
unfamiliar environment one is faced with. For Buyer, migrants and refugees must “find a way 
to incorporate their histories and often painful memories into the present.” 35  
 
In her study of the Lithuanian refugee community in Los Angeles, Liucija Baškauskas notes 
how a sense of community becomes important for refugees and migrants to maintain a sense 
of belonging and place. Baškauskas further observes that asserting one’s ethnic identity through 
cultural and community rituals becomes important to reasserting one’s connection and sense 
of belonging to an ethnically homogenous refugee and migrant community.36  Thus, she notes 
that events such as church services on Sundays not only offer an opportunity for community 
members to interact but also fulfils the important role of reconstructing and maintaining a sense 
of belonging that attempts to re-establish bonds to a life left behind.37  In this sense, one’s sense 
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of place draws both on the life left behind, as well as the ethnic community that has been 
constructed in the host country. Importantly, however, senses of place cannot be seen as being 
static and refugees are not in a passive pathological state of being.38  Cathrine Brun reminds us 
that even those that have experienced forced migration are able to reconstruct senses of place 
and belonging, drawing on the life that was lost.39  As such, rather than arguing that refugees 
need to be either integrated or repatriated, one must realise that people’s relationships to 
identity, culture and place are fluid and that through active rituals of remembrance and 
imagining, refugees and migrants attempt to gain control over place and territory.40   
 
As such, one is constantly in the process of re-negotiating one’s present sense of self with 
reference to one’s past. As Knudsen states: “To secure a positive feeling of self (who I am) 
through identity management, the individual often tries to negotiate on the basis of past, now 
lost, positions (who I was) rather than present conditions (who I have become).”41 Furthermore, 
Merrit Buyer states that by holding on to a refugee identity, as someone who is not settled, 
“[…] they retain […] the possibility of a better future […]”. Moreso, Buyer argues that 
“Remembrance, in essence, points to the incompleteness of the present, of the unfilled desires 
that the individual has lived within his struggle to survive.”42 In conclusion, as Cathrine Brun 
notes, senses of place and belonging are not static, but are continuously negotiated and 
renegotiated, and constructed and reconstructed.43 
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From the above, it is clear that concepts such as memory and myth are invaluable tools that can 
be used to analyse and interpret a person’s sense of place and belonging to reveal clues as to 
how interviewees relate to them over space and time. As Sean Field argues, “People do not 
face the present as an isolated and empty space, sandwiched between the past and future.” 
Rather, “the present” is “[…] a complex series of interlocking histories whose interactions have 
to be re-constructed […].”44 By drawing on concepts such as memory and myth, it becomes 
clear that one’s sense of self and belonging is influenced not only by one’s past but also by 
one’s present, as well as one’s sense of future. As such, “consciously and unconsciously, 
identities allow people to deploy strategies for dealing with the conflicted demands of daily 
life.”45 Chapter three will draw on the above themes in more detail, and will note how they 
have shaped my research for this thesis 
 
Thesis Structure 
The aim of this thesis is twofold: for one, it will seek to locate the history of the FNLA within 
the wider context of Angolan history up until the second half of the twentieth century. This 
will enable me to locate the origins of the FNLA within the context of Angolan history and the 
history of the region, and will also allow me to track the FNLA’s rise and decline over time. 
Secondly, I will analyse the interviews which I have conducted for this thesis with reference to 
concepts such as memory, myth and senses of self, place and belonging, as well as masculinity, 
nationalism and militarism. This will allow me to contrast the two opposing narratives of the 
FNLA: the first consisting of the scholarly narrative that presents the rise and decline of the 
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FNLA while the second consists of recollections by former FNLA soldiers whom I have 
interviewed for this thesis.  
 
Chapter one will provide a brief history of Angola, from its pre-colonial origins, up until the 
mid-twentieth century. This is followed by chapter two, which will provide an overview of the 
history of the FNLA within the broader context of Angolan colonial history, ranging from the 
formation of early political organisations in the 1940s and 1950s, up until the FNLA’s demise 
during the late 1970s. Chapter two will also present the first of the two FNLA narratives, 
namely that of a movement in steady decline, plagued by infighting, as well as a lack of 
leadership and organisational planning, among other aspects. More specifically, chapter two 
will aim to track how the FNLA came to disintegrate and lose its credibility. This will be done 
by drawing on official FNLA documents, as well as secondary scholarly literature on the 
FNLA. In chapter three, the Pomfret community, where the interviews for this thesis were 
conducted, will be looked at more closely. Not only will this chapter provide a brief historical 
overview of the community, but it will also include a research report, where I will present and 
discuss issues of particular interest that I have encountered during my research. Chapter four 
will then move on to the second of the FNLA narratives, namely the recollections of the former 
FNLA soldiers, which present the FNLA as having been a just organisation that was at the 
vanguard of the fight for Angolan liberation. Chapter four will also provide selected interview 
vignettes, and will then analyse sections of the interviews in more detail by drawing on 
concepts such as memory, myth, and senses of self, place and belonging, in an attempt to make 
better sense of why the FNLA veterans chose to talk about the FNLA in the way they did. 
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CHAPTER 1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANGOLA   
As will be discussed in chapter two, the FNLA had its origins within the Bakongo nationalist 
movement in northern Angola during the early twentieth century. Ethnicity and tradition played 
an important role in shaping its nationalist discourse, which initially revolved around the idea 
of re-establishing the old Kongo Kingdom. Given this focus on Angola’s pre-twentieth century 
history, this chapter will provide a brief history of Angola, with reference to the history of the 
region as well as the context of Portuguese colonialism up until the early twentieth century. 
This will allow us to trace a few key developments which would later lead up to the Angolan 
war for independence. Specifically, I will explore how regional as well as international events 
impacted on Angolan society and created the conditions that allowed for the outbreak of 
violence that will be looked at more closely in chapter two. 
 
Ethnicity and Tribalism 
Before continuing, it is worth mentioning a few conceptual problems relating to the terms 
ethnicity and tribe. Terrence Ranger argues that Europeans misunderstood the realities of pre-
colonial Africa. In contrast to the notion that African societies were living in an unchanging, 
ancient context, within a framework of hierarchical status, Ranger contends that customs were 
flexible, and provided a means not only to maintain a sense of community but were also able 
to adapt to changing contexts.46 So too, identities were by no means fixed, and individuals were 
able to move in an out of multiple identities. According to Ranger, “the boundaries of the 
‘tribal’ polity and the hierarchies of authority within them did not define conceptual horizons 
of Africans.”47 Communities underwent constant changes, which included multiple processes 
of assimilation, disassociation, within a shifting and fluid environment. As such, present day 
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African ‘tribes’ need to be seen as colonial constructs, the result of a desire to fix and 
immobilise communities to facilitate control and extraction. Ranger notes that there had been 
a “conscious determination on the part of the colonial authorities to ‘re-establish’ order and 
security and a sense of community by means of defining and enforcing ‘tradition’.”48 
Customary laws and land rights were thus the results of beliefs that tribes were cultural units 
that possessed common languages, social systems and laws, based on kinship ties. According 
to Ranger, this process led to the creation of a “new and unchanging body of tradition”.49 
Moreover, Africans began to appropriate these invented traditions to cope within the colonial 
context, to the extent that tradition was used to defend and maintain the authority of leaders. 50  
 
Like Ranger, Susama Mohanty points out that the term tribalism has generally been understood 
“as an aggregate of surviving archaic institutions and organisations associated with the tribal 
system, i.e. with a system of kinship, forms of inheritance, traditional ceremonies and customs, 
the strength of blood relationships, a sense of ethnic solidarity and so on.”51 Mohanty goes on 
to state that through various sets of relationships between these communities, or tribes, ethnic 
groups are formed, with these relationships founded on territorially based political unity. 
However, Mohanty is quick to add that tribes cannot be seen as “permanent crystalline 
structures”, and that tribes are rather complex unions of various sub-groups, be they families, 
age groups, kinship bodies, clans or villages, which all come together, and form components 
of the ethnic group.52 Furthermore, one must realise that these groups are not static, while 
rather, “there has been a constant merging, penetration, assimilation and hiving off over the 
centuries, whilst many of them have moved their location under the pressure of land, hunger, 
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shifting cultivation or external danger.”53 Thus, according to Mohanty, tribes derive their 
strength from a sense of belonging which provides all its members with a sense of security and 
that this sense of belonging is derived from common religious and social activities as well as 
common interests and values. 54 As we will see in chapter two, this becomes particularly 
relevant during the early to mid-twentieth century, when forms of ethnic nationalism evolved 
that drew on tradition and tribal affiliation to create a sense of legitimacy and authority. 
 
 
Pre-Colonial West Central Africa 
The Angola that we know today is in part a product of the Berlin conference of 1884-85, with 
the territorial borders that Angola has inherited being a product of this conference. However, 
this colonial construct is just that, an arbitrary amalgamation of various ethnic groups, dividing 
pre-colonial ethnic territories, leaving parts of ethnic groups in Angola while parts were 
incorporated into other newly established colonial constructs, divided by arbitrarily drawn 
borders.  To an extent, the Angolan colonial construct has obscured the pre-colonial history of 
the region, and it is for this reason that the following section will look at this history in more 
detail.  
 
The first inhabitants of the region were the San hunter-gatherers, who were gradually displaced 
by the arrival of Bantu-speaking groups sometime between 1000 CE and the thirteenth century 
CE. These groups brought with them technologies and knowledge such as iron work, animal 
husbandry and agriculture, with these Bantu groups soon coming to dominate the region and 
beginning to form distinct ethnolinguistic groups. 55 As Christopher Ehret notes, by 1100 CE, 
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the first states began to be formed around the lower Congo River in South-Central Africa.56 To 
the north of the region, just south of the Congo River, the Kongo people established their 
kingdom. Also in the north, closer to the coast below the Dande River, the Kimbundu 
established their territory. The Umbundu established themselves on the west coast and the 
Benguela highlands, while the Lunda-Chokwe and Nganguela groups established themselves 
to the east on the central highlands, or planalto, west of the Zambezi River. In the south, the 
Nhaneca-Humbe, Ambo, San and Herero established their territories, straddling the Kunene 
River.57 Importantly, as Ehret points out, there existed a constant movement of people, 
knowledge, ideas and technologies in the area, encouraged by widespread trade relations which 
saw the trading of copper, raffia cloth, and iron goods. For the kings and chiefs of the time, 
controlling and drawing tribute from the movement of people and goods formed a vital part of 
creating wealth and political power. Furthermore, legitimacy was gained from being able to act 
as arbiters to settle disputes, and their ability to create allegiances with neighbouring 
communities. 58 The following paragraphs will look at the largest of these groups in more detail, 
being the Kongo, Kimbundu, Ovimbundu, Lunda-Chokwe and Nganguela. It is important to 
note that these groups cannot be seen as primordial, fixed remnants of the past, but are much 
rather constructs of the colonial era.  
 
The Kongo Kingdom, one of the most powerful in the region, has its roots in the fourteenth 
century when several smaller kingdoms came together under one king.59 The Kongo kingdom 
is, therefore, a geopolitical construct, having been established in what is now present-day 
south-western Democratic Republic of Congo and parts of the Republic of Congo, and the 
northernmost parts of present day Angola. Their capital, Mbanza Kongo, was situated south of 
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the Congo River in present day Angola. 60 The power of the Kongo Kingdom and its king was 
derived from controlling the local trade networks, with copper and raffia cloth being some of 
the key commodities to be produced by the kingdom. Straddling the lower Congo River, the 
kingdom was well positioned to control this vital trade artery, controlling the movement of 
goods and people between the Atlantic coast and the Central African interior. Its control of the 
coastal areas also meant that it had a monopoly on the access to cowry shells, which were used 
as the main form of currency at the time. As such, the Kongo kingdoms influence extended far 
beyond its borders. This wealth and regional influence allowed the Kongo king to bring smaller 
neighbouring communities to the north and south under the kingdom’s hegemony, enabling it 
to extract tributes and compliance. However, rather than seeing the Kongo as being a 
homogenous society, Ehret points out that it was much more an entity based on allegiances 
between distinctly different communities, tied together by mutually beneficial alliances. 61  
 
The Kimbundu to the south of the Kongo were almost twice the size of the Kongo kingdom, 
counting some twenty distinct communities as members and occupying a large swathe of the 
western coastline. Like the Kongo, the Kimbundu relied mainly on an agricultural economy 
and traded with neighbouring groups. 62 In contrast, the Umbundu group established 
themselves on the central highlands or planalto. Henderson argues that the Umbundu are more 
homogenous than other groups, and also occupy the largest area of any other group.63 The 
Umbundu economy was primarily based on agriculture, and also depended on trade with 
neighbouring groups. While the smallest political unit was formed by the village, counting 
between 100-1000 villagers, villages fell under the jurisdiction of numerous sub-kingdoms, 
and these, in turn, were ruled by various kingdoms. Henderson notes for instance that the largest 
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kingdom, Bailundu, ruled over some 200 sub-kingdoms, with these ruling over some 300 
villages each.64 As such, although ethnolinguistically homogenous, the Umbundu where 
politically fractured. Due to their central location and size, the Umbundu came to dominate the 
central African trade routes, and Umbundu became an important trade language. Also, the 
Umbundu were very adaptable and learnt to adjust to various cultures that they encountered on 
their trade routes.65  
 
The above three groups make up about 70% of present day Angola’s population. A further 
notable ethnolinguistic group is the Lunda-Chokwe group. The group is made up of seven 
constituent groups, with the Lunda and Chokwe groups being the most dominant. They have 
come to dominate the north-east of present-day Angola. The Lunda were late arrivals to the 
area, having been sent by the Lunda Empire to expand their sphere of influence in the 
seventeenth century. These Lunda emissaries encountered the Chokwe, who were a group 
consisting of twelve clans ruled by chiefs. The Lunda imposed themselves on the Chokwe and 
founded kingdoms along the lines of the Lunda Empire. This period was also marked by 
Chokwe resistance, with Chokwe chiefs refusing to pay tributes to the Lunda Empire.66  
 
The last ethnolinguistic group I will mention are the Nganguela. The Nganguela are a western 
construct, clumping together some 20 distinct groups, which others have also incorporated into 
the Lunda-Chokwe group. The Nganguela occupy present day south-east Angola west of the 
Zambezi, and their economy consisted of agriculture, hunting and fishing. Henderson notes 
that the Nganguela are the most heterogeneous of all groups in Angola, and argues that as its 
constituent tribes were so isolated, they did not feature strongly in Angola’s history.67  
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What becomes apparent from the Nganguela group, in particular, is how Western linguists and 
ethnologists have lumped together different tribes and have created western ethnolinguistic 
constructs. Importantly, however, these constructs, taught over decades in colonial schools, 
have been adopted by the post-colonial Angolan regime, and have so become part of Angolan 
identity and history. Basil Davidson notes that European misunderstanding has led to the 
distortion of the histories of Angolan ethnic groups. For instance, he argues that an emphasis 
on the differences between the groups has led Europeans to see these groups as distinct and 
separate socio-political entities, rather than acknowledging the linkages and similarities 
between them.68  
 
 As such, Davidson states that apart from the San hunter-gatherers, all other ethnolinguistic 
groups in present-day Angola share a common Bantu heritage originating from the Bantu 
migrations into the area. Each group adapted to the particular environment where they settled, 
which in turn resulted in further distinct developments among the groups. However, Davidson 
asserts that similarities in language, political and religious practices, as well as social structures, 
can be traced back to a single Bantu origin, and in fact, Davidson argues that these similarities 
can be found among Bantu groups across Sub-Saharan Africa.69 Therefore, the histories of 
Angola’s ethnolinguistic groups are by no means static or separate, but rather, have developed 
in a highly mobile environment of constant exchange of ideas, knowledge and people.  To 
illustrate this point further, Wheeler and Pélissier point out that trade among the peoples of the 
area was widespread, and that trade routes extended to as far afield as the East African coast, 
providing access to the Indian Ocean trade network. Waterways such as the Congo and Zambezi 
                                                          
68 Davidson, B. In the Eye of the Storm: Angola’s People, Longman, London, 1972, pp. 50-51. 
69 Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, 65-66. 
28 
 
rivers acted as important highways for trade, information, knowledge and migration within the 
area, and aided the promotion of interconnectivity between the peoples of Central Africa. 70 As 
such, it must be said that Angola’s pre-colonial history is very much connected to the early 
history of Central Africa as a whole. 
 
The Arrival of European Explorers 
By the mid to late 15th century, successive Portuguese explorers had made their way down the 
west coast of Africa and had started trading commodities such as ivory, hides, pepper and amber 
with local communities. Later, the most important commodities to be traded were slaves, as 
well as sugar from Portuguese plantations in colonies such as the Canary and Cape Verde 
islands as well as Brazil.71 When the Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão landed on the banks of 
the Congo River in 1482, he encountered the Kongo kingdom, a socio-political entity not much 
different to Portugal in the late 15th century. Apart from significant differences in naval and 
military technologies, there existed similarities such as the manufacturing of cloth and other 
crafts, as well as the Kongo’s socio-political structure, like Portugal, being a kingdom. A 
significant early development of this meeting of the two cultures was the spread of Christianity 
by Portuguese missionaries, with the Kongo King Nzingo a Nkuwu being baptised in 1491, 
and taking on the Portuguese name of Dom Jão I. To a large extent, the Portuguese explorers’ 
relations with the Kongo kingdom and its people during this time was mostly peaceful and 
amicable, with a few Kongo people being taken back to Portugal in order to learn Portuguese, 
so as to improve the relations between the two kingdoms.72 Kongo traders were also able to 
benefit from the introduction of Portuguese goods while the presence of Portuguese ships 
allowed the Kongo access to trading partners that were until now beyond their reach. For 
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instance, access to the Atlantic Ocean trade network allowed for the arrival of new food crops 
such as maize and cassava. This increase in regional and trans-Atlantic trade also benefitted 
Portuguese ship owners, who could now act as middlemen between the different markets. Trade 
in the regions became so profitable that the Dutch even attempted to seize control of the port 
of Luanda in 1641. However, with the aid of a Brazilian expedition force, Luanda was retaken 
in 1648 and returned to Portuguese control. Luanda had been established to avoid taxation at 
the official port of Mpinda at the mouth of the Congo and was regarded as an illegal port by 
Portuguese officials for much of its early existence.73 
 
However, the relations between the two kingdoms also brought forth some significant tensions 
within Kongo society. On the one hand, successive Kongo kings and elites adopted many 
European practices, such as dress and literacy, converted to Christianity and took on European 
names. The Kongo’s capital, Mbanza Kongo, was even renamed São Salvador. On the other 
hand, Kongo kings and their subjects continued to practice African beliefs and customs, such 
as polygamy, which was frowned upon by the Christian Portuguese elite. As such, the Kongo 
elite increasingly traversed two starkly different ways of life, adopting multiple and often 
conflicting identities, an aspect which impacted Angolan societies for decades if not centuries 
to come. For instance, the Kongo kings made use of Christianity to support their authority. The 
king was able to control the appointment of parish priests throughout the Kongo and used them 
to exert his authority throughout his territory.  As such, the Portuguese trading elite and 
missionaries were used to buttress the king’s power and influence.74   
 
Also, the Portuguese that were now living in the Kongo, primarily missionaries and traders, 
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began to engage in profiteering activities such as the trading in slaves and other commodities, 
which often caused disturbances in Kongo society. 75 In a letter dated 1526 addressed to the 
Portuguese king, King Afonso lamented that his authority was being eroded by Portuguese 
traders supplying his vassals with abundant goods, which he had previously used to control 
them. As such, his vassals would no longer obey. He went on to state that his kingdom was 
being slowly depopulated by the greed of slave traders who were seizing his subjects.76 These 
tensions eventually led to a series of wars between the Kongo kingdom and the Portuguese 
between 1622 and 1665, with king Afonso being defeated and killed in battle in 1665. 
Successive Kongo kings were not able to re-establish the Kongo’s regional authority, and the 
Kongo kingdom began entering a period of decline. By the early 17th century, Portuguese 
influence in the Kongo began to diminish and shift southward.77  
 
By this time, an Afro-Portuguese community had established itself at the trading port of Luanda 
as an independent entity, apart from neighbouring African kingdoms, although very much 
connected with them through trade and other social engagements. Soon, this Afro-Portuguese 
elite enjoyed a privileged relationship with Portugal and began to dominate the trade between 
the interior and the coast.  Frequent intermarriage between Portuguese and locals led to the rise 
of a vibrant creole culture, with the dividing lines between Portuguese and African culture, 
traditions and identities becoming increasingly blurred. As Newitt notes, historians have traced 
the current Angolan creole elite’s political, social and economic power to this era.78  
 
From the outset, Portuguese interaction with other kingdoms and peoples neighbouring its 
fledgling colony was not as initially amicable as with the Kongo. The Ndongo kingdom of the 
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Mbundu people, just south of the Kongo kingdom to which it owed its allegiance, was ruled 
by the Ngola (said to be the namesake of Angola), a title given to the Ndongo’s king. Seeing 
the benefits that the Kongo elite gained from the presence of Portuguese traders and 
missionaries, the Ndongo king conveyed his request for the establishment of a Portuguese 
embassy in his territory through the Kongo king Afonso. The Ngola however, was not satisfied 
with the offerings made by the Portuguese, and even took a Portuguese emissary hostage for 
six years. In addition, tensions between the Kongo and Ngola kingdoms increased due to the 
competition to gain profits from the slave trade. This tension even led to a battle between the 
two kingdoms, both sides being supported by Portuguese soldiers, in which the Kongo army 
was defeated. However, the fact that Portuguese emissaries had been held captive by the 
Ndongo kingdom led the Portuguese to give up on diplomatic relations in favour of military 
conquest instead.79 
 
This decision was supported by the fact that other European nations such as the Dutch produced 
better quality goods than the Portuguese and, therefore, threatened to undermine Portuguese 
traders in the region. Additionally, hostile African kingdoms had attacked kingdoms that 
Portugal had established trade links with, and consequently threatened to destroy these trade 
links. Lastly, however, the decision to engage in military conquest was spurred on by the 
rumoured existence of vast mineral reserves in the interior. An expedition to explore the interior 
would, however, require a military force. All of these considerations and motivations 
eventually led to the military conquest of the Ndongo kingdom which continued in various 
stages from the late 16th century until the late 17th century, while this conquest continued in 
other parts of the region for decades.80 Subjugated communities and those that allied 
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themselves to the Portuguese were brought into a “paternalistic relation of subservience“, 
referred to in Portuguese as vassalagem, or vassalage. In what can be described as indirect rule, 
the traditional authority of sobas, chiefs, was kept intact, and the Portuguese exerted their 
authority through them. Sobas, on the other hand, were required to pledge allegiance to the 
Portuguese, provide them with military support, and were required to pay taxes, often in the 
form of slaves.81 
 
The Slave Trade of West Central Africa 
Slavery had been practised in the region even before the arrival of the Portuguese. However, 
according to Davidson, for many kingdoms in the region, slavery was not so much motivated 
by the exploitation of free labour or commercial gain, but rather a practice of bolstering their 
populations and armies, and increasing their influence, authority and wealth. 82 By the mid-
16th century, though, there was an ever greater demand for cheap labour by Portuguese 
plantations across the Portuguese empire, and slaves began to be very profitable commodities. 
The slave trade in the interior came to be dominated by the creole elite, with traders acting as 
middlemen between the African chiefs and kings from whom they sourced the slaves, and the 
European merchants to whom they sold the slaves at Portuguese trading ports such as Luanda 
and Benguela.83  
 
It must be added that captured slaves were not only bound for the slave markets on the coast, 
but slaves were also utilised as soldiers to wage war, and as porters by traders, carrying goods 
from the interior to the coast and vice-versa. More so, however, the slave trade aided the spread 
of European diseases such as smallpox, which decimated local populations, and caused 
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widespread famines as marauding armies destroyed or plundered food crops. The slave trade 
slowly began to erode the established patronage system of paying allegiance between kings, 
chiefs and subjects and locked these communities into a European controlled system of 
economic commodity dependency. To secure their power and authority, African communities 
were forced to comply.84  
 
Some African communities hired small groups of Portuguese musketeers to give them the 
upper hand against rival communities. Combined with the rise of the slave trade, and the 
profitability thereof for all involved, the introduction of European weapons increased the scale 
and intensity of violence in the region. Christopher Cramer notes that violence began to form 
part of the economy of the slave trade, and that “Violence and war were integrated into the 
appropriation and production process […]”.85  
 
Although the Portuguese authorities were against the trading of guns for African goods, slaves 
included, Dutch and British and even Portuguese traders had no such qualms. The British for 
instance began dominating the trade in cheaply manufactured, often technologically inferior 
guns in West Africa from the late 17th century onward. The gun of choice to be traded by 
British merchants was known as the ‘Angola gun’ and was a simple long barrelled flintlock of 
questionable quality. Commentators of the time noted that these guns were not proofed, nor 
bored and that they “[…] are sure to burst in the first hands that fires them.”86 British merchants 
sold these guns directly at Angolan ports, but also exported them to Lisbon, from where they 
would be shipped to Angola by Portuguese traders. These guns became very sought after 
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trading goods and were very popular with African armies.87 
 
The Portuguese slave trade continued well into the 19th century, and even during the 20th 
century forced labour in Angola continued to be commonplace. Even after the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade was abolished and Portugal outlawed slavery in all its territories in 1869, Angolans 
were still being shipped to the Cape Verde islands as forced labourers to work on the plantations 
there. Wheeler and Pélissier estimate the total number of Angolans forced into slavery between 
the 16th and 19th century to have reached well over four million.88 
 
Portuguese Colonialism and the Berlin Conference 
With the subjugation of the Kongo and Ndongo Kingdoms, the Portuguese continued their 
conquest of Angola’s coastal regions. It was not until the mid-18th century that the Portuguese 
decided to move their conquest inland, to the central plateau, marching against the Ovimbundu 
kingdoms. Again, as in the coastal areas, the military conquest of the interior was accompanied 
by an increase in the slave trade and the subjugation of African communities.89 As the 
Portuguese waged their war of conquest, they began to build a number of small forts as they 
moved inland from the coast. This network of forts was intended to enable the Portuguese to 
better control the territory that they had conquered. To achieve the conquest of Angola, the 
Portuguese needed to establish a permanent and official presence in areas such as Benguela 
and Luanda.  To this end, about 100 Portuguese families were initially sent to Angola and were 
provided with seeds and implements. However, in contrast to Brazil, where sugar plantations 
had become the main source of economic activity, for many centuries, slavery and trade 
remained Angola’s most profitable economic outputs, with other economic activities, 
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particularly the growing of crops, remaining marginal. With the creation of the Empire of Brazil 
in 1822, Portugal lost its most prized possession, with the title soon being passed on to Angola. 
By the mid-19th century, the Portuguese Empire was in decline, with its European and 
international political and economic power waning. 90 
 
The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 aimed to set the legal parameters for Africa’s 
colonisation, which included the defining of colonial borders, stemming from an increase in 
colonial activity in Africa by Britain, France and Germany, among others. As such, it was 
agreed that only an effective presence in a territory would allow for a colonial power to lay 
claim to it. This presented Portugal with a dilemma, as it had hitherto limited its official 
presence to the coastal areas, with much of its colonial activity up until the mid-19th century 
having centred on its trading ports of Luanda and Benguela. To secure its claim to the region, 
Lisbon had to extend its administrative reach to the farthest corners of Angola so as to establish 
effective occupation and control. Although being financially constrained, successive 
Portuguese expeditions nevertheless set out to ‘pacify’ these far-flung areas, with  ‘pacification’ 
calling for the establishment of an effective colonial administrative apparatus. Up until this 
time, Portuguese activities in Angola had been spurred on by commercial interests. Its presence 
and authority was secured by a large Portuguese merchant population in coastal cities such as 
Luanda and Benguela, with Portuguese presence in central Angola being minimal, and almost 
if not entirely absent in the easternmost parts of the territory. While Portugal’s commercial 
interests in Angola had been very much informal, commerce now became the central focus of 
its colonial administrative and control framework. Although Portugal had been present in the 
region for centuries, it only started to establish a colonial state in the late 19th century, this, in 
turn, being brought about by pressures from other colonial powers whose dominance threatened 
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Lisbon’s commercial interests. 91 
 
Even in the late 19th century, Portuguese elites had called for a more effective colonisation of 
Angola. However, political and economic constraints stood in the way of a large-scale colonial 
project. This changed when the monarchy was overthrown in 1910, and the new Republican 
regime set out to implement the reform of its colonial policy. With commercial gain standing 
at the centre of any reforms, the new regime in Lisbon set out to implement the following: the 
taxation of its colonies, the cultivation of cash crops, the implementation of legislation defining 
colonial populations which included the legal separation of “[…] ‘civilized’ Europeans from 
African ‘natives’”, and the legalisation of forced labour which occurred two decades before in 
1891.92 Mohanty points out that all Africans were deemed to be uncivilised. According to the 
Portuguese colonial administration, Africans, in the first instance, belonged to a specific ethnic 
group, or tribe, ruled over by a chief, and were subject to customary law. By doing so, the 
Portuguese aimed at maintaining the structure of “traditional” African society, which further 
enabled them to extract an income for the colonial state in the form of a native tax, as well as 
extracting a ready supply of labour. Africans were required to perform various services for the 
colonial administration, which included labouring on plantations or in public works, as well as 
serving with the police.93 The Portuguese administration introduced legislation which stated 
that all Africans had a “moral and legal obligation to work”, having to work in a recognised 
trade or profession, or having to cultivate land of “a specific extent”. Failure to observe this 
meant having to contract oneself to an employer, and failure to do this meant risking being 
forcibly contracted to the colonial administration.94 Mohanty also points out that some 250 000 
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Africans were contracted out by the colonial administration to agricultural, mining and 
construction companies on a yearly basis, and that this forced labour brought in a significant 
profit for the colonial regime.95  
 
Fernando Andresen Guimarães notes that successive political and economic crises prevented 
Lisbon from putting its plans for its colonies into action, and it was decided to hand over more 
power to colonial governments by giving them a high degree of political and economic 
autonomy to govern and administer their territories. This also went for Angola, where 
governor-general José Norton de Matos started an ambitious project to build up Angola’s 
infrastructure, this, in turn, being an effort to attract larger numbers of settlers from Portugal. 
This included the construction of rail networks, and an increased effort to promote cash crop 
production, with forced labour to provide cheap and plentiful labourers. Although the colonies 
held the promise of wealth and an end to Portugal’s economic woes, political unrest in Portugal 
brought on by financial hardship soon led to violence between the incumbent Republicans and 
the dissatisfied Monarchists. This eventually led to the ousting of the Republican regime in 
1926 by way of a military coup. The new military regime was overwhelmed by Portugal’s 
financial problems, and asked a popular right-wing academic António de Oliveira Salazar to 
take over the financial reins, and he was subsequently given full control over Lisbon’s public 
spending. This included clearing the deficits Angola had accrued under Norton de Matos. 
Salazar ushered in a period that became known as the Estado Novo, or New State, which sought 
to marry the bureaucracy and the military, with the one relying on and propping up the other. 
Salazar, a devout Catholic, also relied on the church for support, which had helped the 
opposition topple the Republican regime. The New State era was also defined by its 
authoritarian nature, with the Salazar regime aiming to control every aspect of political, social 
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and economic life, both in Lisbon, and the colonies. As such, being able to repress and eliminate 
dissent was of utmost importance, with propaganda playing an important role in enforcing 
ultimate control. 96 
 
The rapid infrastructure development and arrival of large numbers of Portuguese settlers in 
Angola was accompanied by an increasingly ruthless and repressive style of governance that 
primarily affected the African majority. Over many decades, a racialised caste system had 
begun to develop, with the highest ranking caste being made up of Portuguese brancos 
(whites), followed by mestiços (mixed race or creole), and lastly, the pretos (black Africans). 
Although social interaction between these groups occurred frequently, these race-based labels 
came to define social stratification. While this racial caste system was accompanied by racial 
prejudices as in many other African colonies, these prejudices were also tied to legal and 
economic status, which in turn was tied to citizenship. It also meant that Portuguese settlers 
and traders who would have otherwise been seen as socially inferior in Europe could take on 
roles of dominance, authority, and social superiority in Angola.97 The single biggest flood of 
Portuguese settlers to Angola occurred in the wake of World War Two, and by the 1950s, 
immigrants were arriving at a rate of a thousand a month. However, these immigrants were 
mostly poor peasants, illiterate and with few skills, and they now competed directly with 
African labourers for unskilled work. In addition, those that took up farming began to displace 
indigenous farmers, as Portuguese farmers enjoyed government support and subsidies, and 
were granted large swathes of land. 98 According to Mohanty, 98 square miles of land had been 
set aside for native reserves between 1912 and 1932, while, during the same period, some 1563 
square miles had been allocated to settlers. While settlers were given large swathes of the most 
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fertile land, Africans were systematically driven off their land to make way for Portuguese 
plantations. Mohanty notes that by 1971, 60 percent of Angola’s most arable land was owned 
by Portuguese settlers and farming corporations.99 
 
In 1932, Salazar had been appointed to the post of Prime Minister and made it clear that the 
Portuguese colonies were an extension of Portugal itself. The argument went that without its 
colonies, Portugal would be an insignificant, small country and that its colonies provided it 
with authority and wealth. Hence, Portugal and its colonies were indivisible. Salazar’s regime 
even went as far as to evoke the myth of an ancient Lusitanian Empire, drawing on Portugal’s 
early seafaring expeditions, and depicting Portugal as a harbinger of civilisation and progress, 
with this myth aimed at creating a nationalist ideology. Salazar also made it clear that the 
colonies and Portugal itself should be administered as one unit, and that unitary political and 
economic policies should be applied to all of the Portuguese territories.100 To cement this, the 
status of Portuguese colonies was elevated to that of overseas provinces in 1951, which meant 
that these new provinces were drawn even tighter into Lisbon’s centralised power structure. In 
fact, Salazar had started to create an elaborate civil service apparatus, which facilitated direct 
rule by creating a structure of authority where even the lowest of colonial officials were under 
the direct control of Salazar himself. The 1950s were viewed as being Portugal’s golden years, 
with infrastructure development growing at a fast pace. Angola and other African Portuguese 
territories such as Mozambique were seen as oases of stability and development while other 
parts of Africa faced increased instability brought on by anti-colonial struggles. Increased 
agricultural output, especially coffee, saw Lisbon reaping economic rewards, and Angola had 
become economically indispensable to Lisbon, now more than ever. Not only did Lisbon 
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benefit immensely from the extraction of Angola’s primary commodities, which included 
coffee, cacao, cotton, oil, diamonds and other minerals, Angola and other Portuguese territories 
also acted as markets for Portuguese manufactured goods. 101 
 
However, the 50s also brought with them a growing mood of discontent among Angola’s 
indigenous population. Policies such as forced labour were extremely unpopular, which saw 
certain members of the population who were deemed to be unemployed, even those practising 
small-scale subsistence agriculture, being legally obliged to work for the government for six 
months of the year, working on infrastructure projects or as plantation workers. The 
responsibility of filling forced labour quotas fell to the local chiefs, and when they refused to 
cooperate, police would round up people at random. To evade forced labour and as a result of 
being displaced by Portuguese commercial farmers, many Africans chose to move to urban 
areas in order to look for work and other opportunities such as education. However, they had 
to compete with low skilled Portuguese immigrants that also flocked to urban areas. Portuguese 
labourers were given preferential treatment and even earned three times the amount of wages 
that their Angolan counterparts did for the same work. Factors such as forced labour, native 
tax, land expropriation, and racialized laws, contributed to the widespread resentment of 
colonialism among ordinary Angolan’s and furthermore heightened tensions between the 
Angolans and Portuguese. 102 It is within this context that Angolan nationalist groups began to 
emerge. The next chapter will track the emergence of one of these groups, namely the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola, or FNLA. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FNLA – 1950s TO 1978 
The history of the FNLA forms an important part of the history of the Angolan war for 
independence against the Portuguese colonial regime which had commenced in 1961, and the 
initial stages of Angola’s civil war which had erupted even before independence was gained 
on 11 November 1975. The FNLA finally became obsolete as a military fighting force in 1978 
when it was crippled due to infighting and significant geopolitical developments, and had little 
to no impact on the war’s remaining years. In the wake of its exit from the civil war, the FNLA 
had begun to reinvent itself as a political party during the 1992 elections, and currently holds 
two seats in the Angolan legislature.103  
 
The following chapter will provide a brief historical overview of the FNLA, ranging from its 
origins among the Bakongo nationalist movements of the 1950s, its formation in 1962 during 
the Angolan war for independence until its eventual military demise in the immediate wake of 
Angolan independence during the initial stages of the civil war. The chapter will also locate 
the history of the FNLA within the history of Angola and Central-West Africa as a whole, and 
will further show that the history of the FNLA is closely linked to geopolitical developments 
in the region, which in turn can be related to the wider Cold War dynamics of the time. 
Furthermore, this chapter will track the FNLA’s rise and fall in order to understand how and 
why the FNLA came to unravel in 1978. As such, this chapter will provide the first of the two 
narratives, namely of an FNLA in steady decline, suffering from infighting, a lack of 
communication, as well as an absence of strong leadership and vision. This will be done by 
drawing on both secondary scholarly literature, as well as primary sources in the form of 
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official FNLA documents. It will be shown that although the FNLA, in the form of its 
predecessor the UPA, seemed to be at the forefront of the rebellion against the Portuguese, 
several developments began to erode its legitimacy and unity, to the extent that by the mid-60s, 
a lack of effective leadership caused significant fractures within the FNLA. This is in direct 
contrast to the narratives of the former FNLA fighters that paint the movement in an overly 
positive light that I will present in chapter four. 
 
1950s: Bakongo Nationalism and Early Anti-Colonial Politics 
The history of Angolan political groups goes back to the 1920s. Although there had not been a 
call for outright self-determination, the African intelligentsia of the urban centres started to 
advocate for political representation, and for a greater say in decision making. Groups were 
also formed along ethnic lines, with these specifically advocating regional autonomy, but not 
apart from the colonial state.104 One of the earliest groups to be formed at this time was the 
National African League (LNA), which was founded in 1929, with the more radical Regional 
Association of Native Angolans (ARAN) being founded some time afterwards.105 It is only 
later, during the 1950s and 60s, at a time when anti-colonial African nationalist groups agitating 
for independence were formed across Africa, that groups emerged specifically advocating an 
end to Portuguese colonial rule in Angola. This is the context in which the forebears of the 
FNLA were formed. 
 
Susama Mohanty traces the origins of Bakongo nationalism to December 1913 when a 
Bakongo chief led a revolt against the incumbent Bakongo king after the king had refused to 
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oppose new Portuguese labour demands. Indeed, the Portuguese continued to preserve the 
Kongo kingdom as a useful political control mechanism, making use of the king and his chiefs 
to extract the native tax, as well as round up forced labour. Even though the revolt against the 
Kongo king was finally put down in 1915, Mohanty notes that this event was the first of others 
to follow, where Bakongo resistance to Portuguese colonial rule focused on the Kongo 
kingship.106  
 
When Kongo King Dom Pedro VII died in April 1955, a Bakongo royalist residing in the 
Belgian Congo, Eduardo Pinock, advocated for the choice of a stronger successor who would 
use his position to advocate for Bakongo interests. While Pinock and his supporters threw their 
support behind a well-respected Protestant community leader, Portuguese authorities, on the 
insistence of an alarmed Catholic clergy, chose to back a lesser-known Catholic candidate, who 
was eventually elected by an assembly of royal elders, and crowned as Dom Antonio III. Pinock 
and his reformist supporters first attempted to block the coronation by means of popular protest, 
but soon opted to focus their efforts on having reformist candidates appointed to the posts of 
royal counsellors. Pinock himself was eventually appointed to the post of first counsellor, after 
the king and the Catholic missions gave in to popular pressure. However, the reformist 
counsellors were being seemingly outmanoeuvred by the king, under the guidance of 
Portuguese officials, to the extent that Pinock and his supporters finally chose to oust the king. 
Managing to gather popular support, Pinock orchestrated widespread protests, resulting in 
Pinock proclaiming the king unfit to rule on 27 December 1955. This was followed by swift 
action by the Portuguese, who indiscriminately arrested high-ranking leaders. However, the 
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king suddenly died on 11 July 1957, and the Portuguese decided to leave the throne vacant for 
the time being, in order to prevent a repeat occurrence of the 1955 succession battle.107   
 
Not deterred by the actions of the Portuguese, the reformist royalists, under the leadership of 
Pinock, began to form a political movement in Léopoldville in the Belgian Congo, as a means 
to continue their efforts for political reform.108 Pinock’s move to Léopoldville was mainly 
motivated by an attempt to escape increased Portuguese oppression, with the Portuguese 
colonial regime beginning to thwart any form of political and social activity ruthlessly. Any 
form of dissent was dealt with harshly by the Portuguese secret police, named the International 
and State Defence Police (PIDE), which was set up in the 1940s. It was tasked with infiltrating 
these new political movements in an effort to prevent any form of political dissent within 
Angola. 109 
 
As such, it is significant that many Angolan independence movements have their origins in 
neighbouring Belgian Congo, with many Angolan intellectuals having fled to its capital, 
Léopoldville, to escape persecution by the PIDE. Pinock and his allies eventually decided to 
establish a formal political organisation, which was named the Union of the Peoples of the 
North of Angola (UPNA).  Although many scholars cite the UPNA as having been established 
on 7 July 1954110, Mohanty argues that July 1957 is a more likely date, based on interviews 
                                                          
107 Mohanty, Political Development and Ethnic Identity in Africa, pp. 82-83. 
108 Mohanty, Political Development and Ethnic Identity in Africa, p. 84. 
109 Leão, A., and Rupiya, M. “A Military History of the Angolan Armed Forces from the 1960s onwards – as 
told by former combatants”, in Rupiya, M. (ed.) Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of 
Militaries in Southern Africa, Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg, 2005, pp. 8, 11.; 109 Heimer, “Der 
Entkolonisierungskonflikt in Angola”, p. 210. 
110 Leão and Rupiya, “A Military History of the Angolan Armed Forces”, pp. 8-9, Nortje, The Terrible Ones, p. 
17.; Sadiqali, S. “Angola: Hopes and Fears”, ”, in India International Centre Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 1, 1976, p. 
25.; Anonymous, “The Struggle in Angola”, in Review of African Political Economy, no. 5, 1976, p. 81. 
45 
 
with Pinock and his allies.111 While scholars such as Sadiqali note that the UPNA originally 
agitated for the independence of northern Angola, with the specific aim of re-establishing the 
old Kongo kingdom112, Mohanty notes that the UPNA chose to no longer involve itself in the 
Kongo succession struggle, and rather, aimed to lead a nationalist independence struggle. 
According to Mohanty, this is evident in the fact that the UPNA dropped the N from its name, 
and subsequently became the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA) on 9 November 1958. It 
was also at this time that Holden Roberto, the son of Angolan exiles and the nephew of the 
movement’s former leader, Barros Nekaka, took over as president of the UPA. 113  
 
Soon after, the UPA merged with several other Angolan nationalist movements, each with its 
own political agendas and from various ethnic and regional backgrounds, in order to broaden 
the UPA’s appeal. However, even after this merger, the UPA largely failed to mobilise 
supporters beyond the Bakongo communities, and, as such, was often criticised as being a 
tribalist group advocating only the Bakongo cause. For this reason, as Heimer points out, the 
UPA continued to find it difficult to rally support among non-Bakongo communities, to the 
extent that it would become almost exclusively dependent on Bakongo support.114 In part, their 
move away from narrow Bakongo politics stemmed from the competition of groups such as 
Joseph Kasavubu’s Abako Party, which was advocating the resurrection of the Kongo 
kingdom. In the competition to attract the loyalties of some 500 000 Angolan immigrants living 
in the Belgian Congo, the UPA saw itself distinctly disadvantaged, being seen as a foreign 
movement, not enjoying the same standing as the indigenous Abako party. As an exile 
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organisation, Mohanty argues, the UPA was forced to compete with the Abako party within 
the latter’s own backyard.115 Significantly the UPA leadership, specifically Roberto, was 
criticised for living in permanent exile, while doing little to lead the anti-colonial struggle from 
the front, inside Angola, which had the effect of further alienating the UPA from potential non-
Bakongo support.116  
 
Phyllis Martin points out, that rather than seeing this focus on ethnicity as being an effort to 
revive a seemingly primordial identity, it must be noted that at the time, ethnicity became a 
popular political tool used by leaders to rally support. As such, the Kongo nationalism of the 
UPNA/UPA and Kasavubu’s Abako party was very much a product of its time, merging 
various identities such as class, gender and age, to express and mobilise a particular interest. 
Furthermore, the notion of the tribe at the time must be seen as a colonial construct, which 
sought to group together otherwise very fluid communities to facilitate control, administration 
and taxation. It must also be acknowledged that other loyalties, often more localised, played 
much more important roles in shaping one's identity at the time.117 Martin’s view is supported 
by Inge Brinkman, who argues that in contrast to the modernist view that regards the “tribe” as 
being a homogenous whole, ethnicity forms part of an imagined community.118  Brinkman goes 
on to contend that ethnicity had been most pronounced among the nationalist movements of 
the Bakongo, and rather than seeing ethnicity as a divisive factor in this case, a pan-Kongo 
discourse evolved, which Brinkman refers to as Kongolanité, which provided a means to 
mitigate political, class and clan cleavages.119 So too, Linda Heywood points out that ethnicity 
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had become a useful tool for nationalist groups to appeal to a particular constituency.120 As can 
be seen in the early attempts by reformists such as Pinock, an attempt had been made to make 
use of the legitimacy of the Bakongo kingship to rally support among the Bakongo masses.  
 
What is significant in the case of the UPA, however, is that it was formed and led by a Bakongo 
elite, and although urban and educated, it set itself apart from the assimilated elites in 
Angola.121 Messiant goes on to point out that many Bakongo elite were, in fact, exiles who had 
established themselves in Léopoldville to escape the growing repression at the hands of the 
Portuguese regime during the early to mid-twentieth century. What is more, this elite residing 
in the Belgian Congo was socialised in a very different way to their Angolan counterparts, 
many being non-Portuguese speaking, and having strong ethnic affiliations. For them, positions 
of authority derived from the hierarchical structure of the old Kongo kingdom were very 
important. Significantly, this meant that the UPA leadership in Léopoldville had very little in 
common with the Bakongo masses in Angola, which they claimed to represent.122 This also 
meant that the UPA’s form of nationalism, being characterised by its conservatism and 
traditionalism opposed to white Portuguese colonialism, was very different from the other types 
of nationalist organisations that were being formed in Angola at the time. 123 
 
In 1956, another Angolan independence movement had been formed, calling itself the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA had itself been a result of the 
merger of various smaller organisations. One of these was the Party for the United Struggle for 
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Africans (PLUA) which was founded in 1953, and would go on to merge with the Angolan 
Communist Party (PCA), which was founded in 1955, and had strong links to the Portuguese 
Communist Party. The PLUA and PCA’s merger in December 1956 resulted in the creation of 
the MPLA.124 Significantly, as opposed to the UPA, which had its roots within Pan-Africanism 
and African Nationalism, its PCA origins meant that the MPLA was influenced by Marxist 
doctrine, and found support from the Portuguese Communist Party, which in turn was highly 
organised and received support from the Soviet Union.  Although both the UPA and MPLA 
were based in the Belgian Congo, stark ideological differences and frequent disagreements and 
competition finally led to the MPLA relocating to neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville.125  
 
The tensions in the Belgian Congo between the colonial regime and nationalists calling for 
independence finally led to riots erupting in the capital in January 1959 in what has become 
known as the Congo Crisis. Fearing a possible spill over to Angola, the PIDE began to crack 
down on suspected nationalist activists in Luanda, with 59 people suspected of having been 
involved in anti-colonial activities being arrested in December 1959.  When the Belgian Congo 
gained independence on 30 June 1960, the new government allowed Angolan independence 
movements to operate from its territory more freely.126 By late 1960, the UPA had emerged as 
the strongest of the Angolan independence movements, having been able to establish more 
widespread organisational structures which allowed it to dominate the anti-colonial political 
scene in Luanda from its headquarters in Léopoldville.127 However, as Mohanty points out, 
despite this apparent strength, the UPA had been plagued by internal conflicts at this time. A 
more moderate Bazombo faction within the UPA that had been behind the widespread protests 
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was finally expelled in December 1960, with this faction going on to form its own 
independence movement. Under the heading “Split within the UPA”, the Bazombo faction 
listed four main grievances explaining its split from the UPA: “i) the dictatorial attitude of the 
so-called responsible founders of the party; ii) their refusal to negotiate with Portugal; iii) the 
monopolization of international travel by one party member (meaning Holden Roberto); and 
iv) the absence of a proper accounting system for the party funds.”128  
 
1961: A Year of Revolt  
By early 1961, the economic prosperity of the Portuguese empire took a turn for the worse. 
Triggered by the collapse of coffee prices on the international market, and compounded by 
problems in the fishing and cotton growing sectors, the Portuguese economy found itself 
entering a recession. This resulted in widespread labour layoffs and wage cuts, which in turn 
led to rising unemployment and growing discontent and frustration. Given the slump in cotton 
prices, plantation owners in northern Angola were no longer able to pay their workers’ salaries, 
with the situation finally resulting in violent riots by plantation workers in January 1961. 
Widespread hatred of the Portuguese policy of forced labour added to the discontent. The 
ensuing retaliation by the colonial police, taking the form of beatings and widespread arrests, 
fuelled the already volatile situation, and finally led to a general revolt against Portuguese 
authorities in the cotton growing areas in the northern Cassanje area.129  
 
The initial stages of the revolt took place over the period of 4 to 24 January and was led by an 
obscure religious sect named “Maria”. The violence, in what has become known as Maria’s 
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War, also involved the participation of underground UPA members and resulted in the 
destruction of plantation equipment such as seeds and implements, as well as the targeting and 
looting of Portuguese-owned stores and missions and the killing of livestock. According to Piet 
Nortje, rioters praised Patrice Lumumba, who had led the Belgian Congo to independence 
months before, and that they called for the independence of Angola.130 Significantly, the 
colonial regime’s presence in northern Angola was minimal, which meant that the region was 
vulnerable to a spillover effect from the political developments in the Belgian Congo.131 
 
The revolt finally spread to Luanda on 4 February, when Africans marched on the São Paulo 
prison housing many of the arrested political dissidents, in what was ultimately an unsuccessful 
attempt to free these prisoners. Although the MPLA claimed responsibility for these actions, 
the attempted prison break was in fact carried out by a group organised by the UPA. Days 
earlier, the UPA leadership found out that the PIDE had infiltrated the Luanda UPA group, and 
attempted to delay the assault on the prison. The messenger who was to deliver this message, 
however, arrived too late. The MPLA claiming responsibility meant that it now became the 
main focus of the PIDE’s attention while the UPA itself could continue with its operations.132 
 
The result of the revolts in northern Angola, as well as the attempted prison break in Luanda, 
saw large-scale retaliation by the Portuguese settler community, with the Portuguese authorities 
even arming and organising vigilante groups that would target the slums around Luanda in 
regular nightly raids. What followed were the extrajudicial executions of any African suspected 
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of being involved in or being sympathetic to the anti-colonial movements. As these movements 
were often founded and supported by the African intelligentsia, any African that wore Western 
dress or was found in possession of books became a legitimate target. More generally, the 
colonial regime had deployed the military and police to suppress and gain control over the 
uprisings in the north, and by March, it seemed as though the Portuguese army had gained the 
upper hand.133 
 
For Portugal, the revolts in the north of Angola and Luanda exposed the racial tensions that 
emanated from decades of oppressive rule and harsh colonial policies and legislation, and the 
international community was beginning to take notice.134 The United Nations sub-committee 
on Angola, set up to investigate the increasingly volatile situation in Angola reported: “The 
disturbances and conflicts in Angola are mainly the consequences of genuine grievances of the 
indigenous population against the administration of the territory, including dissatisfaction with 
economic conditions, the impact of African-nationalism, the rise of political groups seeking 
redress of grievances and the right to self-determination, and the severe repression to which 
these groups have been subjected.”135 
 
By mid-March, violence was again beginning to flare up, primarily led by UPA members of 
Bakongo ethnic origin in northern Angola, with about 4 000 to 5 000 UPA rebels participating 
in the conflict, with Cann noting that many of these had been forcibly recruited.136 Believing 
themselves to be immune to the effects of bullets as they had gone through rituals believed to 
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protect them from harm, the UPA fighters orchestrated a series of coordinated raids on isolated 
Portuguese farmsteads and towns, specifically targeting the Portuguese population.137   Men, 
women and children were all considered legitimate targets, and victims were often killed by 
makeshift weapons such as knives and machetes. This targeted violence eventually spread to 
the northern Angolan provinces of Uíge, Zaire, and Cuanza Norte. Over two days from 15 
March, some 7200 people were killed, which also included African plantation workers who 
refused to join or support the UPA rebels.138 Significantly, as Thomas Henrikson notes, the 
UPA did not seem to understand the principles of guerrilla warfare, and its violent behaviour 
towards civilians, which as noted included the killing of plantation workers and forced 
recruitment, consequently alienated many civilians.139 
 
During his trip to UPA held areas in northern Angola in early 1961, George Houser recalls that 
the UPA set up a number of checkpoints and that one could not move between UPA held areas 
without presenting an official UPA passport.140 This served the purpose of not only preventing 
the infiltration of UPA held areas by enemies such as the rival MPLA and Portuguese spies but 
also to control the movement of civilians in the area. As Inge Brinkman notes, those civilians 
who did not possess UPA documents were arrested, tried by UPA supervised village councils, 
and punished, often in the form of beatings. Many transgressors were also used as forced labour 
to clear new paths through the dense forests. Brinkman notes that given the UPA’s use of 
checkpoints to control the civilian populations in areas held by them, it became necessary for 
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civilians to identify as being UPA supporters to escape harsh penalties such as forced labour. 
In other cases, civilians were being press-ganged into joining the UPA as combatants. 141 
 
Controlling the population was, however, not limited to UPA held areas within Angola, but 
extended to controlling the movement of Angolan refugees between Angola and Congo/ 
Léopoldville. As Brinkman points out, this was done with the assistance of the Congolese 
authorities, and she refers to the situation among these civilians as amounting to “forced 
immobility”. Measures to confine and control populations included not only checkpoints but 
also barbed wire fences, watch towers, secret passwords and fear. One could not move unless 
one had written permission from UPA officials. Travelling without a pass could lead to harsh 
penalties if captured, which included arrest and execution. 142 
 
Brinkman goes on to note how many civilians were forced to act as porters to carry essential 
military equipment, as well as food and medical supplies. Given the harsh terrain in the forests 
of northern Angola, another method of transportation was not possible. Many civilians began 
to resent the UPA for forcing people to work for the movement, but this sentiment at times also 
extended to UPA fighters themselves. As Brinkman states, UPA fighters resented the fact that 
they were sent into the forests to fight and live in inhospitable conditions, while the UPA 
leadership remained in Léopoldville, directing the fight for independence in relative security 
and comfort. As one UPA soldier at the time noted: “You do not have pity on us who are 
staying in crazy Angola in improper places.”143 These examples highlight how the behaviour 
of the UPA, specifically civilian victimisation in the form of arbitrary violence, forced 
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immobility, as well as forced recruitment, had the effect of alienating communities in which 
the UPA was operating. In effect, the UPA imposed compliance by making use of force and 
fear. Again, this behaviour may explain why the UPA struggled to attract more widespread 
support. 
 
Portuguese responses to the rebellion were devastating. Using shock tactics, the colonial army 
mutilated the corpses of killed rebels, sticking their severed heads onto stakes to discourage 
others from joining the rebels, as well as to show the supremacy of the colonial regime. The 
colonial air force also made use of napalm for the first time, in order to flush the rebels out of 
their hideouts in the heavily forested areas of northern Angola. What is more, Portuguese 
vigilante groups, not subject to any colonial authorities, began arming themselves and carried 
out retaliatory attacks against African civilians. 144 These vigilante attacks, as well as the actions 
by the military, led to an estimated death toll of 50 000 Africans, many of whom also perished 
as a result of food shortages and starvation brought about by mass displacement.145 
 
The colonial army finally managed to push the rebels northward towards the border with 
Congo-Léopoldville. This meant that the rebellion took place primarily if not exclusively in 
Bakongo territory, which led to the fact that most of the new rebel recruits were Bakongo. 
However, even though the UPA was the most prominent independence movement at this time, 
it was not particularly well equipped, nor did it have the necessary military structures in place 
to organise the rebellion more effectively, and hence, it struggled to maintain the gains it had 
made. A case in point is the UPA’s self-proclaimed Socialist Republic. By April, the UPA had 
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gained control of an area known as Nambuangongo and subsequently declared it as being the 
Socialist Republic of Nambuangongo.146  By May 1961, the Portuguese authorities brought 
reinforcements from Portugal, with its military strategy now focused on regaining control of 
rebel-held areas, as well as taking control of northern Angola in its entirety. In the meantime, 
the UPA used its Republic as a base from which to plan and carry out attacks on surrounding 
cities and even managed to orchestrate several attacks in Luanda. However, the Socialist 
Republic of Nambuangongo was short lived, and on 9 August, the Portuguese managed to 
retake the area. By this time, the colonial army had regained control of most of the urban 
settlements in northern Angola.147 
 
Significantly, the 1961 revolt also saw clashes between the various rebel movements. As the 
UPA controlled much of northern Angola, the MPLA, which had also taken up arms against 
the Portuguese, had to pass through UPA territory from its bases across the border to get to the 
more populous areas of northern Angola. One incident occurred in October 1961 when UPA 
forces captured 21 MPLA guerrillas and subsequently executed them. Incidents such as these 
led to heightened tensions between the two groups, with exchanges of gunfire not being 
uncommon. By the close of 1961, the UPA had implemented a guerrilla warfare strategy, with 
Bakongo communities forming a key support base from which to source new recruits, as well 
as provisions in the form of food, and information regarding the movements of Portuguese 
troops. Although the UPA could not claim to be in permanent control of a certain area, the 
mountainous, forested terrain straddling the borders of Congo-Léopoldville and Angola offered 
the perfect terrain in which to hide and carry out sporadic attacks against surrounding 
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Portuguese targets.148 However, this also meant that the UPA guerrillas were constantly on the 
move to avoid detection, and civilians had difficulties in living alongside them as constant 
moving made farming and building homes impossible.149 
 
This section has shown that although the UPA played a central role in the 1961 uprisings, and 
although it had established itself as the most prominent of the Angolan independence 
movements, it had failed to attract widespread support beyond the areas where it was operating. 
Moreover, its behaviour towards civilians in areas under its control, where it attempted to 
establish a regime of total compliance, was imposed by making use of forced immobility, 
violence and fear. As noted, UPA fighters had resorted to civilian victimisation, particularly 
the killing of individuals who refused to join their ranks.  This had the effect of alienating the 
communities in areas it controlled, with this alienation being further compounded by the forced 
recruitment of civilians as porters and soldiers. It was also noted that UPA fighters were 
beginning to resent their commanders, who were accused of living comfortably in Léopoldville 
while they faced harsh and inhospitable conditions in the dense forests of northern Angola. 
 
1962-1964: A Bumpy Start for the FNLA 
By 1962, the UPA rebellion had failed to expel the Portuguese from Angola, and rather, 
increased pressure from the colonial army forced the independence movements back across the 
borders to their respective bases. According to Mohanty, the UPA had struggled to coordinate 
a seemingly “chaotic, and free-wheeling rebellion”.150 In addition, John Cann argues that the 
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UPA had avoided direct confrontations with the colonial army as far as possible.151  The 
scorched earth policy of the colonial army meant that some 150 000 civilians fled northern 
Angola, primarily to southern Congo-Léopoldville.152 It is important to note that there had 
existed regular cross-border movement between the two countries for decades, with many 
Bakongo having relatives in either country. In fact, for many Bakongo, Léopoldville was the 
closest urban centre, and trade routes were well established and allowed for easy cross-border 
movement.153 For the UPA, refugee camps offered another chance at recruiting new fighters, 
as well as to rally supporters for their cause. According to John Marcum, these refugees 
effectively comprised “a transplanted political constituency”.154 However, as Cann points out, 
the UPA never managed to make use of a well-developed propaganda campaign, and therefore, 
it was never very effective in winning over the refugee population.155 On the military front, the 
UPA was dealt a blow when one of its top commanders, Joao Batista, was killed in battle in 
February 1962. This was followed by the UPA army’s chief of staff, Marcos Kassanda, leaving 
the party in early March, accusing Roberto of tribalism, while also accusing him of being 
responsible for Batista’s death. Mohanty proposes that Roberto’s personality, as well as his 
questionable tactics during the 1961 rebellion, caused serious conflicts within the UPA’s 
leadership.156 
 
On 27 March 1962, the UPA merged with a smaller group, the Democratic Party of Angola 
(PDA), to form the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). 157 Political 
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developments across Africa also presented new opportunities, and when Algeria gained 
independence in July 1962, the FNLA despatched troops to be trained as officers. The FNLA’s 
close relationship with the new Algerian regime also meant that it received welcome aid in the 
form of military equipment.158 This support allowed the FNLA to create its own military wing, 
the National Liberation Army of Angola (ELNA) on 26 August 1962, with an estimated force 
strength of 5000 troops, although these were mostly poorly trained, and ill-equipped. The 
FNLA’s main base was located at Kinkuzu, some 16 km south of Léopoldville. The above 
developments helped to increase the FNLA’s credibility across the continent as well as 
internationally, and by this time, the FNLA enjoyed significant international recognition.159 
The FNLA portrayed itself as the leading Angolan independence movement, and Roberto 
focused much of his efforts on promoting the FNLA cause internationally. According to the 
FNLA leadership, the FNLA was not a “closed club”, and that the “National Liberation Front 
of Angola, the revolutionary directory, and the Angolan National Liberation Army, constitute 
a united and fully representative front”.160 
 
Shortly after the PDA-UPA merger, the FNLA went on to form the Revolutionary Government 
of Angola in Exile (GRAE) on 5 April 1962, with its base in Léopoldville. Although it had 
extended an invitation to the MPLA to become part of the GRAE, the MPLA rejected the offer. 
On 29 June 1963, the GRAE was recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as 
the provisional government of Angola, which further increased its international credibility. The 
FNLA continued to exist as an independent entity, although its leader, Holden Roberto, 
simultaneously acted as the GRAE’s prime minister. Furthermore, the FNLA was now able to 
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interact with other African independence movements, such as the African National Congress 
and the Mozambique Liberation Front, who trained together at the FNLA’s Kinkuzu base. 161 
Holden Roberto envisioned the FNLA/GRAE to become a mass independence movement with 
the aim of representing all Angolans. Furthermore, the FNLA stressed that it was ready to start 
negotiating with Portugal in order to achieve a peaceful settlement. In an address to the OAU 
in 1963, the FNLA proclaimed: “We are making war for our national independence, but we are 
equally ready to make peace. We consider that a democratic, peaceful, and negotiated solution 
is possible […].”162  
 
It is also during this time that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to covertly channel 
funds towards Roberto. The USA realised that Portuguese colonial rule in Africa could not last 
forever, and in an attempt to counter the support given to the MPLA by the Soviet Union and 
Cuba, the US identified the FNLA as its preferred partner.163 For the US, countering Soviet 
influence was accompanied by an interest in securing its economic interests in Angola as well. 
A friendly regime in Luanda would ensure the continued access to Angola’s oil fields by US 
companies.164 William Minter notes that although US funding was minuscule, it did help 
strengthen the FNLA’s position vi-á-vis its main rival, the MPLA.165  
 
However, as Mohanty points out, the GRAE was experiencing significant internal turmoil, 
which can be traced back to the UPA-PDA merger. According to Mohanty, the PDA was never 
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sufficiently incorporated into the new FNLA/GRAE, with both parties having maintained 
separate headquarters. In addition, a lack of telecommunication infrastructure made 
communication between the two difficult, to the extent that the PDA felt that it was being 
marginalised and excluded from collective decision making within the FNLA/GRAE. In fact, 
the old UPA structures under the leadership of Roberto were in firm control of all key decisions 
and actions and Mohanty asserts that Roberto was personally in control of all decision 
making.166 
 
In an attempt to alleviate the situation in Angola and to win back the Angolan population onto 
its side, the Portuguese regime implemented a large-scale infrastructure project. This project 
was intended not only to provide jobs for the Angolan masses but was also intended to make 
Angola more attractive to Portuguese settlers, who had been scared off by the uprisings of the 
early 60s. More so, the practice of legislated forced labour was abolished, and an effort was 
made to provide Africans with more opportunities for education, as well as increased access to 
healthcare. However, the violence of the last few years had already left its mark, with the 
ruthless behaviour of the colonial authorities, in particular, having alienated many Africans. 
On the military fronts, the rebellion against the Portuguese army had reached a stalemate, with 
the rebel groups not being able to muster the number of troops needed to make any gains against 
a well-equipped and trained colonial force. However, the colonial army failed to take full 
control of areas where rebels were still operating, and the Portuguese controlled little more than 
the immediate areas surrounding urban centres. Neither side was able to make decisive gains 
against the other.167   
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The above situation allowed the FNLA to operate in the forests of northern Angola. To escape 
attacks and aerial bombings by the Portuguese army, many civilians fled to the dense forests, 
away from the established towns found along Portuguese controlled roads. Civilians who fled 
to the forests, with this often entailing the relocation of entire villages, now found themselves 
in FNLA controlled areas. As noted in the previous section, the FNLA attempted to establish 
a quasi-state like presence, complete with passport controls to control the movement of people, 
customs posts, a communication and information network, as well as village councils overseen 
by FNLA officials. In addition, the establishment of youth organisations and even a trade union 
meant that the FNLA was able to infiltrate all aspects of every-day life. This extended to the 
gathering and distribution of food, as well as the provision of medical treatment and education. 
In terms of military training, the civilian populations of these forest hideouts participated in 
drills and marching practice, with this including children from as young as seven, as well as 
women.168 In effect, the FNLA was beginning to politicise and militarise the populations under 
its control, with the majority of this population consisting of Bakongo living in northern Angola 
as well as refugee camps in southern Congo-Léopoldville.  
 
Although the above paragraphs seem to portray an FNLA that was making strides in attracting 
international support and organising itself more effectively, this view seems to be misleading 
when one takes account of the following report written by the leader of the National Union of 
Students of Angola (NUSA) Jorge Valentim on 23 May 1964, which provides a telling account 
of the challenges facing the FNLA at the time. The NUSA had been a strong ally of the FNLA, 
and Valentim had travelled to Léopoldville in early 1964 to see for himself the situation at the 
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FNLA headquarters. In his report, Valentim notes that there existed a lack of communication 
between the FNLA leadership and its lower structures and that the leadership failed to issue 
concrete instructions to its followers. Calling for a solution to this particular problem, he noted: 
“The Angolan masses at once want the realisation of a Congress by all means in a short time 
without any delay, to permit the establishment of a dialogue between the leaders and the masses 
and the real participation of all Angolan patriots.”169  
 
Valentim goes on to note with concern the arbitrary arrest and detention of FNLA soldiers of 
non-Bakongo origin deemed as having been subversive. What is more, Valentim points out 
that these arrests were conducted with the aid of Congolese officials, and that those arrested 
were subsequently held in Congolese prisons, without being charged or tried. He states:  
Very recently 155 soldiers originally from the Central, Eastern and Southern Angola, ‘Chokwes, Luhenas, 
Umbundus, Ganguelas and Cuanhamas’ left the military base at Kinkuzu with the consent of the Major to 
go to Léopoldville to present their case legally to the Front on their military strategies which were 
imperatively necessary for the betterment of the Army struggle. Mr. Holden Roberto made an appeal to 
the Congolese soldiers and the Congolese Security to get them arrested. The heroic resistance of our 
soldiers to the unqualified arrests caused three deaths.170  
 
Valentim concluded that he had been able to see a confidential note authored by the GRAE 
Charge of Interior Affairs and addressed to the Congolese National Security, specifically 
asking for the Congolese authorities to intervene by arresting those soldiers who were seen as 
agitators.171 
 
The views presented in the NUSA account are supported by Brinkman, who notes that Holden 
Roberto’s relationship to Congolese politicians and officials stemmed from an attempt to 
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buttress his position as leader of the FNLA. In fact, Brinkman argues that “The UPA/FNLA 
was firmly embedded in the Congolese political elite […]”, with Roberto speaking of Joseph 
Mobutu as being “the father of the Angolan revolution.”172 Also, with regard to expelling non-
Bakongo from the FNLA, Brinkman notes that even within the Bakongo leadership of the 
FNLA, differences caused significant internal power struggles. According to Brinkman, this 
can be traced back to the time of the UPA-PDA merger in 1962. At the time, the Bakongo 
throne was still involved in a succession dispute, with different factions within the Bakongo 
community, the Bazombos on the one side and the Basansalas on the other, supporting 
opposing candidates. While the Bazombos were primarily Catholics, the Basansalas were 
Protestant. What is more, while the PDA consisted mostly of Bazombos, Holden Roberto’s 
UPA had been dominated by Basansalas. 173 
 
Further concerns are underlined in a memorandum to Roberto co-authored by the leadership of 
the FNLA’s Zambia regional headquarters based in Lusaka. The memorandum, dated 20 
September 1964, goes on to highlight various issues of concern. The regional headquarters, 
which had been established in March 1964, had extended its presence to 70 towns across 
Zambia and had managed to grow its membership to some 2500 followers. Despite being able 
to gather this substantial amount of support among the Angolan exile community in Zambia, 
the memorandum laments the lack of communication between the Zambia branch of the FNLA 
and the movement’s headquarters in Léopoldville. More precisely, the memorandum notes:  
Since the party was started here in March, we never received even a single letter from you the party 
president to tell us how we could direct our people from this end. […] Up to now people of this end do not 
know what plans are being made on the future operation in Angola. Due to this the office has failed to tell 
our followers and those interested in our struggle what picture an independent Angola will have. Our 
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president [Roberto] has attended conferences but this office has not been informed of the results of such 
conferences, e.g. the Cairo Conference.174 
 
This lack of communication as outlined above is evident in the fact that the Zambia office still 
went by the name UPA instead of FNLA/GRAE. Specifically, the memorandum also laments 
the lack of information concerning the agenda of the newly formed GRAE, and its relation to 
the FNLA. As the memorandum states: “It is now seven months but this office has not been 
informed of the structure of our government in Exile. This office has no knowledge of the 
Prime Minister’s cabinet composition. […] [This] office does not know what relationship the 
UPA as a party has to the Government in exile. This is because we have not been informed of 
the people who are running the party now.”175 As with the NUSA report, it is evident that there 
seemed to exist a broad-based communication problem between the Léopoldville headquarters 
and regional structures. As the above example suggests, crucial information regarding the 
movement’s leadership composition, the outcome of important conferences, and fundamental 
structural changes to the movement, were not communicated effectively, if at all.  
 
While the memorandum also mentions a lack of funds which negatively affected the Lusaka 
office’s ability to organise its personnel, as well as its ability to effectively organise recruitment 
drives, it also mentions that there existed no support in terms of training and deploying the 
military volunteers it had managed to recruit. As the memorandum to Roberto states: “We have 
so many young people who want to join the Angolan liberation army but alas! no instruction 
or plans of what to do with these young freedom fighters have been received. We have written 
you on this matter for several times […]. But your people are disappointed in that not even one 
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young man has been sent for military training from this wing. We have got about 500 young 
people waiting for recruitment.”176 
 
The above is of particular interest as the FNLA was primarily an independence movement 
engaged in the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. The fact that it was not able to 
effectively train recruits from regional structures and deploy them in battle again shows the 
lack of organisational capacity the FNLA military leadership suffered from. As John Cann 
notes, even though the FNLA had several thousand troops, most of these were very poorly 
trained and ill-disciplined, often not leaving their bases at all.177 Holden Roberto even noted 
with pride that the FNLA had provided training to the first SWAPO fighters at its Kinkuzu 
base.178 However, this is in direct contrast to a SWAPO official’s assessment of the FNLA 
training camps, who noted: “[…] I visited Holden Roberto’s camps near the Angolan border 
with a view to sending our young men there. But the atmosphere in Roberto’s training camps 
was very bad, and I could not recommend such a course.”179 
 
 Also, the memorandum laments the fact that other Angolan liberation movements were able 
to recruit among the Angolan exiles in Zambia with ease while the FNLA branch struggled to 
do so due to the lack of capacity and organisational support it was experiencing. Lastly, the 
memorandum goes on to state that: “[…] political misunderstandings in our GRAE […] have 
resulted in our revolutionary army’s standstill for almost six months.”180 In conclusion, the 
memorandum lists a set of considerations for the FNLA leadership to consider, which include 
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the following: “That this administrative weakness and reluctance in attending to our difficulties 
is the result of the unstable position of the GRAE. […] That this is because our party 
constitution is incomplete in that it does not match with our struggle.”181 Furthermore, the 
memorandum calls for the organisation of a conference to be attended by all FNLA branches, 
so that the existing constitution should be amended to show: “[…] a clear and simple political 
direction, […] what form of government the Independent Angola will have, [and for] the party 
to be non-tribal and non-racial.”182 It seems that the FNLA’s lack of organisational and 
communication capacity, which can be seen to have stemmed from a lack of leadership on the 
part of the FNLA’s senior leadership, undermined the FNLA’s ability not only to recruit new 
supporters but also to train new fighters. More so, it seems that there existed significant 
difficulties in organising the FNLA’s forces, with these seemingly having been in a dismal 
state. Ill-disciplined and poorly trained, equipped and cared for, it would seem that vast 
numbers of soldiers were confined to their bases while the FNLA’s leadership suffered from 
incapacitating infighting or simply a lack of action.  
 
So too, stark differences between Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, who had been 
instrumental in the creation of the FNLA and acted as the GRAE’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
led to Savimbi being expelled from the FNLA. Being an ethnic Ovimbundu, Savimbi’s 
inclusion in the FNLA and appointment as GRAE foreign minister was meant to be a strategic 
move to attract support beyond the FNLA’s traditional Bakongo base. However, the FNLA, 
which was still perceived to be a Bakongo group by its critics, continued to struggle to attract 
support from other ethnic groups.183 In fact, many other non-Bakongo members left the FNLA 
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during the mid-1960s, and Marcum notes that Roberto was purposefully eliminating rivals 
within the movement, replacing them with fellow Bakongo aides to cement his authority.184 
Savimbi’s expulsion primarily stemmed from a difference of opinion with Roberto over 
whether the FNLA should move its leadership to Angola to supervise the rebellion. While 
Savimbi, opted for the latter move, this was opposed by Roberto. Savimbi’s sentiment had not 
been unfounded, as Roberto had focused most of his efforts on international diplomatic 
activity.185 In fact, John Cann notes that according to the CIA, Roberto had not set foot in 
Angola since 1956.186 UPA fighters also viewed the UPA leadership critically, and according 
to Brinkman, some UPA leaders were unfamiliar with the conditions their fighters faced in the 
forests, seeing the forests as an exotic, and hostile place. Eventually, Savimbi denounced both 
the FNLA and MPLA at an OAU meeting in Cairo in 1964, criticising both for not wanting to 
lead the struggle against colonialism from within Angola. 187 Savimbi’s expulsion was followed 
by the resignation of Jose Joao Liahuca on 24 July 1964, formerly the director of the FNLA’s 
refugee aid service, while another prominent non-Bakongo FNLA leader, Alexandre Taty, 
resigned as well. More worryingly, Mohanty mentions that the commander of the FNLA’s 
Kinkuzu base pledged allegiance to a rival nationalist group, accusing Roberto of “adventurism 
and demagogy”. 188 In fact, Mohanty points out that the FNLA was facing competition from a 
plethora of Bakongo micro-parties, some of whom had in fact broken away from the FNLA 
and its predecessors. Although these parties remained insignificant, they show how volatile the 
situation had become in northern Angola, with various parties seeking to extract support from 
the same Bakongo communities.189  
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In 1964, the FNLA was dealt another blow, when Moïse Tshombe became Prime Minister of 
Congo-Léopoldville. Formerly the head of the government of Katanga province, Tshombe had 
had close relations with the Portuguese. When he became Prime Minister, the Portuguese were 
able to convince Tshombe to harass the FNLA, which effectively paralysed its guerrilla 
activities in northern Angola. The situation only changed in mid-1965, when Joseph-Desiré 
Mobutu carried out a coup against the Tshombe government and instated himself as President. 
As will be noted later, Mobutu had an amicable relationship with Roberto, and the FNLA was 
able to continue its guerrilla activities.190  
 
From the above paragraphs, it seems that the FNLA’s rhetoric did not always match its actions 
on the ground. While Roberto focused much of his efforts on courting the international 
community, the commentary provided by Brinkman, as well as the examples listed in the 
NUSA report and the memorandum of the FNLA’s Zambia branch, reveal that the FNLA was 
facing significant internal challenges. While Roberto used his connections to the Congolese 
authorities to crack down on any form of internal dissent, FNLA fighters lamented the 
conditions they faced on the front lines while their commanders lived in comfort and security 
in Léopoldville. So too, it was becoming evident that Roberto relied on Congolese support to 
remain in power, while his focus on his international diplomatic efforts did little to improve 
the internal coherence of the FNLA, with the case of the FNLA’s Zambia branch being a telling 
example. 
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1965-1973: The War for Independence Continues 
By the mid-1960s, the colonial regime had some success in establishing control over Angola’s 
rural populations in northern and eastern Angola. Its strategy of forced relocation moved entire 
villages out of the battle areas, and rehoused them in military garrison towns, surrounded by 
barbed wire and watchtowers, where their movements could be strictly controlled.  Effectively, 
the Portuguese regime was able to deprive the rebel groups of their popular support bases, and 
specifically in northern Angola, the FNLA found itself operating in areas that had largely been 
depopulated.191 The Portuguese effectively combined terror and violence with a hearts and 
minds campaign to convince Angolans to move to garrison towns. This also included promising 
access to goods, social services and peace. According to Brinkman, the north of Angola had 
effectively been turned into a military zone.192 
 
For the FNLA, 1965 not only marked the year of a coup attempt aimed at ousting Roberto as 
the movement’s leader, it also saw more accusations levelled against the FNLA and its 
leadership. 193  In a letter entitled “Roberto betrays both the revolution and the masses”, dated 
15 January 1965, Savimbi criticised the way in which the FNLA/GRAE leadership organised 
the armed rebellion against the Portuguese. He stated: “[…] a revolution is not a mechanical 
process which depends exclusively on external aid. A revolution depends, among other things, 
on the total support of the popular masses as well as, on just and firm leadership capable of 
analysing at each moment, the development of the struggle within the country […]”.194 Savimbi 
went on to say that he believed that the support and morale of the Angolan masses in support 
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of the armed struggle was very high and that many were prepared to join the FNLA’s armed 
wing. However, Savimbi argued that the FNLA’s ability to lead the armed struggle finally 
failed because of Holden Roberto, due to “The absence of collective leadership […]”, and 
because “The G.R.A.E. has become the personal instrument of Holden’s ambitious intrigues. 
His personal whims constitute the law.”195 
 
Furthermore, Savimbi pointed out Roberto’s paranoia concerning any possible form of internal 
dissent or attempts to remove him from his post. Savimbi, like NUSA leader Valentim, noted 
how Roberto relied on the assistance of the Congolese authorities to harass and arrest those 
suspected of subversion. Furthermore, Savimbi alleged that millions of US dollars in aid money 
were appropriated by greedy FNLA officials, including Roberto himself, diverting much-
needed funds from buying weapons and other essential equipment for FNLA troops. Also, as 
noted in the previous chapter, it is alleged that Roberto even sold weapons and medical supplies 
to use the profits for his personal gain, establishing a vast private commercial empire in 
Léopoldville. Savimbi also alluded to the fact that Roberto was favouring an inner core of 
Bakongo supporters while actively trying to get rid of non-Bakongo FNLA members and 
leaders who he saw as posing a threat to his leadership.196  
 
Lastly, Savimbi lamented the lack of political consciousness within the FNLA, specifically 
among its troops, and that, therefore, the FNLA was incapable of winning over the popular 
support of the Angolan masses. Savimbi argued that the arbitrary killings of MPLA fighters 
and civilians, especially those of non-Bakongo origin, alienated many Angolans from the 
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FNLA. This goes hand in hand with the allegedly poor shape of the FNLA army, and Savimbi 
alleged that FNLA soldiers were ill-disciplined, using their weapons and ammunitions to hunt 
animals to sell the meat to locals, rather than using their limited supplies to fight the Portuguese 
army.197 After his expulsion, Savimbi gathered some supporters and moved to Lusaka, Zambia, 
where he contemplated his next move. Significantly, while the FNLA continued to conduct its 
military operations in northern Angola, the independence of Zambia in 1964 allowed the 
MPLA to open an Eastern Front, and the MPLA no longer had to pass through FNLA territory 
to launch its guerrilla operations.198 
 
Another high-ranking official to resign was John Chikasa, the former Chief Publicity Secretary 
of the UPA/FNLA, who resigned from his post in early January 1965. In his resignation letter 
to Roberto, Chikasa noted that he resigned due to the party’s lack of vision, the interference of 
American imperialism which according to him hindered political progress, the interference of 
other anti-liberation groups which “[…] slow down the political struggle towards independence 
and freedom of Angola”, as well as his decision to no longer being able to work under 
conditions of “[…] corruption and a state of indecision”.199 
 
These examples of grievances listed by Chikasa and Savimbi illustrate the problems that the 
FNLA faced at the time. While Roberto and his inner circle were enriching themselves and 
ruthlessly repressing any form of dissent with the aid of the Congolese authorities, the party’s 
ability to lead the armed struggle in Angola suffered. Infighting, ethnic tensions, a lack of clear 
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leadership and organisational capacity, seemed to have paralysed the FNLA/GRAE during this 
time. 
 
So too, after the FNLA Zambia branch’s letter to Holden Roberto seemingly went unanswered, 
it resorted to writing a letter to the Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, dated 17 February 
1965, in order to plead for assistance in an effort to establish communications between the 
FNLA headquarters and its Zambia branch. While reiterating many of the grievances that were 
listed in their previous letter to Roberto, they went on to state that the Angolan revolution was 
passing through a period of serious crisis. The Zambia FNLA branch lamented that they had 
written 22 letters to the FNLA leadership in Léopoldville, all of which had remained 
unanswered. Referring to Roberto, the letter went on to state: “As a result of his bad and weak 
leadership, some people from U.P.A. have at occasions attempted to break away new parties, 
in protest.”200 From this example, it is evident that the FNLA leadership’s continued inaction 
and lack of communication were threatening the Zambia branch’s ability to function. 
 
The memorandum to the Zambian president went on to state that they were entirely “[ignorant] 
of what goes on in Léopoldville”.201 The letter also noted with concern the apparent “tribalistic” 
nature of the Roberto leadership, claiming that Roberto seemed not to want to work together 
with southern Angolans and that in fact, the reason why their letters have gone unanswered 
was because Roberto was only interested in fighting for the liberation of northern Angola.202 
Evidently, a lack of communication and assurance from the Léopoldville headquarters meant 
                                                          
200 Union of the Peoples of Angola (U.P.A.) Zambia Regional Headquarters, Memorandum to the Government 
of Zambia, Lusaka, 17 February 1965, Arquivo Mario Pinto de Andrade, 04308.002.014, Casa Comum, 
Fundação Mario Soares,  pp. 1-3. 
201 UPA Zambia, Memorandum to the Government of Zambia, p. 3. 
202 UPA Zambia, Memorandum to the Government of Zambia, pp. 4-5. 
73 
 
that such rumours went unchallenged, and were allowed to spread unhindered. In conclusion, 
the authors of the memorandum ask the Zambian government to relay some of their concerns 
and suggestions to Roberto, which include that Roberto be persuaded to move the FNLA 
headquarters to another country, as it seemed as though the FNLA was not able to operate 
freely and unhindered in the Congo, given the Congolese authorities’ constant meddling in 
internal FNLA affairs.203 
 
On 13 March 1966, Jonas Savimbi went on to form his own liberation movement inside eastern 
Angola, named the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). UNITA 
remained quite small for the first few years of its existence, lacking the organisational and 
military capacity needed to launch significant attacks against the Portuguese. The FNLA at one 
point invited UNITA to become part of GRAE, but both parties failed to settle on the terms of 
the proposed merger.204 This can be assumed not only to have been a result of their starkly 
different ideological convictions, the MPLA was left leaning, UNITA was influenced by 
African Nationalist doctrine while the FNLA followed a more conservative centre-right path, 
there were other differences as well. While the FNLA was seen as a narrow Bakongo movement 
by its rivals, the MPLA sought support from the creole mestiço and urban intellectual elites, 
while UNITA gained much support from the Ovimbundu communities of Angola’s Central 
Highlands, to which Savimbi belonged. More so, each party received backing from supporters 
who did not necessarily see eye to eye, and for whom cooperation between the independence 
movements was not in their best interests. While the MPLA received much support from the 
Soviet Union, Cuba and Congo-Brazzaville, the FNLA was supported by Congo-Kinshasa and 
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the United States, while UNITA solicited support from China. As can be seen, these allegiances 
reflect the Cold War rivalries at the time. 205 
 
The reliance on foreign aid was not only a result of shared ideological convictions, but also 
stemmed from the inability of other independent African states to fund, equip and support the 
independence movements, not just in Angola, but across Africa. In order to continue their 
rebellions, the Angolan rebel groups had to actively solicit aid from international partners, and 
ideology offered an important tool to establish bonds with potential funders. As Houser argues, 
ideological rhetoric was used by African independence movements to attract support. 
According to Houser, within the Cold War setting, this approach necessitated identifying with 
either the Soviet or Western bloc.206 
 
It is also important to note that much of this support, on the part of the USA specifically, which 
included generous financial aid, was done covertly. Portugal was a NATO member, and the 
strategic location of the Portuguese Azores Islands, where the USA maintained a military base, 
meant that western allies could not openly support the Angolan independence movements. In 
the case of the FNLA, much support was channelled through Congo-Kinshasa under Mobutu, 
who had come to power in 1965 and was a staunch ally of the West, receiving much support 
from the USA himself.207 More so, the FNLA’s relation with Zaire was strengthened by family 
ties between Mobutu and Roberto, and the FNLA thus became a natural ally. Roberto had 
purposefully divorced his wife in order to marry Mobutu’s sister, thus becoming his brother-
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in-law.208 This bond extended to the FNLA’s origins as a Bakongo nationalist movement, with 
a significant portion of the old Kongo kingdom having been incorporated into the then Belgian 
Congo when the arbitrarily drawn colonial borders were created between that colony and 
Angola. 209 However critics were wary of this close relationship, and as the Portuguese 
newspaper Expresso noted, “The FNLA is Holden Roberto and Holden Roberto belongs to 
Mobutu, to whom he is connected by an umbilical cord”.210 Furthermore, as John Cann notes, 
the US intelligence regarded Roberto as being subservient to Mobutu, “who protected him from 
internal challenges to his leadership”.211 Nevertheless, by the mid-1960s, the FNLA had the 
strongest military of all the three main independence movements in terms of troop numbers 
and weapons and enjoyed significant diplomatic recognition despite its significant internal 
divisions. As in earlier stages of the war, the FNLA and MPLA did not get along, and 
skirmishes between rebel fighters of the two factions were not uncommon and often led to 
casualties. It was also not uncommon for one group to capture fighters of an opposing group.212  
 
The rivalry between the various nationalist groups also extended to producing propaganda to 
celebrate the victories of their group, while denouncing the other groups as illegitimate and 
cooperating with the Portuguese. Part of this propaganda included announcing territorial gains. 
By 1967, the FNLA had announced that it was in control of 250 thousand square kilometres or 
roughly one-fifth of Angola’s total territory and that it planned to open up new fronts in eastern 
and southern Angola. In contrast, the MPLA claimed that it controlled large parts of eastern 
Angola while also being engaged in battles in northern Angola and Cabinda while UNITA 
                                                          
208 Melady, T., and Melady, M. (eds.) Ten African Heroes: The Sweep of Independence in Black Africa, Orbis 
Books, New York, 2011, p. 99. 
209 Leão and Rupiya, “A Military History of the Angolan Armed Forces”, pp. 11-12. 
210 Expresso, Lisbon, 17 September 1974, p. 18. 
211 Cann, “The Artful Use of National Power”, p. 204. 
212 Houser, “African Liberation Movements”, p. 12. 
76 
 
claimed control of large parts of eastern, central and southern Angola.213 However, the size of 
the areas under the movements’ control, in addition to the extent of their control in these areas, 
remain questionable.  
 
In 1971, the FNLA was dealt a severe blow as the OAU decided to withdraw its recognition of 
the GRAE as Angola’s provisional government. This was partially brought about by the 
insistence of the MPLA, who argued that it was in control of a greater area of Angola than the 
FNLA while other African countries had previously criticised the GRAE for its inaction.214 
More so, personal attacks against Roberto claimed that while he continued to live a lavish 
lifestyle in Kinshasa, bankrolled by US funding, he did little to lead his fighters at the front.215 
Roberto was said to have used the foreign aid to set up a commercial empire, and critics claimed 
that the FNLA leadership had become a bunch of profiteers and wage earners. While Roberto 
was driving around on the streets of Kinshasa in a black Mercedes, his troops were said to have 
been “underfed, ragged, and villainous”.216 In fact, the OAU’s decision to withdraw its support 
for the FNLA/GRAE was also spurred on by perceptions that the FNLA had become 
incapacitated, and was no longer able to lead the Angolan struggle for independence. In an 
interview conducted with Holden Roberto in 1996, he stated that there was an active agenda 
aimed at excluding the FNLA/GRAE from OAU conferences. Referring to the 1969 Khartoum 
Conference, Roberto states: “We were not invited, because, obviously, there was an agenda. 
[…] MPLA was present. At that time, MPLA did not have any strength. It did not fight. It did 
not have a base and no front in Angola. The only movement that was fighting was FNLA.”217 
In spite of Roberto’s above of having been the only movement fighting, Mohanty argues that 
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between 1961 and 1971, the FNLA had only achieved two of its objectives. The one being 
denying the MPLA access to northern Angola by sealing off the Angola/Congo borders, while 
secondly, maintaining a military presence in northern Angola, albeit marginal. According to 
Mohanty, “Given their logistic and other advantages these activities [reveal] little more than 
dismal failure.”218 
 
Another blow was delivered to the FNLA in June 1972 when it experienced an attempted 
mutiny at its main base Kinkuzu in what was now Zaire. The mutiny attempt sparked tensions 
between the Bazombo and Basansala factions within the FNLA, with Roberto eventually 
expelling the most important Bazombo leaders from the movement.219 Taking note of the 1965 
coup attempt, it seems that the FNLA suffered from frequent power struggles and infighting, 
primarily the result of Holden Roberto’s suspicious and mistrustful character, which stemmed 
from his desire to secure his power and authority as FNLA’s supreme leader. Given this period 
of instability, Roberto agreed to form an alliance with the MPLA that would see the formation 
of the Angolan Supreme Liberation Council (CSLA), with the MPLA in control of organising 
the insurgency, while the FNLA would focus on the administration of rebel-held areas, as well 
as the CSLA’s diplomatic affairs. This attempt at cooperation was, however, short-lived, and 
did not bear any fruit.220 An attempt at unifying the three main rebel groups during a 1973 
Lusaka meeting failed to produce any results as well, and as such, the Angolan war for 
independence was effectively fought out by three distinct and separate independence 
movements. 221 In fact, there had been several attempts at unifying the groups going back to 
1961, with Zaire’s Mobutu being particularly active in trying to bring together the FNLA and 
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MPLA.222 In part, this lack of cooperation was brought about by mutual distrust and 
suspicion.223 It was also in 1973 that China provided the FNLA with significant material 
assistance, and provided 120 trainers to train FNLA troops. For China, its assistance to a non-
socialist FNLA was motivated not only to counter Soviet assistance to the MPLA but also in 
order increase its influence in Central Africa.224 
 
Again, although the FNLA did have more troops on the ground, enjoyed significant 
international support, and had large weapons stockpiles, its apparent advantages over the 
MPLA and UNITA did not translate into significant military successes against the Portuguese 
regime. Although the FNLA was purporting to lead the struggle against colonialism, it had 
very little results to show for it. The legitimacy derived from its assertion of being the leader 
of the Angolan revolution was therefore dealt a heavy blow by the OAU’s 1971 decision to 
withdraw its recognition of the FNLA’s status as being Angola’s provisional government. The 
1972 coup attempt again highlighted the FNLA's precarious internal situation, and the failed 
attempt at cooperating with the MPLA in 1973 in the form of the CSLA highlights that the 
FNLA desperately attempted to regain its former standing. Mohanty proposes that the early 
1970s were marked by the FNLA’s gradual decline. She states: “Beginning as a traditionalist 
organisation, devoted to local ends and sometimes merely personal ends, it remained what it 
had been in the beginning, a movement led by traditional elites. The movement lost much of 
its active and promising leadership as Roberto eliminated all potential rivals and asserted his 
own conservative direction. […] Roberto’s main aim had been ‘to keep himself in being’, 
somehow, and to destroy the rival MPLA […].”225 Thus, according to this assessment, rather 
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than focusing his efforts on winning the war for independence, Roberto was preoccupied with 
eliminating the FNLA’s main rival, while simultaneously trying to keep himself in power at all 
costs. 
 
1974-1975: The Lisbon Coup and Increased Tensions 
By 1974, the conflict between the Portuguese and the three independence movements had 
reached a stalemate. The colonial army could do little more than keep the rebels in check while 
the independence movements did not possess the equipment or troop numbers to engage the 
colonial regime beyond isolated raids and sabotage acts. An end to the war at this time was not 
seen as being likely. Moreover, the Portuguese colonial war, which by this time was being 
fought out in all of Portugal’s African possessions, grew increasingly unpopular in Portugal. 
As the war dragged on, there was a need for greater number of troops, with this need being 
filled by military conscription. As a result, draft evasion in Portugal had become commonplace. 
Also, the colonial war demanded vast amounts of resources and was becoming a financial 
burden. 226  For instance, Mohanty notes that by 1967, the colonial war had cost Portugal some 
$300 000 a day, and an estimated $120 million a year. By 1968, half of Portugal’s regular 
budget was allocated to the military.227  Given this context, a group of Portuguese officers 
staged a military coup on 25 April 1974, in what has become known as the Carnation 
Revolution. According to Minter, this group of officers, known as the Armed Forces Movement 
(MFA), had already started meeting in 1973, no longer convinced that the Portuguese colonial 
wars were worth fighting for.228 However, the coup primarily intended to bring an end to the 
colonial war, and a coherent political and organisational plan never existed. What is more, the 
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coup, and the eventual decision to grant independence to all Portuguese possession in Africa, 
came at a time of significant political turmoil in Portugal. For instance, Portugal had six 
provisional governments and two presidents between 1974 and 1976. As such, the 1974 coup 
was followed by not only political instability in Portugal itself but also increased instability 
within Angola. The colonial authority structures soon began to erode, and it is within this 
context that the decolonisation process took place. 229 
 
The cessation of fighting which followed the coup allowed the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA to 
move freely within Angola for the first time, and each group sought to consolidate its support 
bases.230 For all three, establishing a presence for themselves in the capital Luanda became of 
paramount concern. Interestingly, Roberto purchased Luanda’s largest daily newspaper, as 
well as a television station, to disseminate FNLA propaganda.231 The FNLA also produced 
propaganda pamphlets and dropped these over Luanda using aeroplanes. One of these depicted 
a picture of Roberto with the caption: “God rules in heaven Holden rules on earth.”232 However, 
increased rivalry, which stemmed from the distrust and suspicion of earlier times, came to lead 
to increased clashes and military confrontations between the groups. In fact, there had been a 
concerted effort by the liberation groups to build their militaries, and by 1 January 1975, the 
FNLA army had grown its strength to some 21 000 troops. Another significant development 
was that African servicemen that had been conscripted into the colonial army were now free to 
leave, and in many instances, they went on to join one of the independence movements, taking 
their weapons with them. Moreover, the Portuguese officers behind the coup were 
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communist/socialist inclined, and it seemed as if they were favouring the MPLA. As such, a 
lot of the colonial army’s weaponry found itself on its way to the MPLA.233  
 
The Alvor Agreement of 15 January 1975 set out the terms of Angolan independence, which 
included the setting up of a transitional government made up of Portuguese, FNLA, MPLA and 
UNITA officials that would see Angola to independence, which was set for 11 November of 
the same year. Another term of the Alvor Agreement called for elections to be held to establish 
a constituent assembly that would lead Angola through independence and beyond. 234 These 
elections were to be held before independence, on 31 October to be exact, and every Angolan 
of voting age would be eligible to vote. In anticipation of the vote, the FNLA attempted to 
attract the support of the remaining Portuguese in Angola. Unlike the MPLA, which advocated 
for widespread social and political reform, the FNLA promised to keep the status quo in place, 
enabling the Portuguese minority to maintain its privileges. However, Heimer argues that 
Angola’s population was most probably going to vote along ethnic lines, and with the FNLA’s 
support base, the Bakongo, making up only about 20% of the population, the MPLA and 
UNITA would dominate in the elections. Heimer points out for instance, that UNITA, which 
had been the weakest of the three movements in military terms at this point, could draw on the 
support of some two million Ovimbundu voters. As such, the proposed political process would 
have serious consequences for the FNLA, and threatened to erode its ambitions to lead the 
country. At this point, the FNLA was still militarily superior to the MPLA and UNITA and 
decided to seize power instead.235 However, as Heywood points out, the conflict between the 
three movements, particularly in the case of the FNLA and UNITA, were dominated by ethnic 
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overtones. The FNLA had been gradually expelling some 60 000 Ovimbundu workers from 
the coffee plantations of northern Angola while many Ovimbundu also fled MPLA held areas. 
Many chose to move back to the Ovimbundu dominated Central Highlands. According to 
Heywood, MPLA and FNLA hostility “pushed the issue of ethnic politics to the fore during 
1974-5, [and] more and more Ovimbundu came to identify themselves with UNITA.”236 It is 
due to these developments that UNITA came to be seen as an Ovimbundu organisation, and 
Heywood points out that UNITA represented the first opportunity for the Ovimbundu to 
become a political force.237 In part, Heywood’s analysis backs up Heimer’s reasoning that the 
FNLA feared that it would lose out in an election, as it could not compete with the Ovimbundu 
support that UNITA enjoyed. This view is also supported by Minter, who argues that “a 
campaign based on ethnic and regional appeal would have favoured UNITA.”238 Minter notes 
that if people voted according to ethnic affiliation, the FNLA risked overwhelming electoral 
defeat.239 
 
 Instead of implementing the provisions of the Alvor agreement, which also called for the 
creation of a unitary military, all three parties were more concerned with taking control of 
Luanda. They assumed that whoever was in control of the capital at independence, would 
effectively control the whole of Angola, with this being of particular concern for the FNLA. 
This rivalry heightened tensions between the three groups. At this time, the MPLA suffered 
significant infighting, and one breakaway faction led by Daniel Chipenda went on to align itself 
with the FNLA. In fact, Chipenda had been expelled from the MPLA, being accused of having 
been involved in several assassination attempts against the MPLA’s president Agostinho 
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Neto.240 This move escalated the tensions between the MPLA and the FNLA, to such an extent 
that they found themselves engaging in sporadic battles on the streets of Luanda. In response, 
the MPLA called for the establishment of people's defence units and began arming and 
organising ordinary civilians. Ethnic and regional origin was beginning to be associated with 
political affiliation, and people were beginning to be targeted merely for speaking a certain 
language. While the MPLA mobilised the large Mbundu population living in Luanda, the 
FNLA had a comparatively small support base in the capital.241 By August 1975 the MPLA 
managed to largely expel the FNLA from Luanda, with UNITA leaving voluntarily soon 
afterwards. It is within this context that outside actors entered the fray. November 1975 saw 
the MPLA receiving significant support from both Cuba and the Soviets which enabled it to 
turn the tables on the FNLA militarily. While the FNLA consolidated its hold on northern 
Angola, UNITA set itself up in the Central Highlands city of Huambo.242  Minter points out 
that a gradual escalation of violence was increasingly coupled with external intervention, as 
will be seen below.243  
 
In response to Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA, the FNLA increased its efforts to 
attract outside assistance. The FNLA presented itself as a centre-right organisation striving for 
democracy, and solicited the support of western nations by arguing that it aimed to halt the 
advance of Soviet imperialism in Angola.  In this regard, the FNLA received direct support 
from South Africa and Zaire, with both countries sending troops while the USA provided covert 
support in the form of funding and weapons. For Zaire, support for a friendly regime in the 
form of the FNLA would also mean gaining access to significant natural resources, particularly 
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the oil fields of Cabinda. Moreover, the MPLA had been supporting Katangese opposition 
forces agitating for the independence of Katanga, and as such, Mobutu’s support of the FNLA 
was tied directly to concerns relating to Zairean stability. The FNLA, Zaire, South Africa and 
later UNITA, agreed to a military alliance that would see South African troops supported by 
FNLA and UNITA troops march on Luanda from the south while Zairean and FNLA troops 
were to march on Luanda from the north. 244  
 
To this end, in late August 1975, South Africa was to train FNLA soldiers under the command 
of Daniel Chipenda, who had been stationed in the south of Angola. The South African military 
officials who were to conduct the training of the FNLA soldiers noted that they were a sorry 
sight, wearing tattered clothes, with many not wearing any shoes, as well as being malnourished 
and poorly trained. The following is a South African account describing the condition of the 
FNLA fighters, shortly after having met up with them to commence their training: “[…] the 
base [was] shockingly filthy and neglected. Roughly 300 hungry and badly clothed troops – 
many without shoes and sores on their feet – were standing on a dusty parade ground.”245 As 
the South Africans lamented, these were the troops they had to train to fight the 
MPLA/Cuban/Soviet coalition. Evidently, the FNLA’s lack of organisational capacity at a 
leadership level had dire consequences for its troops fighting on the ground, as at least in the 
case presented here, basic provisions such as adequate uniforms, shoes and food, could not be 
supplied.  
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Another account by Jan Breytenbach, who acted as the commander of the South African 
training mission, recalls that the FNLA base where the training was to take place was in an 
abhorrent state:  
“The approach was through a several-hundred-metre-wide minefield of human excrement, through which 
one had to step gingerly […]. Millions of flies swarmed everywhere and the stench was all-pervading. […] 
They were rubbish! Absolutely rubbish … They were … I actually felt sorry for them because they hadn’t 
eaten properly for weeks and were starving, and had sores on their legs and so on. They were Chipenda’s 
army. Chipenda was the FNLA commander in the south […]. I think they were robbing banks to 
survive.”246 
 
After Breytenbach’s arrival, the troops were assembled on the parade ground. Breytenbach 
recalls: “They were, without a doubt, the scruffiest, most underfed, worst armed and most 
unwarlike body of troops I had ever seen in my life.”247 Instead of wearing camouflage 
uniforms, many of the FNLA soldiers were wearing a mismatched array of brightly coloured 
trousers and t-shirts, as well as baseball caps and sunglasses.248 Interestingly, as will be 
discussed later, many of these FNLA soldiers would go on to join the SADF’s 32 Battalion.  
 
US and Soviet support brought with it the rapid growth of the FNLA and MPLA weapons 
stockpiles. The Soviets, for instance, supplied the MPLA with an estimated 27 shiploads of 
weapons between April and October 1975, while the USA covertly channelled some $60 
million in funds to the FNLA. As such, the conflict that ensued between the three groups rapidly 
moved from its guerrilla warfare origins, and evolved into a conventional style war, which 
included thousands of troops and heavy weapons. As pointed out earlier, this had the effect that 
the FNLA and MPLA specifically, preferred to settle this dispute by military means rather than 
by political compromise, as each group was convinced that it could succeed militarily. This 
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stance was spurred on even further by the willingness of the Soviets and the USA to supply 
weapons and funding.249   
 
1975-1978: Independence, Civil War, and the Demise of the FNLA 
It is within the above context that Portugal handed over power on 11 November 1975, not to a 
unitary government, not even to a particular group, but to the people of Angola. While the 
MPLA declared independence in Luanda, this was met by rival declarations of independence 
by the FNLA in Ambriz, and UNITA in Huambo. Shortly afterwards, the FNLA and UNITA 
formed a coalition government based in Huambo. In the meantime, the columns of South 
African-FNLA-UNITA, and FNLA-Zairean troops marching on Luanda from the south and 
north of Angola respectively encountered heavy opposition by MPLA-Cuban troops, supported 
by Soviet military advisors. By February 1976, Cuba had sent some 11 000 troops to Angola 
in support of the MPLA.250 The northern FNLA-Zairean coalition forces managed to advance 
within 12 km of Luanda before the South African troops, who were now some 100km south of 
Luanda, were ordered to stop and retreat to South-West Africa. It turned out that information 
about the US government’s covert support of the FNLA had been leaked to the media in early 
1976, and the US ceased its support to the FNLA soon afterwards. An end to US support meant 
that the South African government was not willing to risk going it alone, and it withdrew its 
troops in March. The South Africans, did, however, continue to support UNITA in southern 
Angola up until the late 1980s. Additionally, the South African involvement also had the effect 
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of rallying African support for the MPLA, with the result being that the OAU finally recognised 
the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola in February 1976.251 
 
In effect, the Angolan war for independence flowed almost seamlessly into the Angolan civil 
war, and for all intents and purposes, the civil war had already started before independence was 
gained. Left without the support of South African troops, the FNLA and UNITA were quickly 
expelled from the urban centres they had occupied by MPLA-Cuban troops. This meant that 
both movements reverted to guerrilla warfare, retreating to the forests of northern and eastern 
Angola respectively.252 By December 1975, Roberto was beginning to rethink his strategy. For 
now, it seemed that holding on to the territory that the FNLA still controlled could perhaps 
force the MPLA to seek a negotiated settlement.253 
 
In the meantime, the MPLA continued its support for the Katangese secessionists operating in 
northern Angola, who engaged with Zairean forces in what has become known as the first and 
second Shaba wars in 1977 and 1978 respectively. The uprisings in Katanga were led by the 
Congo National Liberation Front (FLNC), a group that had previously aided the MPLA in 
1975. By the second Shaba war, Mobutu decided to negotiate with the MPLA to resolve the 
Katanga issue, which threatened the stability and integrity of Zaire. Mobutu finally signed an 
agreement with the MPLA in 1978, which would see Mobutu cease his assistance to the FNLA 
while further expelling the movement from Zaire. In return, the MPLA was to cease its support 
for the Katangese opposition, while furthermore bringing Katangese rebels in northern Angola 
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under its control. The 1978 peace agreement between Zaire and the MPLA delivered the final 
blow to the FNLA, who had been significantly weakened by the USA withdrawing its support 
in 1976. The loss of its Zairean bases meant that the FNLA had to try and keep on fighting 
within the forests of northern Angola, but it simply lacked the means to continue this effort and 
started to disintegrate. While some FNLA forces decided to join the MPLA, others chose exile 
in Europe and the USA. Others created the Military Committee for the Resistance in Angola 
(COMIRA), which turned out to be a short-lived, unsuccessful effort to continue the fight 
against the MPLA. As such, 1978 marked the end of the FNLA as a credible fighting force, 
and the group ceased to be of any significance for the remainder of the Angolan civil war.254 
 
Even before the FNLA collapsed in 1978, after the aborted 1975-76 march on Luanda to be 
exact, some FNLA soldiers that had been fighting in the south of Angola were left stranded 
along the Angolan border with what was then South West Africa. Their leader, Daniel 
Chipenda, had fled the country, and UNITA, formerly allied to the FNLA, began an assault on 
the remaining FNLA troops left in southern Angola. Many FNLA fighters eventually fled to 
refugee camps which were set up in southern Angola along the border with South West Africa. 
It is from these refugee camps that the SADF eventually recruited many of its Angolan 32 
Battalion soldiers.255 The interviews that will be presented and analysed in chapter four were 
conducted with some of the above soldiers, and for that reason, it is significant to take note of 
the descriptions presented by Jan Breytenbach earlier, as these were some of the final 
experiences these respondents would have had with the FNLA. 
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Conclusion 
As can be seen from the above, the history of the FNLA is as much a history of the Angolan 
war for independence and civil war, and the one cannot be extracted or isolated from the other. 
Moreover, the Angolan war for independence and civil war need to be located within the 
context of the history of the region, as well as the context of international developments such 
as the anti-colonial movement and the Cold War setting.  
 
The FNLA’s Bakongo origins within the Belgian Congo tied it directly to the political 
developments of that country, and as has been noted, Holden Roberto’s relationship with 
Joseph Mobutu was an important factor that shaped the development of the FNLA as a whole. 
The Roberto-Mobutu coalition was further shaped by significant geopolitical developments, 
which were tied to the evolving Cold War dynamics of the time. The FNLA’s relation to 
Mobutu and the USA allowed it to establish itself as a seemingly well organised and structured 
independence movement, which in turn allowed it to attract significant regional and 
international recognition. 
 
However, the demise of the FNLA is equally tied to Cold War developments and regional 
geopolitical events. The political process that was to form part of the independence process 
threatened to sideline the FNLA, as it lacked the large support bases enjoyed by the MPLA and 
UNITA.  Instead, given the strong support accorded to it by the USA and Mobutu, it saw a 
military solution to its problems as possible. However, the MPLA was equally able to rely on 
the support of its backers and soon defeated the FNLA in a military confrontation. As such, the 
Cold War setting not only influenced the political developments in Angola but also directly 
shaped the actions of the FNLA. 
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After the US had ceased its support for the FNLA, it had become reliant on its sole remaining 
backer, Mobutu’s Zaire. Being pushed out of its strongholds in northern Angola, the FNLA 
was entirely dependent on its bases in southern Zaire and the assistance of the Mobutu regime 
in order to continue its fight. However, geopolitical developments in the form of the Shaba 
wars, which threatened the integrity of Zaire, forced Mobutu into a compromise with the 
MPLA. This compromise finally saw Mobutu expelling the FNLA from Zaire, which led to the 
rapid disintegration of the movement.  
 
The examples listed in this chapter have shown that the FNLA found itself incapacitated on 
several occasions, due to infighting between factions within the movement’s leadership, as well 
as a lack of organisational capacity. While several attempted coup attempts from within the 
FNLA leadership sought to oust Holden Roberto, who was accused of doing little to lead the 
fight for independence from the frontlines, it is alleged that he preferred to reside in the relative 
safety and comfort of Léopoldville. There he was able to build up a personal business empire, 
with many accusing him of having done so by appropriating donations and selling equipment 
intended for the FNLA war effort. Consequently, FNLA fighters were left ill-equipped, poorly 
trained, and undisciplined, with many being confined to their bases and not being able to 
participate in the fight against Portuguese colonial rule. Roberto further isolated himself in an 
attempt to keep himself in power by surrounding himself with an inner core of supporters 
originating from his own clan, while seeking the support of the Congolese authorities who 
assisted him in clamping down on any form of dissent. In turn, this close relationship allowed 
the Congolese regime to heavily influence the internal business of the FNLA, and for all intents 
and purposes, Roberto had become reliant on Mobutu’s support to keep himself in power. This 
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seemingly had the consequence of seriously hindering the FNLA’s communication and 
organisational capacity, to the extent that regional FNLA structures, such as its Zambia branch, 
were left to fend for themselves, with no support or instructions being received from the FNLA 
headquarters. This led to the fact that the FNLA’s ability to recruit new supporters and fighters 
among Angolan refugees in places like Zambia was being jeopardised, with rival groups 
finding it easy to undermine what little support the FNLA structures had been able to gather. 
Lastly, it must also be noted that particularly in northern Angola and among the refugee 
population in southern Congo, the FNLA implemented a harsh regime based on control, force 
and fear, with many civilians being pressed into becoming FNLA supporters and fighters in 
order to escape possible penalties such as forced labour, forced recruitment, and punishments, 
which included arbitrary arrest and internment, and even execution.  
 
The FNLA’s problems started soon after it was founded in 1962. Holden Roberto’s focus on 
international diplomacy and keeping himself in power, rather than focusing his efforts on 
building sound leadership and organisational structures, ultimately paved the way for the 
FNLA’s gradual demise. His efforts to salvage the movement after the OAU’s withdrawal of 
recognition for the FNLA in 1971 did not address the fundamental flaws in the movement. As 
such, by the time of the 1974 Lisbon coup, Roberto found himself frantically trying to gain the 
upper hand by all means possible. Fighting his way to power seemed to be the only viable 
solution, but his troops were no match for the MPLA that increasingly enjoyed the support of 
Soviet and Cuban weapons and troops. This chapter has shown that the FNLA suffered a 
gradual but certain decline since its founding, and as shown, this was in large part due to its 
lack of organisational capacity, a lack of sound leadership and vision, and a failure to address 
fundamental internal flaws. The narrative of the FNLA that has emerged in this chapter, that 
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of a failed independence movement, stands in direct contrast to the narratives of former FNLA 
fighters that will be presented in chapter four.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE POMFRET COMMUNITY AND FIELDWORK DYNAMICS 
In the previous chapter, I have noted how scholars as well as evidence from official FNLA 
documents paint a picture of the FNLA as being a movement in disarray, plagued by infighting, 
and suffering from a lack of leadership. I agree with the notion that the FNLA’s legitimacy was 
slowly eroded over time, leading to its eventual collapse. Before we move on to look at how 
former FNLA fighters present the FNLA, we will first look at the respondent group in more 
detail. This will be done by providing a brief historical overview of the Pomfret community, 
from which all respondents originate, followed by a brief presentation of the details of the field 
research which was conducted in September 2014. I hope that this will provide the necessary 
preparation and insight before moving on to chapter four.  
 
In total, I interviewed eight former FNLA fighters in Pomfret. The eight ex-FNLA respondents 
ranged in ages from their late 50s to mid-70s. While three of the respondents are of Bakongo 
ethnicity, another three are Kimbundu, while one each are of Nganguela and Chokwe ethnicity. 
Three were born in Uíge province while one each was born in the provinces of Malanje, Cuanza 
Sul, Cuanza Norte, Cuando Cubango and Zaire. Also, while four of the respondents had been 
under the age of 18 when they had joined the FNLA, one had been 18, another 19, with the rest 
having been 21, 27 and 30 when they had joined. I must also add that all respondents are male 
and that although I made every effort to include female respondents in my research, only one 
non-combatant female respondent was interviewed (that interview does not form part of this 
thesis as it falls out of the thematic scope I have chosen to focus on), while another potential 
interviewee refused to speak to me.256 
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A Brief History of 32 Battalion and the Pomfret Community 
During my search in 2014 for Angolan war veterans living in South Africa, I came across the 
community of Pomfret. The town of Pomfret is located on the edge of the Kalahari Desert, a 
few kilometres from the Botswana-South Africa border in South Africa’s North West Province. 
A former asbestos mining town, it was converted to a military base to accommodate the troops 
of the SADF’s 32 Battalion and their families when they had to be moved from the Caprivi in 
1989 in preparation for Namibia’s independence from South Africa in 1990. The origins of 32 
Battalion go back to 1975 when FNLA soldiers were aided by SADF troops in their march on 
Luanda in order to prevent the MPLA from coming to power. In the late 1970s, the SADF 
decided to create a secret counter-insurgency unit made up of black Angolan troops, led by 
white officers, whose role it was to combat SWAPO. To this end, mainly former FNLA troops, 
many of whom lived in refugee camps on the Namibia/Angola border by this time, were 
recruited and trained by the SADF. As a counter-insurgency force, 32 Battalion wore 
camouflage uniforms and used AK-47 rifles, in contrast to the brown uniforms and R4 and R5 
rifles used by regular SADF troops, in order to make them less distinguishable from SWAPO, 
MPLA and UNITA troops when on operations. The white officers of the unit also smeared 
their exposed skin with a camouflage cream named “black is beautiful”, to blend in with their 
troops when on operations in Angola. 257 
 
Although not as beautiful as their former base in Namibia, most 32 Battalion members 
remember Pomfret to have been well maintained, and having good infrastructure, which 
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included services such as electricity, water, sanitation in the form of flushing toilets, as well as 
a post office, hospital, shop, and a school. The town was divided into two parts, with the more 
affluent, named Salvador, being reserved for the white officers of the unit, and containing 
generous family houses on large stands, a separate pre-school for the white children of the 
town, with tarred roads, street lighting and recreational facilities. Trees were also planted to 
provide shade. On the other hand, the black troops were accommodated in smaller brick houses 
on smaller plots in a separate part of the town, named Esperança, some distance away from 
Salvador. This part of town did not have tarred roads and large trees such as can be found in 
Salvador, and a separate school was built for the black children of the unit. 
 
When 32 Battalion was relocated to South Africa, the government deployed the unit to the 
township of Phola Park on the East Rand of Johannesburg in an attempt to quell the violence 
that erupted in the area during the early 1990s, mostly between rival ANC and IFP groups. 
However, the De Klerk government failed to understand that a unit trained in counter-
insurgency was not equipped or trained to maintain law and order in a civilian environment. 
As such, the deployment which occurred on the night of 8 April 1992 became highly unpopular 
and controversial, not only because it led to some civilian deaths and injuries, but also because 
seemingly foreign (due to their Angolan origin) black troops were being used on black South 
Africans. The Goldstone Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation which was set up to investigate the violence which swept across the country 
at the time determined that 32 Battalion committed acts of violence against the residents of 
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Phola Park, and recommended that the unit not be deployed again unless in the most extreme 
of circumstances.258 
 
In the build-up to the 1994 elections, the De Klerk government took the decision to disband 32 
Battalion in 1993, even though numerous promises had been made that the unit would not be 
disbanded. Some unit members argue that the ANC pressured the outgoing government to 
disband the unit because the unit’s Angolan troops were seen as traitors for having fought 
fellow Africans, including Umkhonto WeSizwe troops, during the Angolan Civil War, but also 
because they had become extremely unpopular and controversial after their township 
deployment. Critics of the unit had also argued that due to their Angolan origins, they were 
foreigners who should not be integrated into the new military.259  
 
After 32 Battalion had been disbanded, it became part of the 2nd South African Infantry 
Battalion (2SAI), and Pomfret remained a military base. The late 1990s also saw many old 
SADF soldiers being offered early retirement packages, which included a lump sum of money 
above the regular pension pay-outs, which many of the older 32 Battalion members opted to 
accept. By late 1997 or early 1998, the decision was taken to move the remaining members of 
2SAI to Zeerust, some 325 km from Pomfret, where troops and their families were provided 
with housing. When the SANDF finally closed down the Pomfret base by 1998/99, the town 
was handed over to the Department of Public Works. Many of the retired black veterans and 
their families decided to remain in Pomfret, in part because they could not afford to move back 
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to Angola or relocate somewhere else. It must also be noted that Angola returned to full-scale 
civil war in 1998 so that returning to Angola was not an attractive option. The former officer’s 
houses were taken over by some of the veterans, and the community was gradually joined by 
Tswana speaking locals who moved into empty houses. It must be added that by this time and 
to the present, the most spoken language in Pomfret among the older generation of 32 Battalion 
veterans and their families is Portuguese, with some not speaking any English or Tswana at 
all.260 
 
The late 1990s and early 2000s also saw many retired 32 Battalion members being recruited 
by private military companies such as Executive Outcomes, as their counter-insurgency skills 
were sought after. In 2004, the mercenary activities of some Pomfret residents received much 
media attention when it was revealed that several mercenaries, including some ex 32 Battalion 
members, were arrested in Harare, Zimbabwe, on suspicion of being on their way to carry out 
a coup in Equatorial Guinea. Media visits to Pomfret revealed the dire situation of many 
Pomfret residents, with poverty and unemployment being rife, and many seeing mercenary jobs 
as a quick way of earning substantial amounts of money.261 International and South African 
journalists, affiliated among others to the BBC, The Telegraph, ABC Australia, and The Mail 
and Guardian, all travelled to Pomfret between 2004 and 2005 to report on the coup attempt 
and the ensuing trial of arrested mercenaries in Zimbabwe.262 Even years later, Pomfret still 
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received sporadic visits by journalists reporting on the mercenary activities of Pomfret’s 
residents.263 
 
As a consequence, the South African government introduced a new law in 2006, making it 
illegal for South Africans to involve themselves in mercenary activities. In addition, steps were 
introduced in 2008 to relocate the residents of Pomfret, in part because asbestos from the old 
mine posed a threat to their health, and also in an attempt to integrate them into South African 
communities and prevent future mercenary recruitment in the town. Residents were to be 
relocated to townships as far away as Mafikeng, some 260km from Pomfret.  However, a 
significant portion of Pomfret residents refused to be relocated, fearing persecution and 
xenophobia, and the government eventually tried to evict them forcibly. Gradually, government 
services such as the hospital, post office and police station were closed, with these buildings 
even being torn down. Police and other officials eventually resorted to destroying houses in the 
town to force residents to move. This was met with heavy opposition by residents, who finally 
managed to prevent further houses from being destroyed. Also in 2008, a court case had been 
lodged on behalf of the residents of Pomfret, which challenged the legality of the forced 
removals and further asked for clarification as to who owns the houses in Pomfret. The court 
case is ongoing. Pomfret residents argue that the houses were left to the community when the 
SANDF left and that, as such, they are the rightful owners. 264  A statement by the North West 
Legislature, dated 6 May 2008, argued that Pomfret residents were occupying houses owned 
by the state, and noted that the North West government was determined to relocate the residents 
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of Pomfret in order to integrate them into various communities in the province.265 Ever since 
Pomfret became a civilian town, the state of the town’s infrastructure has been in decline, with 
the Department of Public Works having shown little effort nor interest in providing adequate 
maintenance.  
 
On my visit in September 2014, I was able to establish that certain government services were 
returned to the town, which includes a visit by a mobile clinic a few times a week, a mobile 
post office, as well as a visit by a mobile pension and social grant vehicle. The school in 
Pomfret also continues to provide schooling for the town's children, although it faces a lack of 
teachers and equipment. Some residents have opened informal shops in order to make a living 
while others have bought taxis to ferry paying passengers to the nearest towns, as Pomfret 
remains very isolated and is not situated on any main road. Other residents, mostly Tswanas, 
have begun keeping goats and chickens in order to consume and sell. Some older residents also 
receive remittances from family members that have opted to move to larger towns and cities to 
work. It was also mentioned that the relationship between the Tswana and Angolan population 
of the town is not always amicable, with some Batswana accusing the Angolans of being 
foreigners who should not be in South Africa while some Angolans accuse Tswanas of being 
thieves and criminals. Another source of income in the area is working as farm hands on 
surrounding cattle farms, while, at the time of my visit, a project had also been initiated by the 
local government to lay new water pipes in the town. Although some of the town’s residents 
found work with the contractors who were given the contract, residents commented that these 
contractors sometimes did not show up for days on end, and sometimes failed to pay workers 
their wages. The general mood among the older veterans is that they have been abandoned and 
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betrayed by the South African government and that they have not been accorded the same 
privileges as other South African military veterans. Many veterans lamented that they were 
facing dire poverty and hardship and that nothing is being done to assist them. As such, the 
veterans seem to have adopted a victim mentality, arguing that they are being punished for their 
role in the old SADF. There is no doubt that the Pomfret residents have become victims of 
political, social and economic processes beyond their control, but as later examples show, some 
members of the Pomfret community have utilised this victim identity to further their personal, 
often financial, interests.  
 
I have since found out that Eskom has disconnected Pomfret from the electricity grid in 
December 2014 due to the amount of illegal and dangerous connections in the town. However, 
the Department of Public Works and the local municipality have disagreed as to who should 
be responsible for repairing the electricity infrastructure, which would come to a few million 
Rand. As a result, the water supply which relies on electric borehole pumps was interrupted for 
several months, with the town only receiving intermittent water via water trucks. I understand 
however that the water problem (as of late April 2015) has since been resolved to some extent, 
with each plot receiving water via an outside tap for a few hours twice a week. As of December 
2015, the electricity supply has not been restored, while the North West Education Department 
has confirmed reports that Pomfret’s school, which caters to some 700 students, would be 
closed down permanently due to a lack of water and electricity.266 To compound this dire 
situation even further, groups of thieves and vandals have reportedly begun to target Pomfret 
in early February 2016, stripping buildings of doors, door frames, windows, window frames, 
zinc roofs, and other fittings. Residents reported that these groups have come in large numbers 
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from as far afield as Pretoria, Johannesburg and Rustenburg and that residents tried to prevent 
these acts of theft and vandalism were being intimidated and assaulted.267 It seems that as the 
neglect and vandalism of infrastructure in Pomfret increases, the prospective cost of repairing 
this infrastructure is increasing exponentially, to the extent that the very future of Pomfret and 
the fate of its residents is becoming increasingly uncertain. At the present, it would appear that 
Pomfret, along with its inhabitants, is being left to decay. I stand to be corrected on the accuracy 
of the above information.  
 
At this point, I would also like to clarify my use of the term community in relation to Pomfret 
and the FNLA veterans living there. From my observations, it seems that Pomfret consists of 
various levels of community. Pomfret is made up of Angolans and Batswana, who do not 
always seem to see eye to eye. As such, there exists a clear rift in the town. What is more, as 
will be discussed in further detail below, hierarchies in terms of military rank and seniority still 
seem to impact on the relations between the veterans of the town. More specifically, it seems 
that FNLA veterans have established a distinct network among themselves, alongside the larger 
network of 32 Battalion veterans in the town. On top of this, there exists a wider network of 32 
Battalion veterans who reside outside of Pomfret, and this network includes an online Facebook 
community. As such, although the Pomfret veterans and their families are united through their 
common 32 Battalion past and Angolan identity, Pomfret can be seen as a community 
consisting of various strata, where various networks exist side by side. This is particularly 
important to take note of when moving on to chapter four.  Below I will outline some of the 
most striking issues that I encountered when I conducted interviews in Pomfret, many of them 
relating to oral history and the process of conducting interviews. 
                                                          
267 Macdonald, C. “Pomfret’s latest hardship”, Facebook, posted on 9 February 2016, accessed on 9 February 
2016, https://www.facebook.com/corlien.macdonald/posts/10153946827968236. 
102 
 
Language and Interpreters 
In the introduction to this thesis, it was noted how oral history interviews can be seen as a form 
of knowledge transaction between an interviewer and respondent, and that the relationship 
between interviewer and respondent will invariably influence the outcome of the interviews, 
particularly what is communicated, and how it is communicated. Accordingly, factors that 
might influence the interview process include “[…] differences of age, colour, class, and 
gender, the issues of language and translation and those of subjectivity, memory and 
reliability”.268  Moreover, these factors also impact on how the researcher shapes his or her 
research agenda, in the ways the researcher “[…] ask[s] questions and respond[s] to narrators 
and interpret[s] and evaluate[s] what they say”. 269  During the interview process, I found 
language to be a major influencing factor, which simultaneously relates to the differences in 
age and culture. Being of mixed ethnic backgrounds, the former 32 Battalion veterans and their 
families primarily speak indigenous Angolan languages such as Umbundu, Chokwe and 
Nganguela within their family units. Within the community, Portuguese is used as the primary 
language for communicating with other Angolans. A few can speak Tswana, Afrikaans and 
English. Therefore, one must note that all of the interviews were conducted in the respondent’s 
second or even third languages.  
 
I must also note that I am not a native Portuguese speaker and relied on a translator to conduct 
some of the interviews. As such, a key issue I encountered during my interviews relates to the 
use of translators. Having used a local translator to help me conduct my interviews in Pomfret 
had obvious advantages, such as the translator and respondent already being acquainted and 
having established a degree of trust given their common veteran identity. In fact, my translator 
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in Pomfret also acted as my guide, and his knowledge of the community was crucial to 
introducing me to possible respondents, and his accompanying me helped me to establish a 
degree of trust with the respondents. In fact, it is important to note the role trust plays in the 
researcher-respondent relationship, specifically concerning the extent of information 
respondents are willing to reveal about themselves. The issue of trust will be addressed in more 
detail shortly. 
 
Making use of a translator is, however, also accompanied by several issues of concern. When 
I visited Pomfret, I had to resort to making use of a translator to conduct six interviews as these 
respondents were not proficient enough in English, or preferred to speak in Portuguese. 
However, when I chose to have these particular interviews translated by a professional 
translator after having left Pomfret in order to establish what exactly was said during the 
interviews, it turned out that my translator had not done a particularly good job. Of course, I 
must note that he was not a professional translator, and probably had very little prior 
experience. Not only were responses not always accurately translated given that my translator 
was not the most proficient English speaker either, but a lot of the richness, detail and depth of 
the respondent’s answers got “lost in translation”.  As such, where the respondent had given an 
answer at some length and in considerable detail, my translator had summarised the 
respondent’s answer to no more than one or two sentences. The professionally translated 
transcripts also revealed that at times my translator had not translated my questions correctly, 
or had asked entirely different questions altogether, perhaps because he may have 
misunderstood my question. Having read the professionally transcribed interviews, it has 
become clear that if I had been aware of some of the details that got “lost in translation”  during 
the interviews, I could have done more to develop the interviews further by asking targeted 
follow-up questions.  
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In light of the above, translators must be seen as being in positions of power in relation to 
respondents, as they not only interpret and translate what has been said but would also be in a 
position to control and edit what is being translated. Minkley and Rasool for instance, point out 
that “oral transcripts, their construction, and their re-presentation in history typically reflect a 
process of selection, editing, embellishing, and deleting the material of individual memory 
[…]”270 Accordingly, it must be acknowledged that historians exercise their power over the 
interviewee as they edit, shape, cut out and splice together the interviews to suit their research 
agenda. The issue of power relations is however also closely related to the presence of existing 
power relations within the community of Pomfret, pertaining to the control over and of the 
veteran’s life stories and their role/s within 32 Battalion. Below I will outline some issues that 
emerged during my field research that related specifically to gatekeeping and power relations. 
 
The Politics of Gatekeeping and Power Relations 
The issue of gatekeepers controlling access to respondents was a particular concern with the 
Pomfret community. One of my contacts had initially advised me to contact a person in Pomfret 
regarded as the official spokesperson of the town’s 32 Battalion veterans. When I first called 
him by telephone sometime in mid-2014, it was difficult to talk to him as he was seemingly 
struggling to converse in English. After having passed the phone to his son, I was asked what 
I would offer the veterans in return for the interviews. After having responded that I was not 
able to pay for interviews, he told me that he did not know whether I should come to Pomfret. 
I then decided to make contact with another Pomfret resident recommended to me as a potential 
translator. After having explained the details of my research to him, I asked him to make contact 
                                                          
270 Minkley and Rassool, “Orality, Memory and Social History in South Africa”, p. 99. 
105 
 
with the veteran’s spokesperson again to explain why I wanted to come to Pomfret and speak 
to the veterans. At about the same time, another contact of mine warned me of this person, 
saying that he was only interested in benefiting materially from my visit. In the meantime, I 
had also asked my potential translator how many former FNLA veterans were left in Pomfret, 
who I could potentially interview. He responded that there were about three, but that I needed 
to offer them something in return for the interviews. I eventually found a more reliable contact 
in Pomfret, who on my arrival introduced me to a veteran who she said she trusted would 
connect me with the right individuals.  
 
It turned out that there were many more FNLA veterans in Pomfret than what I was made to 
believe by my first contact, and in hindsight, it would seem that a small group centred around 
the veteran’s spokesperson had intended to limit any material gain from my visit to them by 
excluding other veterans. As I would come to find out, some 32 Battalion veterans have 
resorted to selling their stories to make some additional money. In fact, when I started many 
interviews in Pomfret, respondents often ignored my initial questions and embarked on a 
seemingly rehearsed and very concise story of how they joined 32 Battalion and how they came 
to be in Pomfret. This may be the result of numerous journalists having come to Pomfret to ask 
the same questions during the time of the attempted coup and its aftermath in 2004/2005. 
Hence, my following questions asking about the details of their early lives before 32 Battalion 
were at times met with quizzical looks.  
 
Two further examples of apparent gatekeeping also relate to the Pomfret community. In one 
instance my guide and translator took me to the house of an old man. As the old man slowly 
made his way to the living room, having difficulty walking, his daughter watched on 
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suspiciously. After my translator had helped me to explain the reason for my visit and that I 
would like to interview him, his daughter interjected and said that her father was old and no 
longer could remember the past correctly, and, that hence, she would not permit him to be 
interviewed as he would tell me incorrect information. After a short rebuttal by the old man in 
Portuguese, it seemed like the daughter got her way, and we said our goodbyes. Another 
example relates to a veteran who said that he first needed to go and consult some of his 
comrades, in order to ensure that he remembered things correctly so that he would not give us 
any wrong information. After about two days, he finally said that he did not want to be 
interviewed. My guide told me that he most probably had spoken to the veteran’s spokesperson, 
and I suspect that he was told not to talk to me, although I cannot verify this. Hierarchy and 
seniority seem to still dictate the interaction between 32 Battalion veterans, and although I 
cannot be certain, in this case, it seemed as though a lower ranking veteran had been told by a 
more senior veteran not to speak to me.  
 
Interestingly, Inge Brinkman notes that during her interviews with Angolan refugees in 
northern Namibia during the 1990s, the issue of telling a story accurately and telling it well 
was an important factor for respondents, and those listening in would be quick to note any 
inaccuracies.   In this case, one must also note that the presence of MPLA and/or UNITA 
informants in refugee camps would have deterred respondents from giving MPLA/UNITA 
critical responses out of fear of reprisals.271 So too, various respondents in Pomfret noted that 
they could only tell me what they knew, and could not tell me any lies. This may relate to the 
fact that in the past, Pomfret residents, even those without 32 Battalion credentials, sought to 
profit from the visits of journalists and researchers coming to the town to speak to veterans. As 
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such, being able to distinguish between genuine veterans and those posing as veterans becomes 
of some concern. In fact, I had some individuals coming up to me in Pomfret and offering to 
speak to me, only to be told by my guide later that they were not in fact former FNLA soldiers. 
Hence, the issue of who can legitimately claim to be an FNLA and 32 Battalion veteran and 
who has the authority to speak of the unit’s history has had an impact on shaping the power 
relations within Pomfret. Although I was not able to fully delineate these power relations, they 
seemed to have had a significant impact on shaping my interactions with the community. In 
light of the latter, one must note that memory is by no means a static repository of facts or a 
final product, but rather, an active and continuous construction in the present. As such, 
memory, as well as identity, is constantly negotiated and re-negotiated. For instance, 
Greenspan notes that the retelling of someone’s story is an active process of construction while 
Abrams refers to memory as being an active process involving the creation of meanings.272 
Accordingly, it is important to note how outside factors, in this case, the work of previous 
researchers, not only influences interviewer-respondent relations but also impacts on how 
respondents shape their memories.  The next section will look at this in more detail, particularly 
on how the issue of trust and suspicion shaped the relations between myself and the 
respondents. 
 
Suspicion 
During the interview process, there were several instances where issues such as suspicion and 
trust played important roles. When I first met with Celestino Januario, it was primarily in order 
to get in touch with other Angolans living in Cape Town. When I arrived for our first meeting, 
which was more or less an informal discussion about my project plans, he informed me that it 
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was important for him to meet me as he did not want to put someone he did not know into 
contact with his acquaintances. In fact, Celestino noted that it was important to build a 
relationship first and to establish trust, before commencing the interviews.273 This is an issue 
that comes up quite often in the oral history literature. Radiboko Ntsimane notes for instance, 
how in southern African cultures, there exists a lot of mistrust about what may be revealed in 
interviews. For Ntsimane, trust plays a major role in determining what may be revealed by 
interviewees, and what remains untold.274  Invariably, the physical context of the interview 
setting, as well as the researcher-respondent dynamics influences how the respondent chooses 
to narrate his/her memories, what he/she is willing to disclose, and what is not disclosed.275 
 
During my interviews, I came to notice that suspicion was motivated by different factors for 
certain communities, these being refugees and migrants, those with continuing connections to 
Angola, and the Pomfret group, whose suspicion was specific to the community itself. Maria 
is an example of the first group. When I first met Maria and told her about my project, she 
asked me whether I was a policeman. I assured her that I was not. This is understandable given 
that in 2009, the United Nations informed its member states to end the refugee status for 
Angolans given the improving situation in Angola. It is only since 2013 that the South African 
government has enforced this, and is no longer issuing or renewing the refugee status for 
Angolans in South Africa, and many Angolans are finding it extremely difficult to get residency 
or work permits approved. On stating that I would want to record the interview with Maria, she 
seemed very apprehensive and asked whether the recording would be broadcast on TV. I 
assured her that I had no such intent. On ending the interview and after making sure that I was 
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no longer recording, Maria confided that she was having difficulties applying for temporary 
residency. It is quite clear that Maria’s anxieties about my motives influenced how she engaged 
with the interview, and it took some convincing to gain her trust.276  
 
When I visited a Cape Town-based refugee and migrant rights centre in mid-2014 in order to 
establish contacts with Angolans living in Cape Town, I was told by the staff that Angolan 
migrants and refugees tend to be extremely suspicious and apprehensive about being 
interviewed. Similar experiences are reported by scholars who conducted oral history 
interviews with Angolan refugees as well. An example is given by Brinkman, who notes that 
during her interviews with Angolan refugees many respondents only agreed to talk to her on 
condition of anonymity. Brinkman states that this was because many Angolan refugees did not 
possess any residency papers, and were fearful of being reported to the police. In fact, 
Brinkman says that she was suspected of being a police informant. 277  
 
Those that still had strong connections to Angola also noted their concern of who might gain 
access to the interview recordings. One of these persons was Jose (not his real name). At the 
beginning of the interview, he had apprehensively asked whether my interviews had anything 
to do with the Angolan government and whether his name was going to be mentioned. After 
having reassured him that I am in no way connected to any government and that my interviews 
are for my studies only, we agreed that I would not mention his real name, and we went on to 
choose the pseudonym Jose. Jose went on to say that some of his family members back in 
Angola were government officials, and he did not want to be seen as trying to embarrass his 
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family should they find out about the contents of the interview. He also wanted to avoid any 
Angolan government officials from finding out his identity, as he would go on to make 
statements critical of the ruling MPLA government.278   
 
I was introduced to Jose by members of a Portuguese church in Cape Town frequented by many 
Angolans. When I had visited the church in order to make contact with possible respondents, I 
was quickly informed that Angolan diplomats were part of the congregation, and that I should 
not present the details of my research to the congregation, but should rather wait until they 
could find suitable persons that they could put me in contact with. Indeed, the fear of the long 
reach of the Angolan government somehow finding out about an individual’s government 
critical views seems to be of some concern to at least a portion of Angolan expatriates in Cape 
Town. I was reminded several times that the Angolan civil war remained a sensitive topic. 
Another example given by Brinkman is that during her interviews with Angolan refugees in 
northern Namibia, refugees frequently crossed the border to Angola to tend to their fields and 
visit family. As such, anonymity became an important condition for refugees agreeing to talk 
to her, as they feared reprisal attacks by UNITA and MPLA troops across the border should it 
be revealed what they had talked about.279   
 
The Pomfret group was equally apprehensive about my motives and questioned who would get 
access to their interviews. However, these concerns were not motivated by fears that the 
Angolan government could somehow find out about the contents of the interviews. In fact, 
some Pomfret veterans, all of whom were granted South African citizenship by the previous 
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regime, seem almost defiant, openly criticising the MPLA for its shortcomings, while 
professing their undying loyalty to the FNLA, some doing so while wearing MPLA caps and 
T-shirts bearing the face of Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, with others having 
his portrait hanging in their living rooms. This MPLA paraphernalia was distributed to 
community members by Angolan consular officials who had travelled to Pomfret to assist with 
the processing of Angolan documents. Community members later informed me that the 
apprehensiveness I encountered was related to the events of recent years, especially around the 
time of the failed Equatorial Guinea coup in which several former 32 Battalion members were 
implicated, when numerous foreign and local media crews came to interview the remaining 
veterans. I was told that many of these media crews came to Pomfret having made promises of 
sums of money and improved living conditions, things that never materialised. In fact, 
whenever I met with potential respondents for the first time, I started the conversation by 
introducing myself and explained the details of my research. This was always met with some 
contemplation, and in many cases, was followed by a response of lamenting past visits by 
people asking questions, and mentioning the promises that were made that never materialised. 
I was always quick to add that my research would not bring me any financial gains and that as 
a student, I was unfortunately not in a position to offer payment for interviews. In at least six 
cases, the answer eventually came that they were tired of telling their stories without getting 
anything in return, and mentioned again the empty promises made by past visitors, and hence 
that they would not want to be interviewed. In other cases, I was able to convince respondents 
to talk to me by promising that I would only use their interviews for my research, and would 
not make the interviews available to people who might use them for financial gain.  
 
A further scenario that I have not encountered myself is presented by Justin Pearce, who 
conducted interviews in Angola in 2008/9. Pearce notes that in a post-conflict Angola, the 
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MPLA was very much interested in promoting its own agendas, which included the promotion 
of an officially sanctioned MPLA historical narrative while attempting to diminish and exclude 
the historical narratives of opposition groups. Pearce argues that this had an impact on how 
respondents interacted with him, weary of the fact that MPLA officials would not be tolerant 
of MPLA critical accounts. In addition, Pearce states that in some villages there existed a 
“control of discourse”, with villagers often referring any questions back to village officials such 
as the chief, who had been instated by the MPLA. Of particular importance was that 2008 had 
been an election year, with MPLA officials quick to remind people that they had suffered under 
UNITA control and that they had been liberated by the MPLA. 280 
 
Accordingly, it is important to realise how senses of identity are “actively and strategically 
constructed in relation to multiple spaces for multiple purposes”.281  More so, forced 
displacement and migration constantly pushes one to renegotiate one’s sense of identity, 
drawing from past experiences and the life left behind, and the new and often hostile and 
unfamiliar environment one is faced with. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Pomfret 
community, as they have undergone several stages of dislocation. As such, their experiences 
of dislocation bear a strong similarity to refugees. The latter issue will be explored in more 
detail in the next chapter. As such, in this case, Buyer’s comment that migrants and refugees 
must “find a way to incorporate their histories and often painful memories into the present” is 
particularly relevant. 282 Senses of community become important for refugees and migrants to 
maintain a sense of belonging and place, and as such, senses of self are constantly in the process 
of being re-negotiated with reference to one’s past. 
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Conclusion 
From the above, it is clear that there are various factors that need to be considered when 
conducting oral history interviews, related not only to the research method but also to specific 
groups of respondents. From looking at my interviews, I see now that in many instances my 
research agenda, shaped and constrained the types of questions I put to my respondents. Also, 
however, it has also become clear how some respondents, particularly those in Pomfret, had 
their own agenda in answering my questions, with many lamenting their present social and 
economic situations while also highlighting their continued loyalty towards the FNLA. As 
such, some Pomfret residents have come to see interviews as an opportunity to voice their 
concerns, with some even expressly asking that their concerns be shared with a wider audience. 
Hence, the interviews that I conducted are clearly a product of a more complex set of intents, 
agendas and motivations, and not merely simple exchanges between an interviewer and 
respondent. Rather, it must be acknowledged that the motivation, intent and agenda of the 
interviewer are often met with an opposing and often entirely different set of intents, 
motivations and agendas on the part of the respondents, all within a context where factors such 
as age, class, culture, ethnicity, language and gender, to name but a few, all play significant 
roles.  
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CHAPTER 4: FNLA, THE FATHER OF THE REVOLUTION  
In chapter two, I have looked at how official FNLA documents, as well as secondary scholarly 
literature, portrays the FNLA as a movement that was continuously plagued by a lack of 
organisational capacity, and a lack of sound leadership. This had dire consequences for FNLA 
regional structures as well as its troops on the ground, as they were left in situations where they 
could not depend on basic support in the form of funds and equipment, as well as crucial 
leadership concerning planning and direction. I have mentioned that former FNLA fighters 
have provided a starkly contrasting view of the FNLA, portraying it and its leader Holden 
Roberto as being the heroic and just vanguard of the struggle for independence, as well as the 
later war against communist imperialism embodied by the MPLA regime. The following 
chapter will first provide a selection of interview vignettes of the respondents, followed by 
interview extracts highlighting how the veterans envision the FNLA. By drawing on the 
concepts of militarised masculinity, gendered dislocation, myth, memory, senses of self and 
place, and public remembering and forgetting, I will seek to analyse these interviews in more 
detail, in order to understand why these particular narratives are so different from the narrative 
presented earlier, and how they have been constructed and sustained. Also, it must be noted 
that interviews were transcribed verbatim. As such, interviews conducted in English were not 
rewritten in perfect English. Interviews that were conducted in Portuguese through a translator 
were professionally translated and transcribed, and this accounts for the differences in 
grammar. 
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Selected Interview Vignettes 
The following constructed interview vignettes are intended to provide the reader with a brief 
overview of the life stories of some of the respondent’s interviewed for this study. They are 
therefore to be seen as summaries of the interviews, rather than direct quotations. 
 
Francisco Paulo  
Francisco was born in the town of Malanje, in Malanje Province, Angola, in 1958. His father was a labourer 
on a coffee plantation owned by Portuguese colonialists, and his mother was a housewife. Francisco’s 
family is of the Chokwe ethnic group. At times, he stayed with his father, while at other times he stayed 
with his grandfather. Francisco remembers being sent to stay with his uncle in Luanda in 1960, where he 
started going to school, but only for a brief period of time. His uncle was a soldier in the Portuguese colonial 
army. Francisco returned to Malanje after two or three years, thereby escaping a very brutal period which 
swept over the north of Angola in 1961 when uprisings against the colonial regime were violently quelled 
by the Portuguese (Note: this has been added by the interviewer, and Francisco does not mention the 
uprisings explicitly). When Francisco returned to Malanje, he notes that he left school shortly afterwards, 
only having attended two or three years of school up until the age of 13. From an early age, Francisco knew 
about the terroristas hiding in the bush and was eventually told that these “terrorists” were UPA rebels 
fighting for the end of colonialism. He notes that when the Portuguese soldiers came to Malanje in their 
search for terrorists, the older population, including his father, hid in the bush to escape Portuguese reprisal 
attacks against the population. The younger population, however, stayed behind in the town. At the age of 
17 or 18, Francisco joined the FNLA voluntarily along with a friend, and they were taken to the then Zaire 
for training. After a few months, they were deployed in Angola. However, independence came a few 
months afterwards. After independence, Francisco notes that fighting broke out between the former rebel 
groups, and he states that the MPLA was responsible for starting the civil war. He notes that the FNLA 
found itself in a difficult situation, having no foreign allies to support them. It is at this time that the FNLA 
made contact with South Africa, and secured their assistance. Francisco tells of how he and other FNLA 
fighters were taken to what was then South West Africa for training for a few months, where after the 
FNLA, led by South African Defence Force (SADF) units, marched on Luanda, with Zaire troops assisting 
from the north. During this campaign, the FNLA and SADF fought against MPLA troops supported by 
Russian and Cuban troops, as well as UNITA. Francisco says that the FNLA leader, realising that they 
were essentially at war with their own people, ordered his troops to fall back, a decision greatly resented 
by South Africa. Francisco’s unit retreated to South West Africa, where they were then incorporated into 
what was to become 32 Battalion. When South West Africa received independence, the entire unit was 
moved to Pomfret, in South Africa’s North West Province, where Francisco and his family are currently 
staying.283 
 
 
Vieira Monte  
Vieira was born in 1955 in the town of Kamabatela, situated in the Province of Uíge in northern Angola. 
Vieira is a native Kimbundu speaker and recalls that his father worked on a coffee plantation while his 
mother ran the household. The family consisted of seven siblings, of which Vieira was the middle child, 
and Vieira notes that he spent much of his early childhood playing soccer. When they were old enough, 
they helped their father on the plantation but did not get paid for their work. Although Vieira had the 
opportunity to go to school, he discontinued his studies at the age of 16 to train as a tailor. He recalls that 
the MPLA had on occasion visited his village in order to recruit new supporters, promising to fight the 
colonialists to liberate Angola. However, Vieira also notes that informers would report those that were 
overheard to speak about politics to the Portuguese authorities. At this point Vieira’s recollection seems a 
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bit blurry: he notes that he witnessed increased fighting between rebels and the Portuguese by the early 
70s, and that he himself wanted to join the army, and that as such, joined the MPLA at the age of 17. When 
asked whether people were forced to join the MPLA, he notes that they were not. He mentions that he liked 
the MPLA, but that he stayed on with them for less than a month. When asked why he left, he recalls that 
the MPLA caught him along with others from his village and that he was in fact taken by force. Vieira also 
mentions that he was treated like a prisoner, receiving little food, while also receiving no form of payment. 
Vieira notes that he was taken for military training and that he was then deployed in Angola. It is at this 
point that he left the MPLA to join the FNLA, and became part of the group of FNLA soldiers that sought 
refuge in South West Africa and later joined the South African military’s 32 Battalion.284 
 
 
Simão Mendes 
Simão was born in 1943 in the Province of Uíge in northern Angola. He notes that he is part of the Bakongo 
ethnic group and that he was the first born of nine brothers and four sisters. His father had been a 
subsistence farmer who grew coffee and peanuts. While Simão was a young child, he looked after his 
siblings and recalled his childhood to be more or less problem free. However, Simão states that he never 
had the opportunity to attend school. Simão recalls that fighting started in 1961, at which point his family 
first fled their village to hide in the surrounding forests, and later made their way to the Congo as refugees. 
At one point, Simão was sent back to Angola to establish whether it was safe to return. He further recalls 
that life in Congo was good and that he eventually joined the FNLA at the age of 18. Asked about what he 
knew about the FNLA before he joined, Simão notes that he had encountered people who were mobilising 
young people to join the FNLA, and were explaining to them why they had to fight the Portuguese. He 
notes that he joined because he believed that the FNLA could liberate Angola, and states that the FNLA 
had enjoyed widespread popularity across Angola’s ethnic divide. Simão ended up in the FNLA’s Kinkuzo 
base and stayed with the group throughout the war for independence.  Asked to describe his life under the 
FNLA as a young soldier, he notes that life was ok and that they received uniforms and sufficient food. 
However, they did not receive any payment, as they joined voluntarily to fight for independence so that 
they could live in peace. Furthermore, Simão notes that the FNLA never forced people to join them and 
that all those that joined the FNLA did so from the heart because they believed in freedom. In contrast, 
Simão recalls that the MPLA had forced people to join them. From parts of the interview, it is clear that 
Simão remains a devoted FNLA supporter. He notes that the FNLA had been like a father to its children 
and that it had only the best interests of all Angolans at heart.285 
 
 
José Francisco  
José was born in 1953 in the town of Gabela in Angola’s Cuanza Sul province and notes that he is an ethnic 
Kimbundu speaker. José recalls that his father passed away when he was seven or eight years old and that 
he stayed with his mother, who was not employed, along with a younger brother and sister. José notes that 
he became very protective of his mother and siblings and that he often got into fights in order to protect 
their honour. Asked how he had first become aware of the conflict in Angola, he recalled that he first heard 
of the FNLA and the liberation war by listening to a radio station that broadcasted from Congo-Brazzaville. 
He further recalls that he attended school in Gabela for about four years until he turned 16, at which point 
he moved to Luanda, where he stayed until he was twenty or twenty-one years old. In Luanda, he started 
working as a mechanic and later trained as an electrician to support his mother and siblings. While he 
worked during the day, he continued his studies at night. Around 1974, José returned to Gabela with the 
intention of joining the colonial army. Asked why he wanted to join the colonial army, he explained that 
only after having served a two-year term could one hope to access better jobs.  However, the 1974 Lisbon 
coup disrupted his plans, and he eventually joined the FNLA instead, which had come to Gabela to recruit 
supporters. Asked why he had specifically joined the FNLA and not one of the other liberation groups, 
José explained that he had admired the FNLA’s leader Holden Roberto and because he generally preferred 
the FNLA to the other groups. After having undergone military training, José was deployed to fight against 
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the MPLA, eventually making his way to South West Africa where he joined 32 Battalion after the FNLA 
had been largely defeated. Asked whether he was paid during his time with the FNLA, he noted that he 
had not. However, he added that he was always treated well and that he received enough food, clothing 
and ammunition. He further notes that he never witnessed people being forced to join the FNLA and that 
those that did join did so out of their own free will. Like other respondents, José noted that he remained a 
dedicated FNLA supporter, noting that he believed in the capitalist democratic policies of the FNLA while 
heavily disagreeing with the communist MPLA, who he accuses of repressing free speech and keeping 
Angola backwards.286 
 
 
Pedro Lenge  
Pedro was born in 1948, in the coastal town of Soyo in Angola’s Zaire province. Pedro notes that he is of 
the Bakongo ethnic group, and recalls that his father was a farmer who grew beans, peanuts and maize, but 
also kept chickens and cattle. Pedro states that his mother died while he was still young. He also recalls 
that he only attended two years of school, until he was seven, but states that he can read and write. After 
school, his father sent him to learn skills as an apprentice but adds that he often had to help his father on 
the farm as well. Growing up, Pedro recalls that he only had aspirations to become a farmer like his father. 
However, he says that he went to stay with his paternal uncle in the Congolese port town of Matadi when 
he was seventeen or eighteen and later learned how to drive, becoming a taxi driver who ferried passengers 
between the Congo and Angola. Pedro notes that he had joined the FNLA when he was 30 while still living 
in the Congo. After he had been deployed to Angola, he lost contact with his family for some time. Asked 
why he had joined the FNLA, he notes that his father had wanted him to join the FNLA to fight for the 
liberation of Angola. Pedro notes that he was treated well while with the FNLA and that although they did 
not receive payment, they had everything they needed. Pedro further recalls that he had joined the FNLA 
because he wanted to fight for his country, to fight for freedom and that all those that joined the FNLA did 
so voluntarily. According to Pedro, people were never forced to join the FNLA. Like other respondents, 
Pedro remains a fervent FNLA supporter and noted that he would remain FNLA until he died. 287 
 
 
João Sebastião  
João was born 1940 in the town of Kamabatela in Angola’s Cuanza Norte province and is a native 
Kimbundo speaker. João notes that he was the eldest of three brothers and that his father and mother died 
when he was very young.  He had trained to be a tailor to support himself and his brothers, and as such, he 
states that he had no time to go to school. João recalls that he was fourteen or fifteen when he left 
Kamabatela due to increased fighting between the rebels and the colonial army and that he joined the FNLA 
soon afterwards. He notes that after joining the FNLA, he received training at the FNLA’s Kinkuzo base. 
Asked why he had joined the FNLA, João answered that many young boys at the time had joined as well 
and that he simply followed their lead as he did not know what else to do. His duties with the FNLA 
included being a cook, and he recalls that his time spent with the FNLA was generally problem free. Asked 
whether he had gotten payment, João notes that no one was paid and that instead, people joined the FNLA 
to fight for the country. João also states that they had received sufficient food and that the FNLA soon 
became like a family to him. Asked whether people were ever forced to join the FNLA, João answered 
with a passionate no, and further stated that people joined the FNLA because they wanted peace, and to 
stop the fighting. 288 
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José Dala Lourenço  
José was born in 1948 in what was then the town of Serpa Pinto, in Angola’s Cuando Cubango province. 
José is a native Nganguela speaker and notes that his father was a carpenter while his mother was a 
housewife. José further recalls that he was the eldest of seven siblings, with him being the only boy. While 
he cannot recall his early childhood, he notes that he went to school for three years from the age of twelve. 
He finally left school to escape the frequent beatings of his teacher and went to work on a farm in Tsumeb 
as a herd boy looking after goats. Not long after, he returned home in order to train as a builder. José recalls 
that he had not been affected by the independence war, which was restricted to Angola’s northernmost 
provinces, and that he only encountered the different liberation groups at the time of independence around 
1975. It was also during this time that his father passed away after the family had moved to the town of 
Cuangar, and José notes that he had joined the FNLA because of the ensuing chaos caused by the war. 
Asked why he had specifically chosen to join the FNLA, José noted that he had liked what FNLA recruiters 
had said, and he notes that a lot of his Nganguela kinsmen were joining the FNLA as well. José continued 
to recall that although no one ever received any form of payment, they received sufficient food, and he 
states that the FNLA never forced people to join them. José also alludes to the fact that he joined the FNLA 
in a time of extreme insecurity, and that joining the FNLA and later the SADF’s 32 Battalion was a 
calculated decision to secure his own survival.289 
 
 
Pedro Manuel  
Pedro was born in the town of Songo situated in Angola’s Uíge province, in 1942, and belongs to the 
Bakongo ethnic group. He recalls that his father was a farmer who cultivated coffee, maize and peanuts. 
Pedro’s mother assisted her husband with the farm work. Most of his early childhood was spent assisting 
his parents with the farming chores, and Pedro notes that as such, he never went to school. Pedro joined 
the FNLA at the age of 19 and received his training at the FNLA’s Kinkuzo base. He recalls that they did 
not receive guns at first and that they had to make due with sticks and pangas. Asked when he first came 
to know of the FNLA, he recalls that he was told about the FNLA by his father, who noted that it was a 
party for northern Angola. However, Pedro notes that the FNLA was open to all ethnicities, and welcomed 
everyone who wished to join. Although Pedro states that he was not forced to join the FNLA, he alluded 
to the fact that the elders of his village encouraged FNLA membership. Pedro notes that his military 
training was tough, but also states that he was treated well. Asked whether he had gotten sufficient clothing 
and food, he recalled that one only ran out of food and clothes when on patrol for months at a time, but 
that generally, there had been enough food. He also states that they did not receive any pay because the 
FNLA was not yet well established. Like other respondents, Pedro notes that he is still a fervent FNLA 
supporter, and he expressed quite some animosity towards the present MPLA regime, arguing that they did 
not want anything to do with FNLA supporters, and as such, ha cannot return to Angola to see his family.290 
 
 
FNLA is the Father of the Revolution for Freedom 
In contrast to the critical narrative of the FNLA which has been presented earlier, what struck 
me when I listened to the interviews I had conducted with the FNLA veterans, was that they 
portrayed the FNLA in an almost overly positive light. Alessandro Portelli’s notion of myth-
making mentioned earlier, is instructive, and the question that therefore arises would be: what 
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purpose does the myth of an unblemished FNLA serve for these respondents individually, as 
well as for the group? Before I attempt to answer this question, I will first provide examples of 
how the FNLA veterans spoke about the FNLA. 
 
Initially, my study attempted to ascertain the reasons why these veterans had joined the FNLA, 
and as such, some of the questions I had asked specifically inquired about how they were 
treated while they were FNLA soldiers, as well as if they received enough food, clothing, 
weapons and ammunition while with the FNLA. I also asked whether the FNLA had recruited 
soldiers forcibly and whether they were free to leave if they chose to. In addition, I asked 
whether they had received any form of payment. In their responses, all respondents adamantly 
asserted that they were never forced to join the FNLA, and that they, as well as all other FNLA 
soldiers,  joined of their own free will; that they had been treated well; received sufficient food, 
arms and uniforms; and that they were free to leave if they chose to. Also, they did not receive 
payment as they had chosen to fight for their country, for freedom and liberation, and that as 
such, payment had not been an important issue. In particular, the assertions that they had 
received enough food, equipment and clothing seems particularly suspect, considering the 
accounts by former 32 Battalion officers that have been mentioned earlier, stating that they had 
encountered these FNLA soldiers in dismal states, some soldiers not having had proper or no 
footwear, having only worn mismatched, ragged t-shirts and shorts, and seemingly having had 
no proper meals for a while.291 This is particularly relevant as the Pomfret respondents 
originated from this group of FNLA soldiers. However, as mentioned, the veterans paint a 
different picture. As José Dala Lourenço recalls: 
CC: Did you get food every day? 
JDL: Ja, food, a lot. They was give us. They was give us food. Nicely. Nice. 
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CC: And did you get some sort of money or something? A payment? 
JDL: From, from FNLA party not. […] No one was paid. 
CC: Ok. […] So did uhm, did the FNLA ever force people to stay in the FNLA army? 
JDL: No. 
CC: So you were free to go when you wanted? 
JDL: No one forced the people to stay in the army. Like myself, no one was forcing me, to do, to join the 
army.292 
 
Similarly, João Sebastião noted: 
JS: We had food. I myself was a chef to cook for the soldiers. 
CC: Can you describe to me what life was like in the FNLA? 
JS: The life I had in the FNLA was to have peace, no problems. 
CC: Were you given food, money, other things? 
JS: Let's tell the truth! We were not there […] to be paid. It was our country. Was just food and that was 
enough, there was no money paid to us.  
CC: Did you ever want to leave the FNLA? 
JS: One was happy to be with FNLA. I was happy because I wanted to be with FNLA. 
CC: Would you say it was like a family for you? 
JS: Yes. 
CC: Did the FNLA ever force people to be part of the movement? Did they force people to be soldiers? 
JS: No, that was an organisation that didn’t like to force people. If everything was like FNLA we would 
not be here in South Africa. […] All of them were FNLA because they didn’t want war, they wanted peace, 
and FNLA also wanted peace, no more fighting.293 
 
José Francisco, who had only been an FNLA soldier for one year before joining the SADF, 
gave the following sparse but precise answers to my questions: 
CC: Did you get payment? 
JF: No, there was no pay. 
CC: No pay? 
JF: No, just that thing was only for free. Ja. I was joining for nothing. 
CC: And how were you treated? Did you get food… 
JF: Ja, there was food enough. 
CC: And did you get enough equipment, clothing, stuff like that? 
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JF: Ja, everything. 
CC: So they never forced people to join them? 
JF: No, no, no. FNLA never forced people. You yourself will decide if you want to join. There was no 
party was forcing, eh, people to join them. 294 
 
So too, Francisco Paulo recalls that the FNLA had been very popular: 
CC: When you joined FNLA, did a lot of other people join as well? 
FP: Yes, because FNLA was the one, she was the number one. She’s the people. Was not forcing people. 
Just yourself, you want to go to join FNLA. It was a lot of people. […] Because, when FNLA came, he 
was talk with people nicely. Nicely, nicely. It was not a problem, he was not forcing people. Yourself, if 
you want, you can join. If you don’t want, you can stay.  
CC: Ok. 
FP: But also, […] he was not promise, to say you are going to get money, because at the time, he was not 
organised, the people, the soldier to pay money. But food, and eh, clothes, it was fine. 295 
 
 
Another account is given by Simão Mendes, who recalled the following: 
CC: Did the higher ranking officials treat the soldiers well? Did you have food and clothes? 
SM: Yes, we had food and uniforms and all we needed. 
CC: Did you also get some money as compensation? 
SM: We had no payment as compensation. At that time, we went to war so we could become independent 
and live in peace.  
CC: How did the FNLA recruit young people? […] Convince them or force them? 
SM: No, that was voluntary. They never forced the people to join them. They joined FNLA from the heart. 
They believed in freedom. 
CC: Would you say that the FNLA had lots of support from the communities? 
SM: That was right, the people liked the FNLA. […] They would come talk to the communities, give their 
ideas about the party to get more and more support from the communities. In the communities, each person 
had the right to choose the party they wanted to join. Like here you have the ANC, IFP, DA. 296 
 
In some instances, I did not even ask about forced recruitment, and respondents chose to 
address the issue, as if in a pre-emptive way. It must be added that when I explained the purpose 
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of my interviews to the respondents, in order to establish why they had joined the FNLA, it 
seemed that some were specifically attempting to paint the FNLA in a positive light from the 
start. For instance, Pedro Lenge remarked the following at the beginning of the interview when 
I had asked him to recall what he remembered about his parents: “[…] I was in Congo with my 
father’s brother, I was not in Angola. I learned to drive there in Congo. I was a taxi man. That 
is what I did when I was in my house in DRC. I later joined the army, but it was voluntary, I 
was not forced to join the army. While I was training I always went home.”297 Asked whether 
he had received sufficient food and had received any form of payment, Pedro replied: “It was 
good, we had everything, was good. […] You must remember at that time we did not fight for 
money, but for the country. Even our parents. […] There was no promises, just become soldier 
for the country.”298 
 
In addition to noting that they had been well treated and had received adequate food, clothes 
and equipment, many Pomfret respondents also noted how the FNLA was fighting a just war, 
striving for peace and prosperity, in order to liberate all Angolan people from Portuguese 
colonialism. Asked whether the FNLA was a liberation movement exclusively for Bakongos, 
some noted that the FNLA had been a truly inclusive organisation that did not discriminate 
against other ethnic groups. Furthermore, some respondents also mentioned the virtuous 
qualities of the FNLA’s leader Holden Roberto. This is in direct contrast to the accounts 
portraying the FNLA as a narrow, Bakongo nationalist movement, fighting for the exclusive 
interests of northern Angola discussed previously. These responses are also quite different to 
how others have described Roberto, namely, as being a paranoid, autocratic leader, who 
seemingly benefited personally from misappropriating FNLA funds. For the Pomfret veterans, 
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as will be shown below, the FNLA and Holden Roberto are still very much held in high esteem, 
with some going as far as to note that they would remain loyal FNLA members and supporters 
until the day they died. 
 
In an interview conducted in 2005, Pomfret resident and ex FNLA soldier João Pequeno dos 
Santos, interviewed by Angela McIntyre, recounts why he had joined the FNLA. Noting that 
his father had been killed while serving in the Portuguese colonial army, João went on to train 
as a mechanic at the age of 15 before joining the FNLA. He remembers: 
AM: When did you join the FNLA? 
JDS: When the brothers moved into the territory…all of us joined that army. 
AM: And you had some sense of the independence struggle? 
JDS: Yes, we were all fighting for independence, for the liberation of the territory; all of us young people 
felt that spirit to join our brothers. […] I was angry, we saw our land was being used by people who didn’t 
belong there, we were inspired, and we joined our brothers who were fighting in the bush. All the youth of 
15, 16, 17 years joined the FNLA […] I joined the FNLA, and that’s where I stayed.299 
 
It is of particular interest to note that the above respondent refers to FNLA soldiers as having 
been brothers, which would indicate a sense of camaraderie and familiarity. This emphasis on 
community is reiterated by João Sebastião, who described the FNLA in the following way: 
“[…] the FNLA wanted to keep the people together, no war, no fighting, and work together.”300 
This view is also shared by Pedro Lenge, who noted the following: 
CC: When did you hear about the FNLA? What was the party like? 
PL: Yes, it was a good party to liberate the country to give freedom. 
CC: When did you first meet people from the FNLA? 
PL: The people is me! I am the people; we are the people. Let me explain: FNLA was my political party, 
making alliance. That is why my father decided that we must go to the army to be part of the FNLA to 
fight for freedom. Our fathers wanted us to go and join the party and organise everything. 
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CC: What was life like in the FNLA? Was it good? 
PL: It was good. I am going to answer like this: FNLA was ok, was good because it was FNLA that won 
the country back. President Holden Roberto, he was the one that was leading. He was the one that made 
agreement […] to cease fire. Holden Roberto went to Portugal to sign agreement with the minister. 
CC: So the reason you stayed with the FNLA was to fight for the country’s freedom? 
PL: That is my party. I grew up in the FNLA and I will die FNLA!301 
 
The above sentiment of one’s continued loyalty to the FNLA is echoed by Francisco Paulo, 
who noted: “[…] I can’t leave FNLA even now, FNLA staying into my heart. I love him too 
much. She never make any problem to me or my family. Even my family I leave there behind 
also was the group of FNLA.” Asked whether he ever tried to leave the FNLA while he was a 
soldier, Francisco Paulo remarked adamantly: “I never leave FNLA, because is the one who 
start with me, is the one when I’m going to die, also, I’m going to remember why I’m here: the 
name of FNLA. Yes.” 302 
 
Similarly, when asked whether he ever tried to leave the FNLA, José Francisco replied: “No, I 
never leave FNLA. I still, I’m still FNLA, until now. Because I don’t see anything wrong with 
FNLA.”303 José explained:  
The idea of FNLA is good. Ja. Because MPLA, working with eh, Soviet, Cuban. Look at the Cuban, how 
they are: they don’t have good job there. They don’t have good life, in Cuba. This is what MPLA want to 
follow. How am I going to follow MPLA? […] No man. FNLA want to follow those, American, French, 
whatever, the way they living there. Ja, that is, they say capitalism. That is the way that people must live. 
Not the way the Cuban live. And to have eh, a permanent president. A president come in, power to be there 
until he die. It is not good. It's not a democracy. Ja, is the same MPLA doing. Jose Eduardo dos Santos is 
there for a very long time. He don't want to come out. How I'm going to join that party? Just to suffer? You 
cannot talk about the president you'll be killed. Here in South Africa, you can talk bad about Zuma 
whatever, never going to, no one who can touch you. Because we are free to say something. But in Angola 
no, you are not free. If you criticise the president you die. That's why they are maintain on that, those 
things. Because of the, they are follow Cuban, Russian. No, no way. Ja.304 
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Another FNLA veteran, Simão Mendes, explains why he joined the FNLA: 
CC: When you joined the FNLA, what was the reason? 
SM: It was a political party that I believed could liberate Angola, like the South African government under 
Mandela. FNLA was like that. 
CC: So you went to fight for the FNLA because you believed they could fight colonialism? 
SM: Yes. 
CC: Was that the case for many other young people that joined the FNLA? 
SM: The majority of people liked FNLA, like here in SA with the ANC. 
CC: Was it only Bakongo people or other ethnic groups as well? 
SM: All others too. 
CC: What was the FNLA like? 
SM: FNLA’s objective was to fight for the people’s freedom. That is what the party was all about. Freedom 
for Angola. Then later the war started, MPLA started attacking FNLA and FNLA responded.  Because of 
that lots of people were killed. Then the FNLA leader Holden Roberto said: we can’t keep killing our 
people because of the way MPLA used the Cubans to fight. From that time, we then joined UNITA but 
later UNITA turned against us. That is the way FNLA lost the war; they were alone.305 
 
The last section in the above answer, in particular, shows how Simão Mendes portrays the 
FNLA as a victim, having been betrayed by enemies such as the MPLA and UNITA. Also, 
Simão Mendes notes that Holden Roberto made the honourable decision to partner with 
UNITA to prevent the deaths of further FNLA comrades. Just like Simão Mendes, Pedro 
Manuel noted that the FNLA was an inclusive movement that was open to all ethnic groups. 
He explains:  
CC: Ok, so eh, how did you, how did you first meet FNLA people? 
PM: It was the party from the north, what when I was born my father he tell me we have a party with the 
name FNLA, but it’s a Bakongo party.  
CC: Ok, so you’re also Bakongo? 
PM: Ja. 
CC: Ok, so what did your father say about FNLA? Just that it was for Bakongo? Or what else did he say? 
PM: No, like ANC and Inkatha, just like ANC and Inkatha, when Mandela was in jail, when he came out, 
he didn't say that party only for ANC.  
CC: Ok, so FNLA was for everyone, not just Bakongo? 
PM: Umbundu, Nganguela, Kyoko, etc. 
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CC: So can you tell me why you joined FNLA? Did someone come to your village and say you must join? 
PM: FNLA was for everyone, you want to join FNLA, you just come in.306 
 
 
Pedro Manuel gave one of the most emphatic statements in support of the FNLA and Holden 
Roberto. He noted:  
Holden Roberto of FNLA [was] fighting for freedom. FNLA is the father of the revolution for freedom. 
The reason was, we wanted a united government, all together for the same objectives. An organ of 
government is not a person. Holden Roberto wanted to unite all the groups and the people but Agostinho 
Neto said no! He didn’t agree. I don’t understand that, he was taking soldier from one group to another. 
He wanted to separate all of us. I don’t know why. […]Holden Roberto was the first, was like a mother, 
was like the first to fight with the colony. And when we got independence, Holden Roberto was supposed 
to put all the three parties, to put together, to build our country. But Agostinho Neto he was not agreeing 
for that.307 
 
Again, the above extract portrays Holden Roberto as the righteous freedom fighter, leading the 
just FNLA against the unjust MPLA under Agostinho Neto. From the above, it seems that 
Holden Roberto’s leadership came to personify Pedro Manuel’s hopes and dreams for his 
country. More so, it is stressed that the FNLA had been the first liberation movement to engage 
in the anti-colonial struggle, and, therefore, was more legitimate than other groups. Pedro also 
likens the FNLA and Holden Roberto to a father and mother figure, with this statement giving 
clues as to how many veterans felt about their leader and their movement. For many FNLA 
soldiers, the FNLA under Roberto came to provide a family-like structure in a time when they 
were separated from their own families and had to deal with a lot of insecurity, death and chaos.  
In a concluding remark, Pedro Manuel reiterated his continued loyalty to the FNLA: “I won't 
be leaving FNLA, even now sitting here I am a person of FNLA.”308 
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Analysis 
As mentioned, the question that arose when I reviewed these interviews was: how and why was 
the myth and memory of an unblemished FNLA produced and sustained by the FNLA veterans 
of Pomfret? In answering this question, the following section will explore several themes, 
including the role of the FNLA and Holden Roberto as parental figures and joining the FNLA 
as a strategy for survival; the role of masculinity and nationalism; senses of betrayal by the old 
South African regime and a sense of abandonment in the current context; senses of place and 
belonging; the image of a just FNLA versus an unjust MPLA; as well as the politics of 
remembering and forgetting. This will be done by drawing on concepts such as memory and 
myth, as well as senses of place, belonging and self, as explored in the introduction. The first 
theme I would like to explore is that of the FNLA and Holden Roberto being portrayed as 
parental figures, within the context of nationalism and masculinity. 
 
Nationalism and Masculinity: The FNLA as the Father of the Revolution 
As seen in the previous section, some veterans likened the FNLA and Holden Roberto to 
parental figures, referring to them as mother and father. For instance, Pedro Manuel noted: 
“FNLA is the father of the revolution for freedom. […] Holden Roberto […] was like a 
mother.”309 Another veteran, João Sebastião, responded affirmatively when asked whether the 
FNLA had been like a family to him. 310 So too, Simão Mendes stated: “FNLA acted like a 
father to his children”.311 In light of the latter comments, it must be noted that many veterans 
had joined the FNLA at very young ages, with some having joined when they were younger 
than 18. Having left their families behind during a time of great uncertainty and insecurity, the 
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FNLA and their fellow comrades provided a surrogate family that gave them a sense of identity 
and belonging during the war years. In addition, Holden Roberto took on a parental figure, 
providing guidance and a sense of purpose. As shown previously, some veterans noted that 
they had joined the FNLA to fight for freedom, and to liberate Angola, at first from Portuguese 
colonial rule, and later from MPLA/Soviet/Cuban occupation. Notions of masculinity and 
nationalism are useful concepts that help to explain the above focus on family and a sense of 
needing to participate in the independence struggle. Moreover, understanding how masculinity 
relates to one's sense of potency and purpose becomes integral to understanding how the 
veterans relate to the FNLA. The term potency used here does not only refer to masculine 
strength and might but also denotes social, as well as political potency.  Below, I will outline 
how notions of masculinity relate to colonialism, nationalism, as well as militarism, before 
drawing on interview extracts in order to illustrate these connections in more detail. 
 
Desiree Lwambo notes that gender roles are socially constructed, as children are conditioned 
for their future roles by means of education and socialisation. Lwambo proposes that in Africa, 
masculinity is connected to one’s ability to head a household by providing for one’s family.312 
This view is supported by Richard Waller, who says that “adulthood for men emphasized the 
achievement of independence as household heads.”313 In his article, Rebellious Youth in 
Colonial Africa, Waller explores how conceptions of adulthood were shaped by late colonial 
processes, causing significant intergenerational tensions, with young men, in particular, 
attempting to become active agents rather than submissive subjects.314 Fundamentally 
disadvantaged by racialized colonial laws, youngsters came to see their impotent elders as 
                                                          
312 Lwambo, D. “‘Before the War I was a Man’: Men and Masculinities in the Eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo”, in Gender & Development, vol. 21, no. 1, 2013, pp. 50-51. 
313 Waller, R. “Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa”, in The Journal of African History, vol. 47, no. 1, 2006, p. 
81. 
314 Waller, “Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa”, p. 77-78. 
129 
 
accomplices to their continued colonial subjugation. According to Waller, this new found 
consciousness increasingly threatened to undermine the “alliance between colonialism and 
‘tradition’”, and while “racial domination undermined the masculinity of men who were no 
longer [their own] masters, […] perhaps they could imagine or make another [world] for 
themselves.”315 Waller argues that youth were angry at an adult society that could no longer 
offer them protection or guidance and that increased defiance vis-á-vis adult society stemmed 
from a deep-seated sense of frustration.316 
 
This sense of frustration found impetus within the nationalist movements of the mid-twentieth 
century, with nationalist organisations, such as the FNLA in this case, offering an opportunity 
for action. Aaronette White argues that nationalism enabled African men to reclaim the loss of 
status they experienced through disruptive colonial policies such as imposed taxation and land 
dispossession.317 Waller notes that for the youth, in particular, nationalist mobilisation 
“conveyed a vivid sense that politics could be fun”, but also offered an opportunity to 
circumvent the betrayal of elders, by taking power and authority by force. As such, nationalist 
movements held the promise of achieving “self-mastery through independence”.318  
 
Moreover, as Joane Nagel points out, there exists a “connection between manhood and 
nationhood”, with “patriotic manhood and exalted motherhood” being constructed as “icons of 
nationalist ideology”. 319 Thus, while nationalism often evolves out of “masculinised memory, 
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masculinised humiliation and masculinised hope”, the nation is often perceived in a feminine 
light, to be defended.320 It is the men who defend “their freedom, their honour, their homeland 
and their women”, and as such, “nationalism is constructed to emphasise and to resonate with 
masculine cultural themes”, with terms like “honour, patriotism, cowardice, bravery and duty 
[…] thoroughly tied to the nation and to manliness.”321 Thus, in this conception where the 
nation is likened to a family, it is the women who embody the nation and its honour, while men 
are the defenders of the family and the nation. According to Nagel, “only cowards shirk the 
call of duty; real men are not cowards. Patriotism is a siren call that few men can resist, 
particularly in the midst of political ‘crisis’; and if they do, they risk the disdain or worse of 
their communities and families”.322 Accordingly, there exists a situation where on the one hand, 
youngsters would have joined nationalist movements in order to counteract the impotency of 
their elders and in the process attain a sense of status, social and political potency and purpose 
themselves, while on the other hand, youngsters would have felt that it was their patriotic duty 
to fight for independence. Shirking their duty would have meant being potentially ridiculed by 
their peers.  
 
White proposes that the “patriarchal nature of war, militarism and military training”, was 
further reinforced during independence struggles, “as nationalist consciousness became 
militarised”.323 In fact, Mary Layoun states that “nationalism and militarism seem to go hand 
in hand” 324 while George Mosse notes that war is an “invitation to manliness”325. According 
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to White, notions of combat as men’s work “promoted hypermasculine views of manhood, 
[e.g.] manhood as aggressive, competitive, stoic, and the opposite of anything feminine”, while 
combat, associated with exercising power, “is understood to be the ultimate test of 
masculinity”.326 Diana Gibson notes that notions of masculinity are socially constructed and 
that the notions of military masculinity, in particular, put an emphasis on “toughness, hardness, 
male-bonding and self-sufficiency”.327 More specifically, Gibson points out that behavioural 
attributes such as power, control, competitiveness, forcefulness, gallantry and resilience are 
particularly espoused. The notion of “warrior masculinity” in an attempt to claim the status of 
manhood is also significant.328  
 
However, Lwambo points out how the impact of war can lead to fractured and dysfunctional 
families, where young boys grow up without positive male role models. Being denied the 
opportunity to gain the financial means to establish one’s own family in order to attain the 
status of manhood, Lwambo argues, leads to young men seeking other strategies that enable 
them to attain recognition and respect.329 According to Nagel, the military brings with it the 
allure of adventurism, entailing a sense of “embarking on a great adventure, [and a] desire not 
to be ‘left behind’ or ‘left out’”.330 Thus, as in the case of nationalism, the military offers 
youngsters an opportunity to gain a sense of potency, while enabling them to establish a sense 
of community and belonging. As I will outline below, the case of the FNLA veterans show that 
for some, the FNLA came to offer a sense of belonging, purpose and political and social 
potency, at a time when families were either absent, or elders were seen as impotent vis-á-vis 
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the brutality and injustice of the Portuguese colonial regime. Therefore, for some veterans, at 
least, the FNLA offered a chance to attain a sense of manhood and status, by fighting for the 
independence of their country. 
 
One case this inter-generational struggle is revealed is in the instance in which Francisco Paulo, 
speaking of the time when he first saw FNLA fighters when he was around 18 years old,  
recalls:  
That time when I see that people, me also I was confused now. Maybe one day me I wanted to be like this. 
No, maybe one day, but I tell my father, father, one day, me also I'm going to be a soldier. No, he tell me, 
why? Say no, I want to be soldier also, I want fighting to be freedom. Say hayi (expression of 
disbelief/disapproval), you never going to be a soldier. I say no, one day I'm going to be. He say ok 
(inaudible), and then, in 1974, when now the, all the group starting now, all the people now we know, we 
have terrorism in the bush that is fighting for freedom. And then one come to our village, say no, we came 
here, to recruit the people to, to go to training, and then after training we are fighting with colonialists. I 
say ahh, I can be that side? I ask my father, he say no, you are young man, you can't be for that soldier 
because you are the one, you are the first born, here the others are still so young. You can't go. […] I say 
no father I have to go. He say no you can't. I say ok fine, and I went to my friend, because that one we was 
play together, I tell him, hey my man, is not the time to wasting time. We are leaving the school, we have 
to go. My friend, also he say ok, fine, let’s go. And then we went there, to give a name, he say ok, you 
want to come to move to us, we say now we are going to. But these people tell us, no you are still young, 
you can't be that side because it's danger now. I say no, we have to go. Then, in 1974, is the time to prepare. 
I didn't tell my father, even my sister, brother, or another uncle, I didn't tell her. Just we went to the bush.331 
 
Francisco’s recollections do not only reveal the inter-generational struggle that existed in order 
to assert one’s potency vis-á-vis the impotency of one’s parents, it also reveals the sense of 
adventurism and camaraderie that accompanied leaving for the bush to join the FNLA. 
Additionally, the above extract reveals that for Francisco, there existed a sense of attaining 
manhood by joining the FNLA, as he was constantly told that he was too young to join by his 
father and others. In this sense, joining the FNLA not only offered Francisco the opportunity 
to rebel against his father’s authority but also offered him the opportunity to attain a sense of 
masculinity that he would not have been able to assert if he would not have joined. 
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It is also interesting to note how Pedro Manuel recalls the time when he joined the FNLA: “I 
was 19 years when I went to the army. Went to Congo to be trained. After the training, I was 
promoted. In 1967 is when I started, went to the bush and left my family.”332 Again, it is 
significant to note the emphasis on leaving one’s family behind when leaving for the bush to 
fight with the FNLA. As such, a direct contrast is created between leaving the familiar and 
structure giving environment of one’s family, and leaving for the unfamiliar, in this case, the 
bush and all the unfamiliarity, anxiety and even fear this brought with it.  So too, the following 
account by João Sebastião reveals how in his case, having lost his father and mother at an early 
age, joining the FNLA provided some direction and structure at a time of great uncertainty and 
violence. He recalls: “[…] my father died and my mother also died a long time ago. When my 
father died I was a child. There was too much confusion at the time. My father was killed 
during the war. […] I didn’t have a father as a child, so that is when I decided to learn to fix 
clothes, […] so I could earn an income to support myself, buy food, clothes.”333 The following 
interview extract provides further examples of the situation João found himself in when he 
joined the FNLA: 
CC: Why did you leave [your home town]? 
JS: Because there was too much fighting and confusion, everyone was running away. 
CC: How old were you? 
JS: At the time I was 14 or 15 years old. I was big already. 
CC: Ok. When you moved, what did you do then? 
JS: I did nothing much. I joined the political party FNLA. 
CC: […] you were about 14, 15 years old when you joined the FNLA, am I right? 
JS: Yes, it is right. 
CC: What was the reason? Do you know why you joined the FNLA? 
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JS: Can’t say I went to the FNLA to become a soldier, but because all the others were running away to 
FNLA I decided to follow them and join also. […] The life I had in the FNLA was to have peace, no 
problems […]. 
CC: Would you say it was like a family for you? 
JS: Yes.334  
 
The above example shows how in João’s case, the FNLA provided him with a sense of 
belonging, direction and purpose, having lost his mother and father early on. As such, he was 
able to recreate an environment of familiarity within the FNLA, adopting the FNLA and his 
fellow fighters as a surrogate family after having lost his biological family. In addition, João 
puts an emphasis on the fact that he considered himself to be big already, and his assertion that 
he joined the FNLA because his peers were doing so as well might reveal that he not only 
feared possible ridicule for not joining, but also that he joined in order to attain a sense of status, 
authority and social potency, which could be seen as an expression of his desire to be seen as 
an adult.  From the other examples given above, it seems that this applied to other FNLA 
veterans as well. Further veterans, who had only joined the FNLA in their mid to late twenties 
or early thirties, note how joining the FNLA provided them with an opportunity to escape the 
violence that engulfed much of Angola immediately after independence. In this case, the FNLA 
provided security at times of great insecurity. For instance, when asked why he had joined the 
FNLA, José Dala Lourenço repeatedly noted that he had joined because of the war. José noted 
that the war had only reached his town in 1975 when he was in his late twenties. The following 
extract from José’s interview supports other accounts which note that the time during and after 
Angolan independence around 1975 had been very brutal.335 As José reports: “Why make me 
to become soldier? Is the war. […] So when the war come, they, if they found, eh, FNLA, eh, 
if UNITA and MPLA, they found FNLA, they kill FNLA. If FNLA and eh, MPLA, found 
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UNITA, they kill UNITA. If UNITA and FNLA, they find MPLA they kill. So kill each other, 
if they found, hey, that one, from another party, they kill you.”336 As such, joining the FNLA, 
or any of the other independence movements for that matter, became a life or death matter. 
While joining one of the movements held the promise of security, one could also easily become 
a target. 
 
Another respondent whom I asked why people had joined the FNLA and later 32 Battalion was 
Frederico Donqua. Although he never joined the FNLA, he found himself alongside many 
FNLA soldiers who had fled to refugee camps on the border of then South West Africa and 
Angola, with some of these FNLA soldiers finally going on to join 32 Battalion. Frederico’s 
comments reveal how some joined the FNLA and later 32 Battalion in order to survive the 
chaos of the war at the time: 
FD: Ja. Many people want to be soldier. Want to be soldier. It the same way [people] went to Caprivi. Men 
from Rundu refugee camp, go and joined there. […] want to survive. Want to survive. 
CC: Ok, and then can I ask you, eh, why you joined 32 Battalion? 
FD: I joined 32 Battalion because I wanted to survive. 
CC: So you wanted to get out of the refugee camp? 
FD: After that, no more refugee camp. Anywhere choose, how survive. Therefore, I choose to go to Buffalo 
(32 Battalion base camp), as nurse. I work there, as nurse. […] every people, choose where place, good. 
[…] some from Huambo, go to north, another people east, to look what better place, to survive.337 
 
Considering the role that the FNLA had played in the lives of these veterans in times of great 
uncertainty, violence and personal trauma, one could argue that they continue to feel a sense 
of great gratitude towards the FNLA, which had provided them with support and security.  For 
some veterans, joining the FNLA also marked the time when they attained the status of 
adulthood, and the status that this brought with it. Being seen as a brave freedom fighter must 
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have instilled them with a sense of pride, authority and social and political potency. This may 
explain why the Pomfret veterans actively portrayed the FNLA in a positive light. It seems that 
their continued loyalty and gratitude prevents them from dishonouring the FNLA, even though 
they might have had negative experiences with the group. As Michael Roper points out, 
reconstructing the past can act as a means to mediate death and loss, and that it can aid in 
restoring the connection between past and present.338 In this case, the loss of one’s biological 
family due to war, and the trauma that this loss has caused in the lives of the respondents, may 
have been stabilised or eased in some or other way by adopting the FNLA as one’s surrogate 
family.  
 
A Life in Limbo: Senses of Self, Place and Belonging 
As will be discussed here, it would seem that for these veterans, drawing on the myth of a just 
FNLA, enabled them to orientate themselves in the misery and hopelessness of the present, 
which has destabilised their sense of self, belonging and place. As Merrit Buyer points out, 
“Spatial displacement and the violence and fear that is behind it often leads to disruption of 
one’s sense of home and belonging, the loss of family or family structures, and a change in 
lifestyle, all of which are central to one’s construction of identity.”339 As such, it is important 
to realise how disruptive the Angolan war for independence and civil war have been for the 
respondents, to the extent that their senses of self, belonging and place have been disrupted 
time and time again. What is more, they are seen as having been on the wrong side of history 
by not only the current MPLA regime but the ANC government as well. As such, the veterans 
of Pomfret can be seen as the human residue of an unpopular war that many contemporary 
South Africans would rather forget. As will be explored in more detail later, it becomes 
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important to understand the relationship between public forgetting and personal and local 
remembrance. Buyer states, for instance, that: “Personal identity is a complex sense of being 
or belonging, not derived from one local structure, but actively and strategically constructed in 
relation to multiple purposes. Those who have been forcibly displaced must re-negotiate their 
identity as refugees in a new country; they must deal with the loss of their home and often their 
families, and find a way to incorporate their histories and often painful memories into the 
present.”340 So too, Anna Green reminds us that “Composing a past we can live with, and that 
gives us a sense of coherent identity, involves actively managing the memories of traumatic or 
painful experiences”.341  
 
Although drawing on refugee literature is useful in this case, as it provides valuable clues to 
understanding how displaced communities make use of certain mechanisms in order to cope 
with the trauma of displacement, it must be noted that in the case of the Pomfret community, 
their experience of displacement was quite particular. One could refer to the Pomfret 
community as a “transplanted community”, as to a large extent, the Caprivi base was merely 
“transplanted” to Pomfret, keeping the structures intact. Although they now found themselves 
living in another country, the people around them, from their extended families to the bases 
personnel, changed little. For the 32 Battalion soldiers, reporting for duty, military drills and 
guard duty continued.  That is not to say that their experience was any less traumatic, but it 
allowed the community to keep social and familial ties intact. Furthermore, up until the 
disbanding of the unit, the Pomfret community lived quite an isolated existence apart from 
surrounding communities, as Pomfret itself had been a military base with restricted access. 
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However, it is also important to take note of the fact that the war in Angola during the late 
1980s and early 1990s was still continuing, and for the Angolan 32 Battalion members, 
returning to Angola at this point would not have been an option. As such, the below section, 
which will explore senses of place and belonging in more detail, must be read with the latter in 
mind. 
 
Veterans alluded to the fact that they find themselves in a situation of uncertainty, seemingly 
having no prospect for a better future in South Africa while also seeing no opportunity to return 
to Angola. This sense of not being able to return relates not only to the perceived hostility of 
the current MPLA government towards former enemy fighters, but also relates to the fact that 
they are now ageing, and do not have the energy, nor the resources to establish a new life in 
Angola. Also, some of their children and grandchildren are working in cities such as Pretoria, 
Johannesburg and Cape Town, and leaving South Africa would mean giving up the support 
structures that they currently have. Nevertheless, there exists a sense that Pomfret has not yet 
become their permanent home, with the prospect of returning to Angola still ever present, 
however unlikely it may seem. As such, it seems that some veterans find themselves in liminal 
state of mind, with this state of mind directly impacting on their senses of self, place and 
belonging. Although this may seem contradictory, it reveals the anguish that these veterans 
face in their daily lives. However much they desire to return to Angola, if only to visit family, 
the prospect of returning remains unlikely. Likewise, however much they are tied to Pomfret 
and South Africa due to their advanced ages and the family support structures that they depend 
on, current developments such as the lack of water, electricity, and the closure of Pomfret’s 
school, as well as the perceived hostility of the current ANC government, disrupt their senses 
of place and belonging on a continuous basis. Pedro Manuel reveals that he feels that he was 
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robbed of a better future in Angola. This sense of loss is amplified even more by his sense of 
having sacrificed a lot while having fought for the FNLA. Pedro recalls:  
1967 is when I starting in the bush. That was when I left my family until now. I would like to see them. I 
have no chance to go that side. Because of the parties, UNITA and MPLA, MPLA don't like us to go that 
side.  I like for President Eduardo dos Santos, when he leaves communism, I'd like to go back to my country 
to join my family. He don't think about us. I'd like to know why Agostinho Neto and President Holden 
Roberto, why when they come back to Angola we start fighting again. I was leave Angola because Holden 
Roberto was the first, was like a mother, was like the first to fighting with colony. And when we was 
fighting and then we get independence, Holden Roberto was supposed to put all that three party, to put 
together, to building our country, but Agostinho Neto he was no agreeing for that. […]And then the way 
we have to see, but who was supposed to stay in Angola, was supposed to be us, because we, we were 
suffering, everything, to fighting with Portuguese, who was starting? Was FNLA.342 
 
So too, João Sebastião expressed his sense of loss and uncertainty when he remarked:  
“We have lost our country. We don’t know if we are going back. Or our children. Nobody knows. […] we 
don’t know tomorrow our children will go there because Angola is no good. […] Now I am in South Africa 
and I am a South African citizen.  Angola, I was born there. When I want to go there why they ask for me 
to sign papers, passport? I was born there! All family is there, so now we don’t know who is controlling 
Angola, we are all here”343 
 
Not only does João expressly state that he has lost his country, he also notes that there exists 
much uncertainty of whether his children will be able to visit or even relocate to Angola. As 
such, it seems that this sense of loss has become intergenerational. João also alludes to the fact 
that although he is now a South African citizen, like all the Pomfret veterans and their families, 
he still feels bound to his birth country, in part because so many of his relatives live there. His 
sense of loss is therefore amplified by the fact that he has to apply for documents in order to 
travel to Angola. His sense of self as an Angolan, as well as his sense of place and belonging, 
have been destabilised and brought into question by the fact that he is treated like a foreigner 
by the Angolan authorities. 
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A further example of the anguish that Pomfret veterans experience due to having lost contact 
with their families is given by José Dala Lourenço. He notes: “I lose my family, my father 
passed away, I didn't assist to my father die, and a lot of family are dying there, you can't go 
there and assist your family […].” 344 José’s comment reveals a feeling of helplessness due to 
not having been able to fulfil his duties to his family by being prevented from assisting with 
his relative's funerals, as well as being denied the opportunity to pay his respects. Another 
veteran who expressed his sense of loss at losing contact with his family in Angola is José 
Francisco. Speaking about the whereabouts of his brother, José notes:  
“My brother no, I don't, I, until now I don't know where is my brother, because when I left Angola, I was 
the first to leave. No, no, my brother was first going to Luanda, and then I follow him to, to look for him, 
but when I get to Luanda I never saw him. I don't know if he was join the party or whatever. Then that time 
there was no communication, no phone, no nothing. Ja, until now, I don't know.”345 
 
Some veterans also expressed their sense of betrayal by the old South African regime, who had 
promised to take care of them. It was noted that they felt that the new ANC government had 
abandoned them, not caring about their wellbeing at all. As Pedro Lenge notes:  
When I left Angola in 1974 I lost all contact with my family, until now, no communication, I only had 
some contact with my brother before he died. He died here but the funeral was in Angola that is when I 
had some communication with the family that stayed there. Now the other family is asking what we are 
doing here! And we are here since we were abandoned, but we were promised a bonus or a package, and 
we are waiting for that, until now nothing, in this community nothing, was given to us from the government, 
that is the situation.346 
 
Not only does the above extract reveal the sense of loss that Pedro Lenge is experiencing due 
to having lost contact with his family in Angola, it also reveals a sense of uncertainty given the 
situation many of the families find themselves in. As will be shown below, for some veterans, 
the prospect of returning to Angola, however unlikely it may seem, remains a possibility. This 
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sense of possibly being able to return to their country of origin significantly impacts on their 
sense of place and belonging. 
 
For instance, José Francisco noted that he continues to support the FNLA, and asked whether 
he would return to Angola, he replied that the FNLA could perhaps come into power in Angola 
in future. He stated: “[…] it didn’t win in Angola, but maybe one day, it will win.”347 This view 
reflects the sentiment of other veterans, who remain hopeful that the FNLA could still unseat 
the MPLA from power. As such, a sense that the fight against the communist MPLA regime is 
not over remains in the Pomfret community. Another example that illustrates the latter is given 
by Francisco Paulo. He stated: “[…] here in Pomfret, all of us we want Angola to be freedom. 
To leave the regime of communista. Maybe one of the day, if I going to die. But my children 
have to go back there where I’m born. Ja. So like other people also, we are crying. When 
Angola going to be fine, to go back in our country?”348  
 
The above two comments illustrate how some veterans aspire to return to Angola, or, at least, 
hope that their children will have the opportunity to do so in future. This shows that for the 
community as a whole, their lives in Pomfret are not entirely settled, as the prospect of a future 
life in Angola is ever present. As such, this sentiment impacts on the senses of self, place and 
belonging, not only of individual veterans but the entire Angolan community in Pomfret. As 
noted previously, Pomfret is seen as being a half-way house between the lives that were left 
behind in Angola, and the possibility of returning to these lives in future. For many, the lives 
that were left behind were lives that bore the fruit of a better future, lives that promised peace, 
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with these lives ultimately having been disrupted by the Angolan independence and civil wars. 
Importantly, however, their unsettled situation in Pomfret allows the veterans to invoke an idea 
of a better life in future. By not committing to life in Pomfret, the possibility of a better life 
away from the hardships that they presently face is ever present.  
 
At this point, it is useful to take note of Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson’s assertion that 
myths act as tools to anchor one's sense of identity and place in the past, a world that has been 
lost.349 In this sense, it is also important to note how the Pomfret community as a whole, with 
the comradeship and solidarity among the veterans, in particular, has come to act as a social 
anchor, in order to locate oneself within the present, and the conditions that many veterans face 
in Pomfret. This reveals the paradoxical tensions that exist in the relationship between the 
veterans’ senses of past and present. By drawing on the familiar, in this case, a common sense 
of shared belonging and identity based on a common FNLA experience, and indeed, this 
applies to the entire 32 Battalion community as a whole, the veterans are able to establish a 
sense of continuity between their war experiences and the present. They are also able to recreate 
the sense of security and structure that the FNLA had provided them, within the present context 
of disappointment and frustration they have been experiencing in Pomfret. The seemingly 
positive experiences with the FNLA that the veterans have mentioned appear to provide them 
with a source of orientation within the present. As such, not being able to put down any roots 
in Pomfret is offset by their ability to identify as being part of this group of FNLA veterans, 
which allows them to locate themselves in the present. The uncertainty and hardship they face 
in Pomfret is therefore eased somewhat by the veterans’ ability to draw on a common identity 
and sense of belonging within the group, as members of an elite and exclusive group of veterans 
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that has allowed them to set themselves apart from others, and has enabled them to draw on a 
sense of pride. As such, this affects how they have come to interpret the present, as being a 
temporary state in a world of hopelessness, always yearning for something better and viewing 
themselves as being only temporary residents.350 Moreover, as Shelley Trower points out, “The 
search after place can be interpreted as an attempt to find rooted security, to establish fixed 
identities amidst – and in opposition to – the flux, fragmentation, and disruption of a 
[postcolonial] world.”351 As such, it could be assumed that a common FNLA identity has given 
these veterans the opportunity to “anchor” themselves in a world where they face constant 
challenges which threaten to disrupt their everyday lives. Their FNLA identity allows them to 
negotiate their present and their past while it seems that the myth of the FNLA that they have 
created provides a sense of stability. 
 
In this sense, the veterans are constantly negotiating and re-negotiating their present sense of 
self concerning their past. As Knudsen states: “To secure a positive feeling of self (who I am) 
through identity management, the individual often tries to negotiate on the basis of past, now 
lost, positions (who I was) rather than present conditions (who I have become).”352 
Furthermore, as Cathrine Brun notes, “[…] fantasy becomes a social practice, and imagination 
becomes part of the construction of people’s biographies which in turn become partly imagined 
lives […]”.353 This is echoed by Merrit Buyer who argues that by holding on to a refugee 
identity, as someone who is not settled, “[…] they retain […] the possibility of a better future 
[…]”, and “Remembrance in essence points to the incompleteness of the present, of the unfilled 
desires that the individual has lived within his struggle to survive.”354 In this sense, their 
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common FNLA identity helps the veterans to maintain and develop social networks which 
allow them to negotiate the instability and uncertainty of their present state of being.  
 
Moreover, it could be argued that by continuing to draw on their FNLA past, veterans are able 
to negotiate their sense of lost potency relating to their youth, when joining the FNLA meant 
being able to demonstrate one’s masculinity. In the past, joining the FNLA provided a sense of 
social potency and purpose within the pseudo-family framework of a nationalist movement, 
which has been challenged and eroded in their current situation. In a culture where masculinity 
is connected with being able to provide for one’s family, the inability to buy food or pay for 
school fees could be said to have brought about experiences of failure, humiliation and 
vulnerability. As Lwambo puts it, “Many […] supposed prerequisites for being a ‘real man’ do 
not withstand economic and social stresses, and are easily lost under unfavourable conditions. 
Their absence can be experienced as weakness and a loss of male identity, resulting in crisis. 
[…] Male privilege is connected to responsibility.”355 In this sense, one’s sense of social 
potency is directly tied to one’s sense of masculinity, and for many FNLA veterans, factors 
beyond their control, such as Pomfret’s lack of water and electricity, the ever looming prospect 
of being forcibly relocated, as well as the recent closure of Pomfret’s school, have led to the 
fact that their power over their everyday public lives is being continuously challenged and 
eroded. 
 
For instance, João Sebastião noted the following when he spoke about his current situation: 
“All this time here I have my children, they don’t have work but they finish school. That is the 
problem I have […].  Our fight now is this one. We don’t see any reason to fight anymore. I 
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am old, I am 74 years old I have no strength anymore.”356 Similarly, Pedro Lenge states: “[…] 
now I am 66 years old. Don’t have nothing else to do or where to work. […] What I do now? 
Run after the goats! That is all I can do.”357 In both these cases, there is a sense that even though 
they made so many sacrifices in the past and dedicated their youth to fighting for Angolan 
independence, they have little to show for it. Moreover, the fact that João is not able to provide 
for his children, and that Pedro now spends his time chasing after goats, reveals how in both 
cases, there exists a sense of lost potency, in contrast to the potency they had experienced 
during their youth. 
 
As such, it is interesting to take note of Luisa Passerini’s assertion that myth is integrally 
connected to senses of potency and purpose. Passerini notes that myth is not only shared by the 
collective, but also inter-generational, and beyond the limits of space and time.358 In research 
based on testimonies of people who belonged to terrorist organisations in Italy during the 1970s 
and early 1980s, Passerini shows how themes such as “heroic stories of revolutionaries […]; 
the legend of the hero or heroine who leaves home to help the oppressed against the oppressor 
[…]; the ideal of a small community united […]; fables of the loyalty of mothers who do not 
abandon their defeated daughters, but are ready to give their lives for them to sustain them 
against everything”, come to constitute myths that “have contributed to create our own notions 
of reality.”359 In reference to the above, Passerini notes: “I have come to believe that these 
people were able to persist against the principles of reality because they could draw on a shared 
imaginary.”360 If one were to apply the above to the case of the FNLA veterans, it could be said 
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that they have made use of a collective myth in order to counteract their current senses of 
hopelessness, as well as negotiate their fluctuating sense of social potency over time.  
 
In addition, it seems that veterans have come to connect the sense of their lost lives in Angola 
with the current MPLA regime, which is held responsible for having sabotaged the FNLA’s 
peace efforts. In contrast, the FNLA is still seen as an entity that can defeat the MPLA, and as 
such, the FNLA still bears the promise of enabling the veterans to return to these lost lives in 
Angola. In fact, some veterans seem to have developed an almost romanticised notion of their 
early lives. Asked to describe his childhood, Simão Mendes noted that “there were no 
problems”. Simão went on to state: “Life was good. I joined the army, and then we continue 
the war against the Portuguese with the FNLA army, fighting against colonialism. That was 
my job.”361 Similarly, Pedro Lenge, who had grown up in the Congolese port city of Matadi, 
noted the following when asked to describe his early life: “Yes, life was good. My father’s 
brother lived in Congo, was a tailor, had shops like canteen, taxis. Even the taxi I was driving 
was my uncle business. I had a good life. So you can see, life was good.”362 These extracts 
reveal a sense of potency and purpose, which have since been replaced with senses of 
hopelessness and despair.  
 
There also exists a sense of the FNLA not having completed its struggle in Angola, and that 
this struggle is ongoing. Some of the previous accounts reveal a deep dissatisfaction and even 
hatred for the MPLA regime. It has been accused of sabotaging the FNLA’s attempt at securing 
peace, with some respondents having noted that the MPLA is solely to blame for the outbreak 
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of civil war after independence. Additionally, some respondents have noted that the current 
MPLA regime is unjust, corrupt, and continues to keep Angola backwards. By painting the 
MPLA in an overly negative light, the FNLA and Holden Roberto, in contrast, have become 
almost saint-like. The juxtaposition between the good FNLA and the evil MPLA allows the 
respondents to justify the myth of a virtuous FNLA. For the respondents, the MPLA embodies 
everything that has gone wrong in Angola, and for some, the continued rule of the MPLA 
regime provides the rationale for them being unable to return to their homeland. In contrast, 
the FNLA provides a sense of continued hope, that if someday, the FNLA should come into 
power in Angola, they will be able to return and reunite with their families.  
 
Hence, the myth of an overly unjust MPLA sustains the myth of a just and virtuous FNLA. For 
instance, the recollections of the former FNLA soldiers suggest that they joined the FNLA in 
order to fight the unjust MPLA, that they blame the MPLA for the outbreak of the civil war 
due to the latter  having derailed the peace process, and that the MPLA is responsible for them 
having fled to then South West Africa and having joined 32 Battalion, in order to fight the 
MPLA-communist imperialism that prevented them from returning home. So too, the MPLA 
was to blame for the fact that they found themselves living in South Africa, unable to return 
home due to the MPLA’s continued rule over Angola. As such, the veterans’ hardship, 
uncertainty and anguish over the years is blamed directly on the MPLA, while, in contrast, the 
FNLA is seen as having provided, and continues to provide, the hope and possibility for a 
potential end to their hardships, and a return to their pre-war civilian lives. As Passerini notes, 
“Foiled in their hopes of making history and creating an ideal future, these [individuals] seized 
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on a common imaginary world […]”.363 As such, myth has become an integral part of how 
these veterans have attempted to make sense of their present.  
 
The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting 
It is clear that the myth of an unblemished FNLA has taken shape within a public-private binary 
of remembering and forgetting. The present ANC and MPLA regimes have sought to forget 
and exclude both the FNLA and 32 Battalion from the official master narratives of post-war 
Angola and post-Apartheid South Africa. In light of the latter, the myth of an unblemished 
FNLA, which equally seeks to forget and deny the failures of the FNLA, can be seen as an 
attempt to challenge the public forgetting of the state. Moreover, as products of an unpopular 
war, they also have no positive public memorial that they are able to draw from, other than 
their own localised FNLA-32 Battalion veteran networks. The 32 Battalion Tree of Honour, a 
tree trunk that bears all the names of 32 Battalion members who were killed in action, now 
stands at the SADF memorial at the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria. Not only is the Tree 
of Honour far removed from Pomfret and not easily accessible to many Pomfret veterans, the 
SADF memorial is also a private initiative, and according to the Voortrekker Monument 
website, the SANDF has in the past declined to participate in commemorative events.364 This 
again reveals the tensions between public and private memory and commemoration, 
particularly regarding the South African Border War. Daily Maverick journalist De Wet 
Potgieter notes that 32 Battalion, along with equally controversial 31 Battalion and Koevoet,365 
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have become unpopular relics of the South African border war: “They are living in a country 
hostile to them for their [past] choices […], for siding with the ‘Boers’. [They] […] have today 
drifted into obscurity.”366 Thus, the public FNLA myth promoted and sustained by the Pomfret 
veterans provides a space for them to engage with their private memories and gain public 
recognition, having been denied this recognition by the MPLA and ANC. Citing Hannah 
Arendt, Michael Jackson notes that: “[…] the public realm is a space […] where individual 
experiences are selectively refashioned in ways that make them real and recognisable in the 
eyes of others”, while in contrast, “[…] privacy suggests confinement to ‘the subjectivity of 
[one’s] own singular experience’.” 367 
 
In this sense, the public and private are inextricably linked, but it must also be realised that this 
relationship is by no means static. Rather, the FNLA myth has been constantly adjusted and 
reworked over time in relation to changing contexts. Hence, Jackson states that “[…] 
storytelling is never simply a matter of creating either personal or social meanings, but an 
aspect of the ‘subjective-in-between’ in which a multiplicity of private and public interests are 
always problematically in play.”368 It is important to note that the social potency that the 
veterans are able to derive from this myth enable them to bridge this public-private binary. 
Significantly, however, this social potency, like the relationship between the public and private, 
ebbs and flows and fluctuates on a continuous basis. As such, one must realise that this social 
potency cannot be constituted in isolation, but is rather a product of the relationship between 
the public and private. Additionally, in light of this fluidity and instability over time, the public 
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myth of the FNLA promoted by the veterans of Pomfret provides them with a degree of fixity 
and a sense of security.  
 
It is through the relationship of public and private myth and memory that the connection 
between oral history and broader historical processes becomes clearer. The myths and 
memories of the FNLA veterans presented here are a product of their experiences during the 
Angolan war for independence and civil war, as well as the South African border war and their 
experiences of displacement, relocation and the attempts to forcibly remove them from 
Pomfret.  It is through these processes of remembering that mythology acts as a toolbox of 
ideas, enabling one to reimagine and appropriate myths in order to negotiate fluid and changing 
contexts over time. According to Jackson, “In making and telling stories we rework reality in 
order to make it bearable. […] for what matters is that stories enable us to regain some purchase 
over the events that confound us, humble us, and leave us helpless, salvaging a sense that we 
have some say in the way our lives unfold. In telling a story we renew our faith that the world 
is within our grasp.”369 
 
Not only does the process of mythmaking enable the FNLA veterans of Pomfret to claim a 
public space for themselves that they have been denied by others, it also enables them to 
strengthen and maintain their network/s of “comrades” that they can draw on for support. Being 
able to build relationships based on their common FNLA past, and investing in a common 
FNLA myth, allows the veterans to draw on each other for support in the face of the constant 
changes and uncertainty that they face in their daily lives.  
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Conclusion 
By drawing on concepts such as memory and myth, the interview extracts have shown that 
one’s sense of self, place and belonging is influenced not only by one’s past but also by one’s 
present, as well as one’s sense of future. As such, “consciously and unconsciously, identities 
allow people to deploy strategies for dealing with the conflicted demands of daily life.”370 Thus, 
in answering the question how and why the myth and memory of an unblemished FNLA was 
produced and sustained by the FNLA veterans of Pomfret, it could be argued that the veterans 
have created this myth in order to provide a mechanism with which to negotiate the 
contradictions and tensions between the ruptures of the past, as well as the uncertainties of the 
present and future. As such, it is important to note how myths do not only apply to individual 
memory but collective memory as well, with this being particularly relevant in the case of the 
relationship between the politics of public and private remembering and forgetting. As Samuel 
and Thompson remind us, “[…] myth [is] embedded in real experience: both growing from it, 
and helping to shape its perception.”371 This is of particular interest considering the veteran’s 
current context, with many arguing that they have been betrayed, abandoned and forgotten. In 
this sense, the notion of a collective myth that seeks to counter the public forgetting of the 
MPLA and ANC governments is even more significant. Samuel and Thompson explain this in 
the following way: “[…] for minorities, for the less powerful, and most of all for the excluded, 
collective memory and myth are often still more salient: constantly resorted to both in 
reinforcing a sense of self and also a source of strategies for survival. In this context, it is often 
persecution and common grievance which define belonging.”372 
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It has been noted how during their youth, some of the veterans may have seen their elders as 
impotent, having become accomplices in buttressing the status quo of colonial Portugal due to 
their inaction. In this sense, those who joined the FNLA against the wishes of their parents and 
communities can be seen as having challenged this complicity and impotence. In fact, 
Portuguese colonial policies such as forced labour, native tax, and the denial of citizenship 
status, were intended to keep Africans in positions of subservience vis-á-vis their Portuguese 
‘masters’. Having joined the struggle against colonialism can, therefore, be seen as an attempt 
to achieve a sense of masculinity, social potency and purpose. 
 
According to Nagel, war offers “the allure of adventure, the promise of masculine camaraderie, 
the opportunity to test and prove oneself, the chance to participate in a historic, larger-than-
life, generation-defining event. Given this stick and these carrots, for many men the attraction 
of war becomes as irresistible.”373 Nagel goes on to note how war provides a powerful sense 
of group membership, whereby a shared set of symbols comes to define and constitute the 
individual.374 In this sense, the veterans came to see themselves as belonging to an FNLA 
family, which provided them with a sense of self. This is particularly relevant as the veterans’ 
stories can be seen as products of wider historical and geopolitical processes. 
 
Taking the above into consideration, it is important to note, as Cathrine Brun explains, that 
senses of place and belonging are not static, but are continuously negotiated and renegotiated, 
and constructed and reconstructed.375 Oral history methods are invaluable tools that can be used 
to analyse and interpret a person’s sense of self, place and belonging, to reveal clues as to how 
                                                          
373 Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism”, p. 259. 
374 Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism”, p. 260. 
375 Brun, “Reterritorializing the Relationship between People and Place in Refugee Studies”, p. 18. 
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interviewees construct memory and myth over space and time. As Sean Field argues, “People 
do not face the present as an isolated and empty space, sandwiched between the past and future. 
Rather, “the present” is “[…] a complex series of interlocking histories whose interactions have 
to be re-constructed […].”376 So too, Samuel and Thompson explain that historians need to 
“[…] consider myth and memory, not only as special clues to the present, but equally as 
windows on the making and remaking of individual and collective consciousness, in which 
both fact and fantasy, past and present, each has its part.”377 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
376 Field, Oral History, Community, and Displacement, p. 53. 
377 Samuel and Thompson, The Myths We Live By, p. 21. 
154 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have explored two divergent FNLA narratives. On the one hand, official FNLA 
documents and secondary scholarly literature revealed that from its inception in 1962, the 
FNLA found itself grappling with serious internal cleavages that eroded its legitimacy and 
effectiveness as a national liberation movement over time, to the extent that it finally collapsed 
in 1978. I have argued that the movement’s leader, Holden Roberto, had been preoccupied with 
keeping himself in power while enriching himself and his inner circle. His dictatorial and 
repressive leadership alienated many of the movement’s leaders as well as potential supporters. 
On the other hand, I argued that former FNLA fighters I have interviewed for this thesis 
continue to idolise and romanticise the FNLA and Roberto, referring to Roberto and the FNLA 
as being the “father of the revolution for freedom”, and having fought for the liberation of all 
Angolans. More so, respondents highlighted the FNLA’s and Roberto’s virtuous qualities vis-
á-vis the current MPLA regime, which has been labelled as being corrupt and oppressive, and 
as having sabotaged the FNLA’s attempt at bringing peace and prosperity to Angola. The 
central question that I therefore posed at the beginning of this thesis was the following:  How 
and why was the myth and memory of an unblemished FNLA produced and sustained by the 
FNLA veterans of Pomfret? 
 
In addressing this question, I have focused on the respondents, their individual experiences, 
and how they have come to grapple with these. I have argued that the respondents have 
experienced several stages of dislocation and processes of displacement: having experienced 
internal displacement during the Angolan war for independence; having fled to refugee camps 
after their military defeat in 1975; having been relocated to South Africa from Namibia in 1989; 
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while further having been subjected to forced removal attempts in 2008. I have argued that the 
veterans live a life in limbo, with the prospect of losing their current homes being ever present.  
 
From the interviews, it is clear that feelings of despair, and unresolved loss and fear, have come 
to dominate their every-day lives. It is within this context that I have contended that their 
romanticisation of the FNLA has taken shape, and I explored this by making use of notions of 
militarised masculinity, as well as gendered loss and dislocation. Related to this is the question 
of choice, and understanding how respondents have wrestled with the issue of limited and 
constrained choices throughout their lives. Furthermore, I have drawn on notions of power 
throughout this thesis, relating not only to the power relations in my fieldwork and my 
subsequent interpretations and analysis, but particularly how respondents have struggled with 
a sense of lost social potency, how they have attempted to cling to fragments of power which 
are subject to constant fluctuation over time, as well as the power relations between public and 
private remembering and forgetting. Thus, the idolisation and romanticisation of their FNLA 
past, aides the respondents to cling to fragments of power and social potency in the present, in 
an environment where this social potency and their power over their own lives is being 
challenged and eroded on a continuous basis.  
 
As such, the myth of an unblemished FNLA allows the veterans to negotiate the tensions and 
contradictions that exist between their past and present. This extends to the relationship 
between public and private remembering and forgetting, and I have argued that the myth of an 
unblemished FNLA constructed by the Pomfret veterans can be seen as a response to counter 
the MPLA and ANC governments’ master narratives which actively exclude the FNLA and 32 
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Battalion. From this, it is clear that the veterans have constructed and reconstructed their stories 
over space and time, in order to adjust to varying pressures and situations.  
 
Given the above, it is my opinion that the veterans’ stories are inextricably linked to and shaped 
by wider historical and geopolitical processes. Oral history, therefore, provides opportunities 
to explore the experiences of respondents, and how they attempt to make sense of these. I have 
posited that concepts such as myth, memory, as well as senses of self and place, are valuable 
tools that help us to interpret life stories, particularly, how respondents choose to narrate these, 
and how this may change over space and time. However, I must also add that the respondents 
that I have interviewed form quite a small group within the Pomfret community, and more so 
within the FNLA community. In my opinion, this does not detract from the conclusions that 
have been arrived at here, as these conclusions are centred on the individual respondents and 
their distinct experiences within the FNLA and Pomfret. On the other hand, this does prevent 
me from arriving at broader conclusions about the experiences of the Pomfret community as a 
whole, as well as the experiences of other FNLA fighters. 
 
Consequently, there remain many more possibilities to conduct research in Pomfret, given the 
community’s distinctive and interesting history. This extends to the experiences of the former 
32 Battalion soldiers, but also to their wives and children. Although a few books have been 
written about 32 Battalion by the former white officers of the unit, none of these explore the 
collective and individual experiences of the Angolan veterans and their families in much detail. 
Hence, there are many more stories that remain untold.  
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As noted in the introduction, the story of the FNLA has in many instances been sidelined by 
the dominant histories of the MPLA and UNITA, with many scholars who have dealt with the 
Angolan war for independence and civil war merely mentioning the FNLA in passing. This is 
not aided by the MPLA regime’s exercise of a monopoly over the history of the independence 
and civil wars, with the MPLA seemingly intent on creating and controlling a master narrative 
in which it plays the dominant role. Subsequently, much remains to be done to explore to what 
extent factors such as ideology, identity, ethnicity and regionalism have influenced the FNLA’s 
political, social and military behaviour during Angola’s independence and civil wars.  
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